The impact of the World Trade Organisation on the formulation of the antimonopoly law of the People's Republic of China by Zhou, Zhaofeng
 
 
 
 
The Impact of the World Trade 
Organisation on the Formulation 
of the Antimonopoly Law of the 
People’s Republic of China 
 
Zhaofeng Zhou (周照峰) 
 
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
School of Law 
Faculty of Law, Business and Social Science 
University of Glasgow 
 
© Zhaofeng Zhou              19th November 2007 
2 
Abstract 
 
China became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 
2001. This historical event has impact on both China and the WTO. As an 
observer noted, ‘The WTO will change China, but China will also change the 
WTO’.1 This thesis is an example how the WTO will change China. It examines 
the WTO’s impact on the formulation of China’s first comprehensive competition 
law, the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007). The formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has 
generated unprecedented interest within and outside China due to the sheer size 
of the Chinese economy and trade.  
Despite this significance, there is a lack of studies on the WTO’s impact on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Against this background, this study 
examines whether, and if so, how the WTO could have had impact on its 
formulation, and to what extent the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
has reflected such impacts. To this end, it focuses on four aspects: 
a. consistency: the content of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 needs to be 
consistent with the WTO rules; 
b. obligation: the enactment of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 could 
help China implement its WTO commitments; 
c. enabling: WTO rules could have enhanced the case for China 
seeking to combat anticompetitive practices through the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007; and 
d. peer pressure: the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 could 
have been influenced by the peer review system—the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism.  
These four aspects are examined in Chapter Three, Chapter Four, Chapter Five 
and Chapter Six respectively. These four chapters constitute the main part of 
this thesis. 
 
 
                                         
1
 Observation made by C. Christopher Parlin at the Georgetown University Law Center Course on 
WTO Law and Policy for MOFTEC Officials, 19-30 June 2000. 
3 
This thesis concludes by noting that (1) the WTO could have had impact on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; (2) such impact could have been 
reflected through four aspects; (3) the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 has been influenced by the WTO. 
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Introduction1 
1 Purpose 
This study aims to examine the impact of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007).2 
Competition law aims to prevent or remedy anticompetitive practices and 
protect competition.3 One of the first two pieces of competition legislation in 
the modern era4 is the American Sherman Act which was enacted in 1890.5 The 
American Supreme Court claimed: ‘The Sherman Act was designed to be a 
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and 
unfettered competition as the rule of trade’.6 Since World War II, most of the 
world’s developed countries, particularly all members of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and many developing and 
                                         
1
 In this study, the titles of the Chinese articles, journals, newspapers, and books cited are 
translated into English along with their original Chinese ones and Pinyin, and quotes from these, 
are unofficially translated into English. So are the Chinese publishers. Not all pieces of the 
Chinese legislation mentioned in this study have official translations. In the case where there is 
no official translation, the translation is provided by the author. All Chinese names mentioned in 
this study are given in the Western order, the family name being last and first name being first. 
All websites quoted in this study were last visited on the 1st September 2007. 
2
 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
3
 The objectives of competition law vary in different countries during different times as well. See, D. 
Valentine, ‘US Competition Policy and Law: Learning from a Century of Antitrust Enforcement’, 
in Y.-C. Chao, G. San, C. Lo and J. Ho, eds., International and Comparative Competition Law 
and Policies, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, (2001), 71, p. 72. 
4
 H. Harris argued that competition laws existed in many countries in ancient times. See, H. Harris, 
ed., ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Competition Laws Outside of the United States, (2001), pp. 
6-7. 
5
 Canada has the oldest competition law in modern terms, which was adopted in 1889. 
6
 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4, 78 S. Ct. 514, 517, 2 L. d. 2d 545, 
549 (1958). 
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transitional economies have enacted laws of one sort or another to control 
anticompetitive practices. In addition to these national competition laws, the 
European Union (EU) has its own competition rules effective in its twenty seven 
Member States.7 
 
China’s significance in the world economy and trade grows dramatically each 
year. So does the importance of its competition-related legislation. Before the 
adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, China had several pieces of legislation 
dealing with some types of anticompetitive practices. These competition-related 
provisions were scattered in several laws, regulations and sector rules at 
national level. 
 
China started to draft its first comprehensive competition law, the Antimonopoly 
Law, in the late 1980s.  After nearly 20 years of formulation, the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 was adopted by the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s 
Congress (NPC) on the 30th August 2007. Once it comes into force on the 1st 
August 2008, it will unite all the current competition-related legislation in China 
into one place and bring some coherence to the Chinese competition regime. It 
will provide a systematic legal basis for combating anticompetitive practices. 
The increasingly significant role played by China in the global economy and trade 
means that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will inevitably have international reach. 
As one journalist claimed, adopting an antimonopoly law in China is ‘another 
sign that China is reshaping the way that global business works, this time as a 
regulator’.8 Due to the significance of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the process 
of formulating it has attracted unprecedented interest from academics, 
multinational companies, organisations, and other governments. 
 
The WTO was founded on the 1st January 1995 by the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter the Marrakesh 
Agreement).9 It is the inheritance and development of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed by 23 nations on the 30th October 1947. It is ‘the 
                                         
7
 The EC consisted originally of six member states, and has grown through accession to the 
present level. Further states are in various stages of negotiations towards accession. 
8
 F. Kempe, ‘China the Antitrust Power’, Wall Street Journal, 3rd November 2005. 
9
 The Marrakesh Agreement is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
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only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between 
nations’.10 It is considered ‘the most ambitious and far-reaching international 
trade agreement ever concluded’.11 Currently, there are 150 members in the 
WTO.12 Due to the significant role played by the WTO in international trade, 
China joined the WTO on the 11th December 2001, after fifteen years of 
negotiations.13 
 
One of the most important characteristics of the WTO is that it is a rule-oriented 
organisation. Under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter the Dispute Settlement Understanding), an 
affected WTO Member has a right to appeal to the Dispute Settlement Body 
against other WTO Members who fail to implement their commitments.14 Based 
on the ruling of a Panel or the Appellate Body, the Dispute Settlement Body can 
authorize the affected WTO Member to retaliate against the offending WTO 
Members. Thus, the WTO principles and rules are legally enforceable and binding 
through the dispute settlement system.15 Therefore, WTO Members must take 
into account the WTO principles and rules while making their trade-related 
policies.16 Bing Zhang argued: 
Clearly, in the setting of the WTO, international law is intermingling and 
penetrating into the Members’ domestic formal institutions and playing a 
                                         
10
 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm. 
11
 P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and 
Materials, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005), p. 45. 
12
 All members are listed at the WTO website. 
13
 For more details of the history of China’s accession to the WTO, see Chapter One. 
14
 The text of the Dispute Settlement Understanding is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm. 
15
 P. Sauve, ‘Assessing the General Agreement on Trade on Services’, Journal of World Trade, vol. 
29(4), 125, p. 141. 
16
 A concern of national sovereignty arises. C. Oman argued that a diminished national policy 
sovereignty was one of the results of globalization. See, C. Oman, Globalization and 
Regionalisation: the Challenge for Developing Countries, Paris: Development Center, OECD, 
(1994), pp. 33-34. Also see the discussion presented by G. Winham, ‘The World Trade 
Organization: Institution-building in the Multilateral Trade System’, The World Economy, vol. 
21(3), (1998), 349. 
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much more important role in national policy-making processes than 
before.17 
There are at least four aspects where the WTO could have impact on the 
development of its Members’ domestic legislation:  
(ii) consistency: WTO Members’ domestic legislation needs to be 
consistent with WTO rules; 
(iii) obligation: the adoption of domestic legislation could help WTO 
Members implement their WTO commitments; 
(iv) enabling: the WTO rules could enhance the case for WTO Members 
seeking to act in the way permitted by the WTO; and 
(v) peer pressure: the WTO peer review system, the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM), could contribute to the development of WTO 
Members’ domestic legislation. 
As a WTO Member, China is no exception. In other words, the WTO could, in 
theory, influence China’s domestic legislation, particularly trade-related 
legislation. Based on this assumption, this study aims to explore the WTO’s 
impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. To this end, the key 
research questions examined in this study are: 
(1) whether the WTO could have had an influence on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007; 
(2) if so, how the WTO could have had an influence on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007; and 
(3) to what extent the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has 
reflected the WTO’s influences. 
These three questions are clearly linked. The answer to the second question 
depends on the answer to the first question, while the answer to the third 
question is based on the answer to the second question.  
 
 
 
 
                                         
17
 B. Zhang, ‘Assessing the WTO Agreements on China’s Telecommunications Regulatory Reform 
and Industrial Liberalization’, (2000), p. 4, http://www.tprc.org/abstracts00/assesswtopap.pdf. 
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2 Structure and Scope 
2.1 Structure 
This study is structured in six chapters plus an introduction and a conclusion. 
Chapter One and Chapter Two aim to provide the necessary background and 
foundation on which this study is based. To this end, Chapter One examines some 
general issues surrounding the WTO, national competition law and China, such as 
the evolution of competition-related provisions under the GATT/WTO system, 
whether China’s WTO commitments are binding on China and, if so, how China 
implements such commitments. Chapter Two examines the history and the status 
of competition-related legislation in China before the adoption of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, and the reasons and the history of adopting the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Chapter Three to Six constitute the main part of this thesis. Together they 
explore whether, and if so, how the WTO could have had an influence on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, and to what extent the formulation 
of this Law has reflected such influences. To this end, Chapter Three examines 
the influence of the WTO national treatment principle. Chapter Four examines 
the influence of Articles VIII and IX of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), and Section 1.1 of the Telecommunications Reference Paper on 
Regulatory Principles of the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (the 
Reference Paper). Chapter Five examines the influence of Articles 8.2, 40 and 
31(k) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Chapter Six examines the influence of the TPRM. 
 
Finally, this thesis concludes that (1) the WTO could be seen to have had impact 
on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; (2) the WTO could have had 
such impact through the WTO national treatment principles, Articles VIII, IX of 
the GATS, Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the 
TRIPS, and the TPRM; (3) such impact can be illustrated by examining the 
changes made to some provisions in the drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
during the process of formulating the law. 
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2.2 Scope 
2.2.1 Competition-Related WT Rules 
In more than a half-century of evolution, the GATT/WTO regime includes 
numerous treaties. 18  Although it is approximately fifteen pages long, the 
Marrakesh Agreement embraces four annexes which include altogether about 
16,000 pages of text, schedule commitments, and other matters. Competition-
related WTO principles and rules are scattered in these annexes without being 
integrated into a coherent body of competition rules. It is not possible for this 
study to examine all these principles and rules due to the limitation of space and 
time. Rather, it focuses on the WTO national treatment principle, Articles VIII, 
IX of the GATS, Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, Articles 82, 40 and 31(k) of 
the TRIPS and the TPRM since they are the most relevant to a national 
competition law. 
 
2.2.2 Competition Law 
In general, competition law can be divided broadly into three areas of focus: 
restrictive agreements, abuses of dominance, and anticompetitive acquisitions 
and mergers. 19  However, anticompetitive acquisitions and mergers are not 
                                         
18
 The results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is usually referred to as the 
WTO Agreements which comprises a large number of agreements of which the GATT is an 
integral part, referred to as GATT 1994. For explanations of the WTO Agreements, see J. 
Jackson, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1999); the WTO Secretariat, Guide to 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, (1999) (As the official WTO explanation of the Uruguay Round 
treaties, this guide provides a detailed explanation of the legal significance of the agreements 
coming out the Uruguay Round of negotiations). In addition, R. Bhala provided a clear and 
thorough explanation of the GATT provisions, see, R. Bhala, Modern GATT Law, London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, (2005). 
19
 This category has been used by many academics as a framework of competition law analysis. 
See, e.g., A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2007). 
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directly covered by the current WTO agreements.20 As Frédéric Jenny pointed 
out: 
[W]hen trade policy makers address the issue of competition, they are 
less interested in international mergers because such mergers rarely 
create an international trade problem. They tend to focus more on 
international cartels because such cartels nearly always create a trade 
and competition problem.21  
Mitsuo Matsushita also observed: 
Mergers and acquisitions in the scope of the WTO should be put off for 
future consideration until such time comes when national markets will 
have been so globalised that they are integrated into one world market 
and the distinction between domestic policy and international trade 
policy will have been blurred so much that convergence of merger policy 
is essential to maintain the integrated world market… [I]tems such as the 
convergence of filing requirement in mergers and acquisitions is a very 
important issue. This should be dealt with in the appropriate forum. 
However, taking into account the objective of the WTO, one may say that 
this is outside its scope.22 
Even the failed proposals which aimed to include a competition agreement 
within the WTO framework did not include the issue of cross-border acquisitions 
and mergers.23 Therefore, this study only focuses on anticompetitive agreements 
                                         
20
 Despite the fact that the rules on investment could be relevant to anticompetitive mergers and 
acquisitions, there is no agreement on investment under the current WTO framework (though 
some current WTO Agreements mention investment issues). 
21
 F. Jenny, ‘Competition, Trade and Development Before and After Cancun’, in B. Hawk, ed., 
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2003, New York: Juris Publishing 
Inc., (2004), 631, p. 641. 
22
 M. Matsushita, ‘Reflections on Competition Policy/Law in the Framework of the WTO’, in B. 
Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 1997, New York: Juris 
Publishing, (1998), 31, pp. 34-38. 
23
 However, some scholars do propose a uniform pre-merger review system within the WTO. For 
example, Eleanor M. Fox proposed a uniform international competition law for pre-merger 
review within the WTO as a supranational enforcement agency. See, E. Fox, ‘Toward World 
Antitrust and Market Access’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 91, (1997), 13. Andre 
Fiebig recommended an international pre-merger review within the WTO as a super-
clearinghouse with authority to dictate which national competition regimes have sufficient nexus 
to a particular transaction so as to justify pre-merger notification filings. See, A. Fiebig, ‘A Role 
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and abuses of dominance. In other words, the Chinese legislation on merger 
control is not examined in this thesis. 
 
3 Literature Review 
There are three research areas that are relevant to this study: the WTO rules 
which are relevant to competition issues, the WTO’s impact on China, and the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. What follows is a brief review of all 
three areas. 
 
3.1 Literature Review of Studies on Existing Competition-
Related WTO Rules 
The WTO set up the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy (WGTCP) during the Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996.24 
Over more than seven years, the WGTCP provided several reports on such 
issues.25 During the same period, many WTO Members, particularly the US and 
the EU also contributed to this debate. Indeed, they made about 250 study 
reports on such issues.26  In addition, there are also rich literatures on these 
competition-related WTO rules in particular, and competition issues within the 
WTO in general carried out by organisations and academics.27 In particular, the 
                                                                                                                           
for the WTO in International Merger Control’, Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business, vol. 20, (2000), 233, pp. 247-251. 
24
 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, (1996), para. 20, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm. 
25
 WGTCP, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy Annual 
Reports for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, WT/WGTCP/1, WT/WGTCP/2, 
WT/WGTCP/3, WT/WGTCP/4, WT/WGTCP/5, WT/WGTCP/6, and WT/WGTCP/7, respectively. 
26
 All these contributions are documented as WT/WGTCP/W/* in the WTO and available at 
www.wto.org. 
27
 See, e.g., OECD, Competition Elements in International Instruments, Background Document for 
a Joint Roundtable of the Trade and Competition Law and Policy Committees held on 15 April 
1994, Paris: OECD, COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(94)35, (1994); OECD, The Note of Discussions held 
at the Joint Roundtable of the Trade and Competition Law and Policy Committees held on 15 
April 1994, Paris: OECD, COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(94)76, (1994); E.-U. Petersmann, Competition 
Policy Aspects of the Uruguay Round: Achievements and Prospects, Paris: OECD, (1994); B. 
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paper titled ‘Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post-
Uruguay Round Overview of WTO Agreements’ gave an excellent analysis of the 
competition elements of the existing WTO agreements.28 James H. Mathis and 
Misuo Matsushita reviewed the relevance and possible application of the WTO 
core principles to closer multilateral cooperation on competition.29 Furthermore, 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring explored the extent to which the 
existing WTO dispute settlement system would be suitable in resolving 
competition related cases.30 There are also extensive studies on the interaction 
between WTO principles and competition policy.31 
                                                                                                                           
Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, ‘Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT’, The World 
Economy, vol. 17, (1994), 121; E. Fox, ‘Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging 
the Links of Competition and Trade’, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, vol. 4(2), (1995), 1; E.-U. 
Petersmann, ‘International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private Business’, 
Journal of World Trade, vol. 30(3), (1996), 5; B. Hoekman, Trade and Competition Policy in the 
WTO System, Discussion Paper 1501, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, (1996), 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/1501.html;  M. Matsushita, (1998), note 22, 31; OECD, 
Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post-Uruguay Round Overview of 
WTO Agreement, Paris: OECD, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, (1998); OECD, 
‘Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements’, in OECD, Trade and Competition: 
Policies for Tomorrow, Paris: OECD, (1999); P. Marsden, A Competition Policy for the WTO, 
Oxford: Cameron May, (2003); M. Matsushita, ‘Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of 
Competition Policy’, Washington University Global Study and Law Review, vol. 3, (2004), 363; 
and A. Bhattacharjea, ‘The Case for A Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A 
Developing Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 9, (2006), 293, 
pp. 295- 299. 
28
 OECD, (1998), note 27. 
29 See, J. Mathis, ‘WTO Core Principles and Prohibition: Obligations Relating to Private Practices, 
National Competition Laws and Implications for A Competition Policy Framework’, Geneva and 
New York: the United Nations, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2003/2, (2003); also see, M. Matsushita, 
(2004), note 27, 363. 
30
 C.-D. Ehlermann and L. Ehring, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the 
Perspective of the Appellate Body’s Experience’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 26, 
(2002), 1505. 
31
 See, e.g., WGTCP, Communication from the European Community and its Member States, 
WT/WGTCP/W/115, (1999); WGTCP, Communication from Switzerland, WT/WGTCP/W/117, 
(1999); WGTCP, Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/119, (1999); WGTCP, 
Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/120, (1999); WGTCP, Communication from the 
United States, WT/WGTCP/W/131, (1999); and E.-U. Petersmann, ‘WTO Core Principles and 
Trade/Competition’, in B. Hawk, (2004), note 21, 669. 
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To date, these studies focus on two issues broadly: (1) whether the existing 
competition-related WTO provisions are sufficient to deal with trade-related 
anticompetitive practices; and (2) if not, how to regulate trade-related 
anticompetitive practices at the international level. However, no studies have 
explored the impact of the WTO principles and rules on WTO Members’ domestic 
competition laws. 
 
3.2 Literature Review of Studies on the WTO’s Impact on 
China 
China’s accession to the WTO is a milestone in the process of its economic reform. As Karen 
Halverson argued, ‘Perhaps in no other country has WTO accession had such a 
profound impact on economic, legal, and political change as in China’.32 Thus, 
the impact of China’s WTO membership on its economic, legal and political 
system obviously has become an important research topic in recent years. There 
are thousands of articles in regard to the WTO’s impact on China published in 
China’s academic journals. 33  There are also many articles published in the 
academic journals outside of China. For example, Karen Halverson provided a 
comprehensive analysis of the unparalleled influence of the WTO on China’s 
economic, legal, and political system. 34 In addition, there are also numerous 
books examining the WTO’s impact on China. For example, China and the World 
Trading System - Entering the New Millennium, analysed the key issues relating 
to the impact of China’s WTO membership.35 Ching Cheong and Ching Hung Yee 
examined, from the economic aspect, China’s WTO commitments and the WTO’s 
                                         
32
 K. Halverson, ‘China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications’, Boston 
College International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 27, (2004), 319, p. 322. 
33
 According to D. Liu’s research, over 2,300 articles regarding the WTO impact on China had been 
published in China’s academic journals by 2002. See, D. Liu, WTO and State Sovereignty 
[WTO与国家主权, WTO yu Guojia Zhuquan], Beijing: People’s Publisher [人民出版社, Renmin 
Chubanshe], (2003). 
34
 See, K. Halverson, (2004), note 32, 319. 
35
 D. Cass, B. Williams and G. Barker, eds., China and the World Trading System: Entering the 
New Millennium, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2003). 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Introduction, 28 
impact on China.36 Supachai Panitchpakdi and Mark L. Clifford examined both the 
WTO’s impact on China and China’s impact on the WTO.37 The unprecedented 
amount of studies regarding the WTO’s influences on China demonstrates the 
significant impact of China’s WTO membership on the development of China’s 
economic, cultural and legal system. 
 
3.3 Literature Review of Studies on the Formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
China is the second-largest economy in the world after the US measured on a 
purchasing power parity basis and the third biggest trading power after the EU 
and the US.38 It attracts more foreign capital than any other developing country. 
Chinese companies have also increased their activities in overseas markets. Due 
to these facts, the formulation of China’s first comprehensive competition law 
has generated unprecedented analysis from academics, companies, professional 
associations, foreign governments, governmental organisations, and non-
governmental organisations. As H. Stephen Harris pointed out, ‘Though many 
jurisdictions have adopted competition laws in recent decades, none of these 
laws has engendered the level of interest sparked by China’s proposed Anti-
Monopoly Law’. 39  China’s Antimonopoly Law is ‘the most hotly-debated and 
closely-followed legislation’ in China. 40  Its drafts have generated numerous 
comments both inside and outside of China. Hundreds of articles in regard to the 
drafts and the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 have been published in 
China’s academic journals. And the number of such articles has been increasing 
rapidly in recent years. Most of these articles are comparative studies. In 
                                         
36
 C. Ching and H.-Y. Ching, Handbook on China’s WTO Accession and Its Impacts, London: 
World Scientific, (2003). 
37
 S. Panitchpakdi and M. Clifford, China and the WTO: Changing China, Changing World Trade, 
New York: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., (2002). 
38
 The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ. 
39
 H. Harris, ‘The Making of An Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s 
Republic of China’, Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 7, (2006), 169, p. 169. 
40
 Y. Jung and Q. Hao, ‘The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third Way for Competition 
Regime?’, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, vol. 24, (2003), 107, p. 109. 
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general, they introduce other competition regimes and analyze how an 
antimonopoly law could be drafted in China based on the experience of these 
competition regimes. 
 
There are also dozens of articles in this area published in the academic journals 
outside of China. 41  In particular, the International Bar Association and the 
American Bar Association have provided article-by-article comments and 
recommendations on several drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law.42 Youngjin Jung 
                                         
41
 See, e.g., B. Song, ‘Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: The Case of China’, Stanford 
Journal of International Law, vol. 31, (1995), 387; S. Snell, ‘The Development of Competition 
Policy in the People’s Republic of China’, New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics, vol. 28, (1995), 575; M. Williams, ‘Competition Law Developments in China’, Journal of 
Business Law, May 2001, 273; X. Wang, ‘The Prospect of Antimonopoly Legislation in China’, 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 1, (2002), 201; Y. Jung and Q. Hao, 
(2003), note 40, 107; X. Wang, ‘Issues Surrounding the Drafting of China’s Antimonopoly Law’, 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 3, (2004), 285; L. Chen, ‘The Current 
State and Problems of Antimonopoly Legislation in the People’s Republic of China’, Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 3, (2004), 307; B. Owen, S. Sun, and W. Zheng, 
‘Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibility’, Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics, vol. 1(1), (2005), 123; M. Williams, Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005);  M. Furse, ‘Competition 
Law Choice in China’, World Competition, vol. 30(2), (2007), 323.  
42
 See, e.g., the International Bar Association’s Antitrust Committee, Comments on the Draft Anti-
Monopoly Law of The People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Draft of 27 July 2005), 23rd August 
2005, http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/IBA%20Submission.pdf; the American Bar 
Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law, Joint Submission of the American 
Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice on the Proposed 
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, July 2003, 
www.abanet.org/antitrust/comments/2003/jointsubmission.pdf; the American Bar Association’s 
Sections of Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property Law and International Law, Joint Submission of 
the American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law, intellectual Property Law and 
International Law on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, 19th 
May 2005, 
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/antitrust/chinacommentsantimono
poly.pdf; American Bar Association, Proposed Revisions to Selected Articles of The April 8, 
2005 Revised Draft of The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, In 
Supplementation of the Joint Submission of the American Bar Association’s Sections of 
Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property Law and International Law, On the Proposed Law, dated 
May 19, 2005, Submitted to Mr. Wu Zhengguo of MOFCOM, (2005), 
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/antitrust/jointcomments05supple
ment.pdf. 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Introduction, 30 
and Qian Hao published an excellent article based on two drafts of China’s 
Antimonopoly Law. 43  Their article analyzed the basic features of an 
antimonopoly law in China by comparing different competition regimes 
worldwide and their relevance to China’s idiosyncrasies in the forthcoming 
Antimonopoly Law. It also promoted a better understanding of China’s emerging 
competition regime by providing illustrative comments. In addition, it 
highlighted the far-reaching innovations in the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly 
Law which were prompted by the extraordinary challenges that China had to 
face. It concluded that an antimonopoly law in China could ‘incidentally provide 
“a third way” of framing competition law that provides a tremendous example 
particularly for developing countries in which legal and administrative 
monopolies are rampant’.44 An article by Kevin X. Li and Ming Du provided an 
analysis on the issue of whether China needed a competition law. 45 Through 
comparing EU and UK competition law, it argued that the existing competition-
related legislation in China was far from sufficient to combat anticompetitive 
practices because China’s economy had transferred from a centrally planned 
model to a free market model. Thus, it concluded that it was necessary for 
China to adopt a comprehensive competition law.  
 
3.4 Literature Review of Studies on the WTO’s Impact on 
the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Despite the existence of a wealth of material on issues of competition and the 
WTO, and the WTO’s impacts on China, there are very few studies touching upon 
the issue of the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
The lack of studies on this topic does not imply that it is not important. On the 
contrary, it is a very significant topic. Several conditions contribute to the lack 
of studies on this topic. First, both the WTO and competition legislation are new 
areas for both Chinese academics and the Chinese government. A decade ago, no 
Chinese universities taught competition law, while the teaching of WTO law was 
only at an early stage. Even now, it is still hard to find expertise in these two 
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 See, Y. Jung and Q. Hao, (2003), note 40, 107. 
44
 Id., 107, pp. 169-170. 
45
 K. Li and M. Du, ‘Does China Need Competition Law’, Journal of Business Law, March 2007, 
182. 
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areas, particularly in competition law. There are even fewer Chinese scholars 
who have expertise in both areas. Therefore, not many Chinese scholars are able 
to carry out the study on the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. In the case of foreign academics, some are not 
interested in this topic, while others are simply unable to pursue this topic due 
to language barriers46 and the interdisciplinary nature of this topic 
 
One of the few articles which touch on the issue of the WTO’s influences on the 
formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law is entitled ‘Entering WTO and the 
Legislation of China’s Antimonopoly Law’ by Professor Xiaoye Wang, who is a 
leading competition law expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and one of 
the designers of the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law.47 It argued that China 
urgently needed a competition law because the WTO would hasten the process 
of China’s economic reform. Thus, it focused on the economic aspect of the 
WTO’s impacts on the formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law. However, it did 
not provide a systematic study on the WTO’s impact on the formulation of 
China’s Antimonopoly Law, from a legal point of view.   
 
A second article is entitled ‘Legislate China Antimonopoly Law according to WTO 
Rules’ by Chaopeng Chen.48 It touched upon some legal issues in regard to the 
WTO’s impacts on the formulation of a Chinese antimonopoly law. First, it argued 
that the enactment of a competition law could be helpful for China to 
implement some of its WTO commitments. Second, it pointed out that China’s 
first competition law had to be consistent with WTO rules, such as the WTO non-
discrimination principle. However, it did not comprehensively examine the legal 
impacts of the WTO on the formulation of a Chinese antimonopoly law because it 
has about 3,700 Chinese characters.  
 
                                         
46
 Sometimes, translation of Chinese research papers and legislation is not reliable. 
47
 X. Wang, ‘Enter WTO and the Legislation of China’s Antimonopoly Law’ [入世与中国反垄断法的
制定, Rushi  Yu Zhongguo Fanlongduan Fa de Zhiding], Journal of Law [法学杂志, Faxue 
Zazhi], No. 2, (2003). 
48
 C. Chen, ‘Legislate China Antimonopoly Law according to WTO Rules’ [根据WTO规则制定中国
反垄断法, Genju WTO Guize Zhiding Zhongguo Fanlongdua Fa], China WTO Tribune [WTO 经
济导刊], vol. 22(2), (2005), 111. 
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Professor Xianlin Wang, who is arguably a leading scholar in this area in China, 
has published a book entitled WTO Competition Policy and China Antimonopoly 
Legislation. 49  This book is based on his previous paper ‘Two Issues on the 
Formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law against the Background of China’s 
Accession to the WTO’.50 It examined the effect of the WTO competition policy 
on China’s competition legislation. However, the links between the WTO and 
China’s Antimonopoly Law were poorly examined in this book. In fact, they were 
only occasionally mentioned. Moreover, there are few explanations as to why 
and how these links exist. Thus, it seems that this book examined two separate 
issues instead of one: the competition policy under the WTO and China’s 
Antimonopoly Law. 
 
To date, therefore, there are no comprehensive and thorough studies on the 
issues of whether, and if so, how the WTO could have influenced the formulation 
of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, and to what extent the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 has reflected such influences. The absence of literature 
in this area leaves a great deal of room for innovative work. Against this 
background, this study aims to fill the gap left by other scholars and examines 
these key questions.  
 
4 Research Methodology 
This study focuses on analysing both primary and secondary sources in regard to 
the impact of the WTO on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. In 
doing so, four different types of research methods—explanatory, descriptive, 
comparative and prescriptive analyses are used. In particular, comparative 
analysis is used widely in this thesis to explore the changes of different drafts of 
China’s Antimonopoly Law. Explanatory and descriptive analyses are used to 
                                         
49
 X. Wang, WTO Competition Policy and China Antimonopoly Legislation [WTO竞争政策与中国反
垄断立法, WTO Jingzheng Zhengce Yu Zhongguo Fanlongduan Lifa], Beijing: Peking University 
Press, (2005). 
50
 X. Wang, ‘Two Issues on the Formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law Against the Background 
of China’s Accession to the WTO’ [ “入世”背景下制定我国反垄断法的两个问题, Rushi Beijing Xia 
Zhiding Woguo Fanlongduan Fa de Liangge Wenti ], http://www.law-
star.com/pshowtxt?keywords=&dbn=lwk&fn=lwk017s202.txt&upd=1. 
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examine the WTO rules by which the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
has been influenced.  
 
The primary sources in this study mainly comprise of a number of pieces of 
Chinese competition-related legislation, the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law, 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the WTO agreements, cases, the annual reports of 
the Trade Policy Review Body, and the documents regarding China’s first trade 
policy review. It has to be accepted that some pieces of Chinese competition-
related legislation are not available in English. During the process of the 
formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law, numerous drafts were circulated and 
commented on. The drafts examined in this thesis are51: the 1999 Draft,52 the 
February 2002 Draft,53 the April 2002 Draft,54 the October 2002 Draft,55 the 2004 
Submitted Draft,56 the April 2005 Draft,57 the July 2005 Draft,58 the November 
2005 Draft,59 the June 2006 Draft,60 the June 2007 Draft,61 and the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007. Comparing other primary sources, these drafts and the Antimonopoly 
                                         
51
 More about these drafts, see Chapter Two. 
52
 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. An outline of this draft can be seen from M. 
Williams, (2005), note 41, pp. 177-191; and X. Wang, (2002), note 41, 201, pp. 224-225. 
53
 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. An English edition is on the author’s file. 
54
 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. There is a discussion article based on this draft, 
see, Y. Jung and Q. Hao, (2003), note 40, 107. 
55
 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. There is a discussion article based on this draft, 
see, Y. Jung and Q. Hao, (2003), note 40, 107. 
56
 An English edition is available at http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Questionnaire%20-
%20final.pdf. 
57
 An English edition is available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/China%20Antimonopoly%20Law%20April%208%2020
05%20Draft%20-%20English-v1.pdf. 
58
 An English edition is available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Draft%20of%2027%20July%202005.pdf. 
59
 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. An English edition of this draft is on the author’s 
file. For an overview of this draft, see H. Harris, (2006), note 39, 169. 
60
 An English edition is available at http://www.buyusa.gov/asianow/270.pdf. 
61
 This draft is not available to public. However, the differences between this draft and the June 
2006 Draft are highlighted on the NPC website. See, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/flzt/index.jsp?lmid=15&dm=1520&pdmc=ch. 
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Law 2007 are particularly significant in this thesis because analysing the changes 
in different drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is one of the major methods 
used to illustrate how and to what extent the WTO influenced the formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007. The WTO agreements are available in English at the 
WTO website. 
 
The cases used in this study are mainly from China, the EU, the GATT/WTO, the 
UK, and the US. It has to be borne in mind that cases are treated differently in 
these regimes. Cases are considered as sources of law in the UK and the US, 
while they are not considered as sources of law in China. In practice, Chinese 
judges do not cite previous cases in their judgements.  In the EU whose legal 
system has the characters of both civil law system and common law system, 
cases are also arguably considered as sources of law. In the GATT/WTO, cases 
are not considered as source of law, though Panels and the Appellate Body do 
cite previous findings.  
 
In addition, some annual trade policy review reports by the Trade Policy Review 
Body are cited in this study, particularly in Chapter Six. These annual reports are 
available on the WTO Website. The documents regarding China’s first WTO trade 
policy review, such as the Secretariat Report, which are also used particularly in 
Chapter Six, are also available on the WTO website. 
 
Secondary sources include comments from academics, governments and 
organisations regarding the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law. As mentioned, 
each draft of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has generated numerous comments. 
Some of them are available in English, while others are only available in 
Chinese. Some of them are available on the websites of some professional 
associations, such as the American Bar Association, and governmental 
organisations, such as the OECD.  
 
5 Defining Terms 
It is not only significant but also necessary for the purpose of this study to define 
some terms that is used. 
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5.1 Competition Law  
There are two definitions of competition law depending on the scope: broad 
definition and narrow definition.62 The broad definition means that competition 
laws are the laws which seek to promote competition by prohibiting both 
anticompetitive practices and unfair competition practices, while the narrow 
definition refers to the legislation that prohibit anticompetitive practices only.  
 
The differences between unfair competition practices and anticompetitive 
practices are huge, despite both of them being aimed at protecting market 
competition and consumer welfare. According to a study by the OECD, unfair 
competition refers to ‘the sort of fraudulent behaviour or misapporpriation of 
property rights’. 63  Unfair competition practices normally include commercial 
bribery, misleading advertising, deception (by ‘passing off’ and other means), 
defamation of competitors, and misuse of trade secrets. Thus, combating unfair 
competition focuses on ‘protecting enterprises from such dishonest practices by 
their competitors’.64  
 
A few countries adopt the broad definition of competition law. Germany and 
China are in this group. In Germany, Wettbewerbsrecht (competition law) refers 
to both unfair competition and anticompetitive practices, while Kartellrecht 
(cartel law) refers to all types of anticompetitive practices rather than cartels 
only.65 In China, the term ‘competition law’ refers to both unfair competition 
and anticompetitive practices. For example, Competition Law, which is one of 
                                         
62
 See, e.g., X. Wang and P. Wang, ‘Research and Proposals on the Regulating Scope of China’s 
Antimonopoly Law’ [中国反垄断法调整范围的思考与建议, Zhongguo Fanlongduan Fa De 
Tiaozheng Fanwei De Sikao Yu Jianyi], Law Science Magazine [法学杂志, Faxue Zazhi], No. 1, 
2005, 31, p. 31. 
63
 OECD, The Role of Competition Law and Policy, Paris: OECD, CCNM/CHINA(2001)15, (2001), 
p. 28. There is a short discussion of unfair competition in the EU and its Member States, see, B. 
Rodger and A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the European Community and 
United Kingdom, 2nd ed., London, Sydney, Portland and Oregon: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
(2001), pp. 26-27. 
64
 See, OECD, (2001), note 63, p. 29. 
65
 David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, (1998), p. 4. 
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the leading textbooks on competition law for postgraduate law students in China, 
includes both unfair competition and anticompetitive practices. 66  The only 
textbook of Chinese competition law in English67 also adopts the broad definition 
and includes both unfair competition and anticompetitive practices.68 
 
However, the major competition regimes adopt the narrow definition of 
competition law. Many countries, such as South Korea, have separate legislation 
in regard to unfair competition practices and anticompetitive practices. When it 
is used in these countries, the term ‘competition law’ refers to anticompetitive 
practices only. Even in countries with a single legislative act including both 
unfair competition and anticompetitive practices, such as Australia, Hungary, 
and Russia, the term ‘competition law’ only refers to anticompetitive practices. 
In one of its studies, the OECD clearly points out that ‘it is important to 
understand that bans of unfair trade practices or unfair competition are not 
generally referred to as being a part of “competition law”’.69 This study adopts 
the narrow concept of competition law. In this study, therefore, the term 
‘competition law’ does not include unfair competition legislation.  
 
5.2 Nomenclature 
The names of competition law (narrow definition) are not universal,70 despite the 
                                         
66
 X. Wang, Competition Law [竞争法学, Jingzheng Faxue], Beijing: Social and Document [社科文
献, Sheke Wenxian], (2007). This book is divided into three parts. The first part is a general 
introduction. The second part deals with the prohibition of unfair competition. And the third part 
deals with anticompetitive practices. 
67
 C. Jin and W. Luo, Competition Law in China, New York: William S. Hein & Co., (2002). 
Currently it is the only book providing a thorough and comprehensive discussion on Chinese 
competition law in English, although there are several books in English which explored Chinese 
competition law, such as Mark Williams discussed China’s competition law in M. Williams, 
(2005), note 41 and M. Dabbah and P. Lasok, eds., Merger Control Worldwide, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, (2005), (which has one chapter discussing China’s merger 
control). 
68
 It refers to anticompetitive practices as ‘antitrust’ because the authors used to study in the US. 
69
 See, OECD, (2001), note 63, p. 29. 
70
 Most competition regimes use ‘competition law or act’ as the title for their competition legislation. 
See, e.g., X. Kong, The Principles of Anti-monopoly Law [反垄断法原理, Fanlongduan Fa 
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fact that most of the competition regimes aim to preserve competition and free 
markets against anticompetitive practices and use much the same means. The 
name of competition legislation generally reflects the emphasis of the nation’s 
objectives. For instance, competition legislation in the US is called antitrust law 
although not all anticompetitive practices that subject to the US antitrust laws 
involve illegal trusts. The reason why competition legislation is called antitrust 
law in the US is that the US had to deal with widespread trusts when it enacted 
its first competition legislation, the Sherman Act, in 1890. From the illustration 
of its name, someone might think that China’s Antimonopoly Law only prohibits 
monopolistic practices. However, it also prohibits anticompetitive agreements 
and anticompetitive mergers.  
 
5.3 Competition Policy 
The terms competition policy and competition law are different, although they 
are often used synonymously.71 Competition policy can be defined as ‘spanning 
the broader set of measures and instruments that may be pursued by 
governments to enhance the contestability of markets’,72 while competition law 
can refer to ‘the set of rules and disciplines maintained by governments relating 
either to agreements between firms that restrict competition or to the abuse of 
a dominant position (including attempts to create a dominant position through 
merger)’.73 From this point of view, therefore, competition policy is broader than 
competition law and ‘will therefore encompass within it a system of competition 
law’.74 Except competition law, competition policy can also include actions to 
                                                                                                                           
Yuanli], Beijing: China Legal Publishing [中国法制出版社, Zhonguo Fazhi Chubanshe], (2001), 
pp. 2-7. 
71
 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, (2007), note 19, p. 2; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, Economic 
Development, Competition Policy, and the World Trade Organisation, Policy Research Working 
Paper, No. 2917, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, (2002), p. 4. 
72
 B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, (2002), note 71, p. 4; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Holmes, 
Competition Policy, Developing Countries, and the World Trade Organisation, Policy Research 
Working Paper, No. 2211, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, (1999), p. 3. 
73
 B. Hoekman and P. Holmes, (1999), note 72, p. 2; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, 
(2002), note 71, p. 4. 
74
 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, (2007), note 19, p. 2; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Holmes, (1999), note 
72, p. 3. 
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privatize state-owned enterprises, deregulate activities, reduce licensing 
requirements for new investment or entry, cut firm-specific subsidy programmes, 
and trade liberalization.75  
 
5.4 Exceptions and Exemptions 
An exemption refers to a provision within a domestic competition law that 
provides non-application of substantive or procedural standards that would 
otherwise apply. Sometimes, the term of ‘exemption’ is distinguished from the 
term of ‘exception’.76 Exemptions are considered to be broader in scope than 
exceptions that tend to be ‘determined on a case-by-case basis’.77 In this study, 
however, these two terms are interchangeable since they both have similar 
impacts on international trade and competition. 
 
5.5 China 
Politically, China includes Mainland China (communist China), Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (hereinafter Hong Kong), Macau Special Administrative 
Region (hereinafter Macau) and, arguably, Taiwan Province. Article 31 of the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Chinese 
Constitution 1982) provides: ‘The state may establish Special Administrative 
Regions when necessary’. 78  Hong Kong and Macau have their own political, 
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 B. Hoekman and P. Holmes, (1999), note 72, p. 3; also see, B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, 
(2002), note 71, p. 4. 
76
 See, e.g., S. Khemani, Application of Competition Law: Exemptions and Exceptions, Geneva and 
New York: United Nations, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25, (2002), pp. 1-2. 
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 Id., p. 2. 
78
 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国宪法; Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xianfa] is the highest law within the Chinese legal system. The current version was 
adopted by the NPC on the 4th December 1982 with amendments in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 
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turn. The Chinese Constitution 1982 has five sections: the preamble, general principles, the 
fundamental rights and duties of citizens, the structure of the state, and the national flag and 
emblems of state. For explanations of the Chinese Constitution 1982, see, J. Chen, Chinese 
Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, Its Nature and Development, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, (1999), pp. 67-69. 
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economic and legal systems distinct from Mainland China. Their legal rights are 
defined by the Basic Law of Hong Kong and the Basic Law of Macau respectively. 
These Basic Laws are Constitutions for Hong Kong and Macau. Article 1 of the 
Basic Law of Hong Kong provides that Hong Kong ‘shall exercise a high degree of 
autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power’. The 
Basic Law of Macau is similar to Hong Kong’s Basic Law. The final interpretation 
of the Basic Laws belongs to the NPC and its Standing Committee. In regard to 
competition legislation, both Hong Kong and Macau have the power to enact 
their own competition law. In theory, their competition regimes are separated 
from the competition regime in Mainland China. 79  The case of Taiwan is 
complicated. Mainland China regards Taiwan as an integral part of China. The 
Chinese Constitution 1982 provides: ‘Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the 
People’s Republic of China’.80 However, it has a separate competition regime. In 
this thesis, therefore, ‘China’s competition regime’ only refers to the 
competition regime in Mainland China. For the purpose of the WTO, China, Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan are treated as separate members. They have their own 
representatives in the WTO. Due to these reasons, China only refers to Mainland 
China in this study.  
 
6 China’s Legal System, Hierarchy of Chinese Law 
and the Chinese Law-Making Process81 
Before examining the WTO’s impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007, it is necessary to explain the Chinese legal system, hierarchy of Chinese 
law and the law-making process in China. 
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 Currently Macau does not have a competition law. 
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 See preamble to the Chinese Constitution 1982. 
81
 For a basic understanding of the laws and institutions in China, see, E. Chua, ‘The Laws of the 
People’s Republic of China: An Introduction for International Investors’, Chicago Journal of 
International Law, vol. 7, (2005), 133. 
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6.1 China’s Legal System 
The Chinese legal system is similar to the civil law systems of Japan, France and 
Germany.82  The primary sources of law in China are written legislation. Cases 
cannot be cited as legal sources in Chinese courts. The judgements are normally 
very short (about one page in most cases). They are not available in English. 
6.2 Hierarchy of Chinese Law83 
The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the 
Legislation Law 2000) lays down the general rules of the hierarchy of Chinese 
law.84 Under the Legislation Law 2000, legislation can be divided into at least 
seven different categories: the Chinese Constitution 1982, national law, 
administrative regulation, local decree, autonomous decree and special decree, 
administrative and local rule. The Chinese Constitution 1982 has the highest 
legal authority.85  National law is enacted by the NPC or its Standing Committee. 
It can be divided into two sub-categories: basic laws and others. There is no 
clear definition what laws can be basic laws. The Legislation Law 2000 does not 
clearly provide that basic laws are higher than other national laws. In practice, 
however, basic laws are generally considered more important than other 
national laws. Administrative rules are issued by the ‘various ministries, 
commissions, the People’s Bank of China, the Auditing Agency, and a body 
directly under the State Council exercising a regulatory function’. 86  Local 
Decrees, Autonomous Decrees and Special Decrees, and administrative rules are 
enacted by the People’s Congress of a province, an autonomous region, or a 
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 For China’s legal system, see, D. Chow, The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China in 
A Nutshell, St. Paul, MN: West Group, (2003); also, C. Hsu, ed., Understanding China’s Legal 
System, New York: New York University Press, (2003). 
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 See, Chart Introduction-1: The Hierarchy of Chinese Legal System. 
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 See, Chapter Five Scope of Application and Filing of the Legislation Law of People’s Republic of 
China which was adopted by the 3rd Session of the 9th NPC in 2000. An English translation is 
available at http://www.novexcn.com/legislat_law_00.html. 
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 The Legislation Law 2000, Art. 78. 
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 Id., Art. 71. 
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municipality directly under the central government.87 Local rules are enacted by 
the local governments at province level. The hierarchy of these laws, regulations 
and rules is as follows: national law has higher legal authority than 
administrative regulations, local decrees and administrative or local rules. 
Administrative regulations have higher legal authority than local decrees and 
administrative or local rules’. 88 Administrative rules and local rules have the 
same legal authority and are implemented within their respective scope of 
authority.89 But the autonomous decrees that are issued by autonomous regions 
and special decrees that are issued by special economic zones can vary from 
national laws due to some historic reasons. 90  There is no clear definition of 
decisions and orders of the State Council in the Legislation Law 2000.91  But it 
does provide administrative rules have to be consistent with ‘decisions and 
orders of the State Council’.92 From this view, decisions and orders by the State 
Council are higher in China’s legal hierarchy than administrative rules. 
6.3 Law-Making Process in China 
The legislative body of highest authority is the NPC, which consists of 
approximately 3000 deputies who only meet for ten days every March. The NPC 
Standing Committee consisting of 150 members is elected by the deputies of the 
NPC and is responsible to it.93 Only deputies of the NPC can serve on the NPC 
Standing Committee. The members of the NPC Standing Committee are full time 
and regularly meet for about ten days every two months. A small subcommittee 
handles day-to-day matters. A number of bodies, such as the State Council, the 
Central Military Committee, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), the Supreme 
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 Id., Art. 63. 
88
 Id., Art. 79. 
89
 Id., Art. 82. 
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 Id., Art. 81. 
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 The State Council is the highest executive organ of the People’s Republic of China. For the 
functions and organizations of the State Council, see, 
http://english.gov.cn/links/statecouncil.htm. 
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 The Legislation Law 2000, Art. 71. 
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 The Chinese Constitution 1982, Arts. 65, 66, and 68. 
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People’s Procuratorate, have the power to introduce a bill.94 However, most laws 
are drafted by ministries and submitted by the State Council. This was the case 
for the submission of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Section 2 (about the legislative process of the NPC) and Section 3 (about the 
legislative process of the NPC Standing Committee) of Chapter II of the 
Legislation Law 2000 stipulate the national law-making process.95 As mentioned 
above, national law can be divided into two sub-categories: basic laws and 
others. The basic laws can only be enacted and amended by the NPC.96 When the 
NPC is not in session, its Standing Committee can amend and supplement basic 
laws ‘provided that any amendment or supplement may not contravene the basic 
principles of such national law’. 97 However, the NPC Standing Committee has no 
power to enact basic laws. The law, other than basic laws, can be enacted and 
amended by the NPC Standing Committee.98 The Legislation Law 2000 provides 
neither a list of what national laws can be basic laws nor a clear definition of 
the concepts of basic laws and other laws. A bill is normally deliberated three 
times before it is enacted, although it is possible that a bill is enacted after only 
being deliberated once.  
 
The Antimonopoly Law 2007 was adopted by the 10th NPC Standing Committee 
on the 30th August 2007, after it was deliberated three times. Under Sections 2 
and 3 of the Legislation Law 2000, therefore, it is not a basic law but a normal 
national law. 
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Chart Introduction-1: The Hierarchy of Chinese Legal System 
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Chapter One:                                                  
The WTO, Competition Law and China 
This chapter examines some issues surrounding the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), national competition law and China. To this end, it is structured into two 
sections. The first section examines some issues surrounding the WTO and 
competition law, while the second section focuses on some issues surrounding 
the WTO and China. These issues serve as the basis of this study. Thus, it is 
necessary to explore them before examining the impact of the WTO on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter Antimonopoly Law 2007).1  
  
1 The WTO and Competition Law 
First, this section examines the interaction between international trade and 
competition policy. Second, it explores the evolution of competition-specific 
provisions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO system. 
Third, it examines whether WTO Members’ national competition laws could be 
challenged under the existing WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
1.1 International Trade and Competition Policy 
The relationship between international trade and competition law and policy has 
been extensively examined and remains mainly undisputed.2 Thus, it is not the 
                                         
1
 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
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 The OECD and WTO committees charged with studying competition policy issues have produced 
a wealth of material on the interaction of competition policy and international trade, which is 
available in their publications and on their respective websites. In addition, many scholars have 
also contributed to this topic. See, e.g., G. Bercero and S. Amarasinha, ‘Moving the Trade and 
Competition Debate Forward’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 4, (2001), 448; the 
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney 
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purpose of this sub-section to explore comprehensively this relationship. What 
follows explains briefly how anticompetitive practices could have adverse 
effects on international trade. It is necessary to explain these effects because 
they are some of the reasons why China’s competition law matters to the WTO 
and its Members, and they explain why the WTO could have had impacts on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007.  
 
1.1.1 The Impacts of Anticompetitive Practices on International 
Trade 
What follows explains briefly the impacts of anticompetitive practices on 
international trade.3 
 
1.1.1.1 Horizontal Restraints 
Horizontal restraints are agreements or other forms of collusion among actual or 
potential competitors. 4  Although horizontal restraints are generally 
anticompetitive, they could have pro-competitive efficiency effects. 5  Some 
types of horizontal agreements, such as agreements to fix prices, rig bids, limit 
output, divide markets by allocating customers or territories (these agreements 
are normally referred to as hard-core cartels), normally have a significant 
                                                                                                                           
General for Antitrust, Washington D.C.: US Department of Justice, (2000), pp. 201-279, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/chapter5.pdf. 
3
 For comprehensive studies on the impact of anticompetitive practices on international trade, see, 
e.g., the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP), 
Communication by the European Community and Its Member states - Impact of Anti-
Competitive Practices on Trade, WT/WGTCP/W/62, (1998); WGTCP, Communication from 
Argentina - Opening-up of Markets to International Trade and Mark Competition - The Argentine 
case, WT/WGTCP/W/63, (1998); WGTCP, Communication from Norway - Revision, 
WT/WGTCP/W/65/Rev.1, (1998); WGTCP, Communication from the United States, 
WT/WGTCP/W/66, (1998); WGTCP, Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/68 (1998); 
WGTCP, Communication from Canada, WT/WGTCP/W/70, (1998); and WGTCP, 
Communication from Turkey, WT/WGTCP/W/77, (1998). 
4
 For a general discussion of horizontal agreements and competition law, see, R. Whish, 
Competition Law, 5th ed., London: LexisNexisUK, (2003), pp. 453-582. 
5
 See, S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application 
and Measurement, London: Sweet & Maxwell, (2002), para. 5.57. 
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impact in limiting effective competition.6 Thus, they are considered as serious 
infringements under any competition regime.7 These agreements could also have 
negative impacts on international trade by limiting market access and raising 
barriers to entry by foreign firms. For example, if a group of domestic firms with 
market power agrees to boycott foreign products, the consequence of that 
horizontal cartel agreement could be to inhibit foreign firms from gaining access 
to the market. Another example is that companies from different countries 
could form an international cartel to fix the prices of their products, control the 
amount of production, or divide markets. Such a cartel could have an adverse 
impact on international trade and offset the benefit of trade liberalization 
achieved by the WTO. This has been illustrated in a number of well-known cartel 
cases, such as the National Lead case,8 the ICI case,9 the Uranium Cartel case,10 
and the Sugar Cartel case.11 
 
Other types of horizontal agreements, such as joint ventures, licensing 
agreements between firms and co-operative standards setting, can have pro-
competitive efficiency effects under certain circumstances.12 Thus, they are not 
per se illegal and are normally dealt with according to the rule of reason.13 Like 
hard-core cartels, however, these agreements could have negative impacts on 
                                         
6
 For a general discussion of cartels and competition law, see, e.g., M. Guerrin and G. Kyriazis, 
‘Cartels: Proof and Procedural Issues’, in B. Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: 
Fordham Corporate Law 1992, New York: Juris Publishing Inc., (1993); J.M. Joshua, ‘Attitudes 
to Anti-Trust Enforcement in the EU and US: Dodging the Traffic Warden, or Respecting the 
Law?’, in B. Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law1995, New 
York: Juris Publishing Inc., (1996); and M. Jephcott and  T. Lübbig, Law of Cartels, Bristol: 
Jordans, (2003). 
7
 See, R. Whish, (2003), note 4, p. 453. 
8
 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.1945). 
9
 United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
10
 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
11
 Cooperatieve Vereinigung ‘Suiker Unie’ UA and Others v. Commission [1975] E.C.R. 1163. 
12
 For a general discussion of these agreements and competition law, see R. Whish, (2003), note 
4, pp. 545- 582. 
13
 It is a method of competition analysis in which the court is permitted to make a detailed inquiry 
concerning the effect on price and output of a certain practice in order to determine whether 
consumers have been harmed. 
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market access and thus lead to an increase of barriers to entry by foreign firms. In 
other words, horizontal restraints could limit market access and substantially raise 
barriers to entry by foreign firms even though they are not considered 
anticompetitive under some competition regimes. 
 
1.1.1.2 Vertical Restraints 
Vertical restraints are agreements made between firms operating at different 
levels of the market. 14  These restraints include exclusive dealing or purchase 
agreements, exclusive financing agreements, territorial restrictions and resale 
price maintenance. Although there are a variety of types of vertical agreements, 
vertical restraints can be divided in general into two categories: pricing vertical 
restraints and non-price vertical restraints. Like horizontal restraints, vertical 
restraints can have various positive and negative impacts on competition.15 Pricing 
vertical restraints, such as resale price maintenance, are prohibited per se in most 
competition regimes, particularly in the Members of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, it is not the case for 
non-pricing vertical restraints. Non-pricing vertical restraints such as exclusive 
territories and exclusive dealing agreements can have a variety of effects on 
competition. Such vertical restraints can also have a variety of effects on 
international trade. For example, vertical restraints on exclusive territories could 
have parallel positive effects in increasing market access. Similarly, exclusive 
dealing may, for instance, facilitate new entry by a foreign firm which may find it 
helpful to offer such an arrangement as an incentive to a potential distributor in a 
new market.  However, vertical restraints could also have negative effects on 
international trade because they create or enhance barriers to entry by foreign 
firms.  For example, a group of domestic manufacturers with market power could 
threaten to cut off sources of domestic supply to domestic distributors unless 
the latter agree not to handle competing imported products. 
 
                                         
14
 B. Rodger and A. MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the European Community and 
United Kingdom, 2nd ed., London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, (2001), p. 171. 
15
 For a general discussion of vertical restraints and competition law, see, e.g., B. Rodger and A. 
MacCulloch, (2001), note 14, pp. 171-201; S. Bishop and M. Walker, (2002), note 5, paras. 
5.36-5.48; and R. Whish, (2003), note 4, pp. 583-653. 
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1.1.1.3 Abuses of Dominant Positions 
Abuses of dominant positions include excessive pricing, price discrimination, 
discounts and rebates, tying and binding, predatory behaviours, and refusal to 
supply. 16  These abuses could have a significant impact on both trade and 
competition, in particular if they involve the exercise of market power in order to 
deter or foreclose actual or potential competition. 17  Under most competition 
regimes, exclusionary practices by dominant firms could constitute an 
infringement of competition law. Different approaches may, however, persist 
about such issues as the assessment of the relevant product and geographical 
market, the relevant criteria to define what constitutes a dominant position, the 
role of barriers to entry etc.  
 
From the international trade perspective, an abuse of a dominant position could 
raise problems in international trade. For example, if a manufacturer with 
market power in a domestic market prevents its distributors and retailers from 
dealing in imported goods that compete with the goods supplied by the company, 
access to such markets will be blocked or denied. Another example is the tie-in 
contract. A tie-in contract could exclude imports, because foreign suppliers are 
deprived of the opportunity to sell competing products. An international 
dominant company could also leverage into export markets and engage in price 
predation. These practices could lead a nullification of the benefits of trade 
liberalization. Due to such potential adverse impacts on trade liberalization by 
abuses of dominant positions, the Plan of Action that emerged from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) X conference, which 
was held in Bangkok from 12 to 19 February 2000, noted: 
While dominant market positions are not anti-competitive in themselves, 
                                         
16
 For a general discussion of abuses of dominant positions and competition law, see, R. Whish, 
(2003), note 4, pp. 653-732. 
17
 M. Janow explored the circumstances under which abuses of dominance can raise problems of an 
international or transborder nature and compared trade and competition policy approaches to the 
issue under certain scenarios e.g. (i) denial of market access by a dominant firm and (ii) 
leveraging into export markets and price predation. See, M. Janow, ‘International Perspectives on 
Abuse of Dominance’, in OECD, Abuse of Dominance And Monopolisation, OECD/GD(96)131, 
(1996), 33, pp. 40 ff.  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/61/2379408.pdf. For the impact of abuses 
of dominant positions on competition, see S. Bishop and M. Walker, (2002), note 5, paras. 6.71-
6.127. 
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certain practices applied by companies enjoying such positions can limit 
international competition and market entry by competitors. Anti-
competitive practices raise import costs and limit market access and 
market entry. 18 
Despite this consensus that an abuse of a dominant position could have an adverse 
impact on international trade, it is not unanimous among different countries on 
what types of abuses of dominant positions should be condemned due to the 
‘considerable divergence among jurisdictions about the range of practices’ of 
abuses of dominant positions. 19 
  
1.1.2 Trade Liberalization Commitments Could Be Nullified or 
Impaired in the Absence of An Effective Competition 
Regime 
Thus far, some anticompetitive practices could have adverse impacts on 
international trade under certain circumstances. Anticompetitive practices could 
hamper the ability of firms to gain access to or compete in foreign markets. As 
formal governmental barriers to international trade are reduced or eliminated, 
international attention is turning more to anticompetitive practices occurring 
within nations that affect international trade. As Eleanor M. Fox pointed out, ‘As 
the trade barriers fall like a waterline, the low tide reveals rocks and shoals- 
which are the private restraints and uncaught government restraints’.20 
 
Many of these anticompetitive practices are prohibited in most competition 
regimes in the world. From the point of view of international trade, therefore, 
an effective application of competition laws by national authorities will have 
positive effects on international trade. As the EU claimed, ‘competition laws that 
are effectively enforced will support autonomous trade liberalization measures 
                                         
18
 The Plan of Action that emerged from the UNCTAD X conference, TD/386, 18th February 2000, 
para. 69, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ux_td386.en.pdf. 
19
 M. Janow, (1996), note 17, 33, p. 48. 
20
 E. Fox, ‘Toward World Antitrust and Market Access’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 
91, (1997), 1, p. 3. 
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taken by countries’.21 In the absence of a sound competition regime, the benefits 
from trade liberalization and regulatory reform would not be delivered—at least 
not to their fullest extent. Where no competition law and policy is in place or 
there is competition law and policy but such law and policy is not effectively 
enforced, it is impossible for a country to prevent anticompetitive practices 
from replacing former state monopolies and thus raise the barriers for entry by 
foreign firms. This is clearly reflected in the Plan of Action that emerged from 
the UNCTAD X conference, which states: 
RBPs [restrictive business practices] should not impede or negate the 
realization of benefits arising from the liberalization of tariff and non-
tariff barriers affecting world trade, particularly those affecting the trade 
and development of developing countries. Efforts to tackle the negative 
effects of RBPs are also necessary to attain greater efficiency in 
international trade and development by, inter alia, promoting 
competition, controlling concentration of economic power and 
encouraging innovation. There is a need to prevent enterprises from re-
establishing market barriers where governmental controls have been 
removed.22 
 
The Argentine government even carried out 18 empirical studies which provided 
concrete evidence to support this argument.23Following comprehensive trade 
liberalization, the presumption was that prices of certain products would tend 
towards import parity levels in Argentina. However, these studies discovered 
that in a number of cases this had not occurred due to some anticompetitive 
practices. Based on these studies, the Argentine representative argued, during 
the discussions of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy (WGTCP), that an effective competition regime was needed 
in order to ensure that the benefits from trade liberalization were not nullified 
by anticompetitive practices.24 
 
                                         
21
 WGTCP, Communication from the European Community and Its Member States, 
WT/WGTCP/W/1, (1997), pp. 2-3. 
22
 UNCTAD, TD/386, note 18, para. 70. 
23
 See WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/63, note 3. 
24
 Id. For example, WGTCP, Submission from Korea, WT/WGTCP/W/56, (1997). 
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Similarly, during the discussions of the WGTCP, the EU also argued: 
The case, from a trade policy point of view, for an effective application of 
competition policy is clear.  A country that has undertaken trade 
liberalization measures has every interest in ensuring that the welfare and 
efficiency benefits arising from such measures are not lost due to anti-
competitive practices by firms.  Avoiding the nullification or impairment 
of trade liberalization commitments, as a result of such practices, is also 
a matter of legitimate concern for trading partners.  Competition laws 
and policies do not normally have specific trade objectives, such as 
promoting market access.  However, in pursuing the goals of promoting 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare, an effective application of 
competition law is essential for tackling barriers to entry set up by 
business in the market or other anti-competitive practices which affect 
both foreign and domestic producers.  As stated by Brazil at the 16 
September [1997] meeting: ‘Competition policy can suppress barriers 
where trade policy is less effective.  It is possible to imagine a country 
that strictly follows GATT rules but where cartels, exclusivity 
arrangements and other forms of restrictive practices prevail impeding 
market penetration. In that hypothetical case, competition policy could 
be very helpful to improve market access.25 
It continued: 
All WTO Members would benefit from the effective application of 
competition law to anti-competitive practices which limit access to the 
markets of other countries for goods, services and investment.  The 
substantial reduction of government obstacles to trade, as a result of 
successive Rounds of trade liberalization has greatly contributed to 
enhanced conditions of competition.  At the same time, in the absence of 
an effective competition law framework firms may have an incentive to 
engage in anti-competitive behaviour with a view to protect the domestic 
market against foreign competition.26 
In the absence of an effective competition regime, therefore, the benefits of 
trade liberalization could be nullified or at least reduced. 
                                         
25
 WGTCP, Submission by the European Community and Its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/45, 
(1997), p. 4. 
26
 Id. 
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1.1.3 Limitations of the Interaction between International Trade 
and Competition Policy 
 
1.1.3.1 Not All Trade-Related Restraints Are Anticompetitive 
Needless to say, it should be borne in mind that not all restraints which have 
adverse impacts on international trade are considered anticompetitive under 
national competition regimes. Under certain circumstances, some restraints may 
be considered pro-competitive where efficiency-enhancing properties exist, 
despite the fact that they may have negative impacts on international trade. In 
addition, the criteria by which restraints are considered as anticompetitive vary 
during different periods. 27 
 
In sum, on one hand, a restraint could have adverse impacts on trade flows and 
market access where foreign firms are being kept out of a market by virtue of 
the restraint. On the other hand, this restraint may be considered pro-
competitive if it has efficiency-enhancing properties for the participants in the 
local market. In other words, not all restraints which could have negative 
impacts on international trade are anticompetitive and thus prohibited under 
competition regimes. 
 
1.1.3.2 Not All Competition Problems Are Relevant to International Trade 
Similarly, not all competition problems are relevant to international trade, either. 
For example, the procedural and substantive features of multi-jurisdictional 
merger review warrant additional efforts at convergence, harmonization and 
minimization. These issues, while important, are not matters customarily 
considered of consequence for international trade policy. Similarly, expanding 
cooperation between competition authorities and developing protocols regarding 
the treatment of confidential information are important global challenges to 
competition policy but are not matters of relevance to international trade policy.  
 
                                         
27
 See, K. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, (2003). 
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1.2 The Evolution of Competition-Related Provisions in 
the GATT/WTO 
Due to the adverse impacts of anticompetitive practices on international trade, 
the WTO has paid attention to competition issues. What follows is intended to 
examine the evolution of competition-related provisions in the GATT/WTO.28 It 
is divided into four stages: (i) competition-related provisions under the 
International Trade Organisation (ITO); (ii) competition-related provisions under 
the GATT; (iii) competition-related provisions under the WTO; and (iv) after the 
establishment of the WTO. 
 
1.2.1  Competition-Related Provisions under the International 
Trade Organisation 
Anticompetitive practices at the international level, particularly the practices of 
German cartels and Japanese zaibatsu, during the 1930s, illustrated that 
anticompetitive practices could block market access. This experience provided 
the incentive to prohibit anticompetitive practices under the Havana Charter for 
an International Trade Organisation (hereinafter the Havana Charter). 29  The 
anticompetitive practices prohibited under the Havana Charter included: (a) 
price fixing or agreements on terms and conditions of supply of a product; (b) 
agreements to exclude suppliers or allocating markets between suppliers; (c) 
                                         
28
 The American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law made an 
excellent description on the history of the competition laws at the international level, see the 
American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law, Report of the ABA 
Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law and Practice on the Internationalization of 
Competition Law Rules: Coordination and Convergence, (1999), pp. 1-12, 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/comments/2000/convexe.html; E. Fox, ‘Competition Law and the 
Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade’, Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal, vol. 4(2), (1995), 1, pp. 2-7; and M. Matsushita, ‘Competition Law and Policy in the 
Context of the WTO System’, Depaul Law Review, vol. 44, (1994), 1097, pp. 1101- 1103. 
29
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Final Act and Related Documents, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, from 21 November 1947 
to 24 March 1948, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948). For a general discussion of the Havana 
Charter, see R. Wilson, ‘Proposed ITO Charter’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 41, 
(1947), 879; also G. Bronz, ‘The International Trade Organisation Charter’, Harvard Law 
Review, vol. 62, (1949), 1089. 
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discrimination against particular enterprises (d) limiting production or fixing 
production quotas; (e) agreements preventing the development of particular 
technologies; and (f) unjustified or unlawful extensions of patent or intellectual 
property rights.30  
 
The Havana Charter was the first attempt to provide an international set of rules 
to combat anticompetitive practices. Under the Havana Charter, the ITO had the 
power to investigate any complaint brought by a Member and, if upheld, the 
Member concerned would have to do everything possible to remedy the situation. 
However, the ITO failed to materialise. Thus, one can only speculate whether 
and how these comprehensive provisions would be implemented in practice.  
 
1.2.2 Competition-Related Provisions under the GATT 
Chapter V of the Havana Charter that prohibits anticompetitive practices was 
not included in the original GATT. Thus, the GATT was born without competition-
related provisions. In 1954 and 1955 a number of Contracting Parties of the GATT 
pressed for the inclusion of competition-related provisions in the GATT. In 1958, 
the Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices was appointed by the 
Contracting Parties of the GATT to examine the competition issues relating to 
international trade. It concluded:  
It would be unrealistic to recommend at present a multilateral agreement 
for the control of international restrictive business practices. The 
necessary consensus amongst countries [do] not yet have sufficient 
experience of action in this field to devise an effective control 
procedure.31  
This conclusion was due to the perception that cartels were not a major problem 
at the time and there was opposition to loss of national policy autonomy in such 
a sensitive policy area. Nevertheless, the Decision on Arrangements for 
Consultations on Restrictive Business Practices based on this report was 
eventually adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties in 1960. 32 It recognised that: 
                                         
30
 The Havana Charter, Art. 46. 
31
 See the Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, Restrictive Practices- Arrangements 
for Consultations, BISD 3S/170, (1960), para. 7.  
32
 See Decisions, Reports, etc., of the 16th & 17th Session, BISD 9S/170, (1961). 
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Business practices which restricted competition in international trade may 
hamper the expansion of world trade and the economic development in 
individual countries and thereby frustrate the benefits of tariff reductions 
and of the removal of quantitative restrictions or otherwise interfere with 
the objectives of the GATT.33 
However, this decision only recommends that Contracting Parties enter into 
consultations in the event of harmful restrictive practices in international trade 
on either a bilateral or multilateral basis. 34  Thus, it is not binding on the 
Contracting Parties. Three decades later, in 1986, developing countries proposed 
to include restrictive business practices on the agenda for the Uruguay Round 
negotiations (1986-1994). 35  But the US and other developed countries rejected 
such a proposal.36  
 
1.2.3 Competition-Related Provisions under the WTO 
As the result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, GATT Contracting Parties signed 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter 
the Marrakesh Agreement) in April 1994. 37  Although the need for addressing 
competition issues in the context of trade policies was recognized during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, there is no overarching set of principles or 
interpretation of the WTO rules as they apply to competition issues. 
Competition-related provisions are scattered around in different WTO 
agreements.  
 
There are dozens of competition-related provisions under the existing WTO 
framework.38  These competition-related provisions have been reviewed by the 
                                         
33
 Id., p. 28. 
34
 Id., pp. 28-29. This arrangement for consultation has been invoked on only three occasions, all in 
1993, between the US and Japan concerning business practices affecting consumer 
photographic film and paper.   
35
 See, GATT, GATT Activities 1986, Geneva: GATT, (1987), p. 27. 
36
 Id. 
37
  It is available on the WTO website. 
38
 For a summary of competition-specific provisions in the WTO Agreements, see, E.-U. 
Petersmann, Competition Policy Aspects of the Uruguay Round: Achievements and Prospects- 
Achievement and Prospects, Paris: OECD, (1994); OECD, Competition Elements in 
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OECD39, the WTO40 and some scholars.41 There is consensus that these provisions 
include Articles II, XIX, XVII of the GATT, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, Articles 
8.2, 40, and 31(k) of the TRIPS. In addition, the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT) requires standards be no more restrictive on trade than is 
necessary. Articles VII to XVI in the Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) 
could be used to challenge certain anticompetitive practices, such as bid rigging. 
Compared to the GATT, thus, competition-related rules under the WTO covered 
more trade-related anticompetitive practices, although a comprehensive 
agreement on competition with the existing WTO framework is lacking. 
 
1.2.4 After the Establishment of the WTO42 
At the Marrakesh Ministerial meeting at which the Marrakesh Agreement was 
signed, trade and competition policy was identified as an item for consideration 
on the WTO future work programme. During the first WTO Ministerial Meeting 
                                                                                                                           
International Trade Agreements: A Post-Uruguay Round Overview of WTO Agreement, OECD: 
Paris, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, (1998); M. Matsushita, ‘Reflections on Competition 
Policy/Law in the Framework of the WTO’, in B. Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: 
Fordham Corporate Law 1997, New York: Juris Publishing, (1998), 31; and M. Matsushita, 
‘Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy’, Washington University Global 
Study and Law Review, vol. 3, (2004), 363. 
39
 OECD, Competition Elements in International Instruments, Background Document for a Joint 
Roundtable of the Trade and Competition Law and Policy Committees held on 15 April 1994, 
Paris: OECD, COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(94)35, (1994); OECD, The Note of Discussions held at the 
Roundtable, COM/DAFFE/CLP/TD(94)76, Paris: OECD, (1994); OECD, (1998), note 38; 
OECD, Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post-Uruguay Round 
Overview of WTO Agreements, Paris: OECD, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, (1999). 
40
 WTO, ‘Trade and Competition Policy’, in WTO, WTO Annual Report 1997, vol. 1, Geneva: WTO, 
(1997).  
41
 See, e.g., E.-U. Petersmann, ‘International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private 
Business’, Journal of World Trade, vol. 30(3), (1996), 5; M. Matsushita, (1998), note 38, 31; E.-
U. Petersmann, Competition Policy Aspects of the Uruguay Round: Achievements and 
Prospects, Paris: OECD, COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)26/FINAL, (1999); M. Matsushita, (2004), 
note 38, 363. 
42
 For the details of the development of competition issues after the establishment of the WTO, 
see, P. Marsden, A Competition Policy for the WTO, Oxford: Cameron May, (2003); also see, A. 
Bhattacharjea, ‘The Case for A Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing 
Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 9, (2006), 293, pp. 295- 299. 
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which was held in Singapore in 1996, WTO Members agreed to set up the 
WGTCP. 43  The mandate of the WGTCP, however, did not imply that any 
negotiations would eventually be launched; this would only occur after an 
explicit consensus decision was taken to that effect by WTO members.44 For 
more than seven years, the WGTCP has provided a forum for Members to discuss 
the ‘relevance of fundamental WTO principles of national treatment, 
transparency and most-favoured nation treatment to competition policy and vice 
versa’.45 It has also provided a forum for WTO Members to discuss the possibility 
to set up a peer review in the WTO competition context.46  
 
The Doha Ministerial Meeting in 2001 led to the inclusion of competition policy in 
the Fourth Ministerial Declaration in Doha (hereinafter Doha Ministerial 
Declaration). During that meeting, WTO Members also agreed to start 
negotiations on competition policy ‘after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that 
session on modalities of negotiations’.47 Moreover, the Doha Declaration specifies 
the following areas for the negotiations on competition policy: core principles, 
including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and 
provisions on hardcore cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support 
for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries 
                                         
43
 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, (1996), para. 20. 
44
 Id. 
45
 WGTCP, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy Annual 
Reports for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, WT/WGTCP/1, WT/WGTCP/2, 
WT/WGTCP/3, WT/WGTCP/4, WT/WGTCP/5, WT/WGTCP/6, and WT/WGTCP/7, respectively.  
46
 See, WGTCP, Communication from the European Community and its Member States - Dispute 
Settlement and Peer Review: Options for a WTO Agreement on Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/229, (2003); WGTCP, Communication from the United States - The Benefits of 
Peer Review in the WTO Competition Context, WT/WGTCP/W/233, (2003); WGTCP, 
Communication from Korea - Peer Review in the Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy, 
WT/WGTCP/W/235, (2003); WGTCP, Communication from Japan - Introducing a Model of Peer 
Review, WT/WGTCP/W/236, (2003); WGTCP, Communication from the OECD- Practical 
Modalities of Peer Review in a Multilateral Framework on Competition, WT/WGTCP/W/243, 
(2003); and WGTCP, Communication from the OECD - Peer Review: Merits and Approaches in 
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through capacity building.48 China generally supports the idea of establishing a 
competition-specific agreement within the WTO.49  
 
After the failure to reach an agreement on launching negotiations on 
competition policy at the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in September 2003, 
consensus was reached to exclude competition policy from the Doha Round of 
trade negotiations at the WTO General Council meeting in July 2004.50 
 
Despite the failure to start negotiations on competition, WTO Members have 
successfully included competition principles in some new agreements. For 
example, the Telecommunications Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles of 
the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (the Reference Paper) was 
negotiated after the establishment of the WTO.51 Under the Reference Paper, 
Members’ national competition regulations are potential matters of trade 
concern.52 Lawrence A. Sullivan claimed that the competition rules stipulated in 
Section 1 of the Reference Paper make the Basic Telecommunications Agreement 
(BTA), potentially, ‘the most significant multilateral ‘antitrust’ regime ever 
undertaken’. 53  Another example is paragraph 1 of the Understanding on 
Commitments in Financial Services (UCFS) which was also negotiated after the 
establishment of the WTO.54 It deals with monopolies.  
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1.3 National Competition Laws Could Be Challenged 
under the Current WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Anticompetitive practices could have negative impacts on international trade. In 
theory, therefore, the adoption and the enforcement of competition laws are 
matters of international trade. As Frédéric Jenny claimed, ‘international trade 
policy makers are equally concerned with the design of domestic laws and the 
quality of domestic enforcement to the extent that they may have an effect on 
the ability of foreign firms to gain market accesses’.55 
 
Although there is no requirement for a WTO Member to adopt a national 
competition law under the current WTO system, the WTO does include dozens of 
provisions that are relevant to the content and the enforcement of a WTO 
Member’s national competition law. As Stefan D. Amarasinha pointed out, it is a 
fact: 
[A]t least among trade people, namely that competition laws and 
competition regulations, etc., are in fact covered by those GATT 
provisions to the extent that they somehow affect the conditions for trade. 
That is probably a point which is not always well understood—in fact, 
there are some who are unwilling to accept it—but, as with so many other 
things in life, it is a fact that you will have to accept, and that is the 
situation that we will have to live with.56  
 
So far, however, few of the competition-related WTO provisions have led to cases 
or enforcement within the WTO dispute settlement system. One of the reasons 
for this could be that the existing WTO framework lacks an overarching set of 
competition rules. As Francois Souty argued, the dispersion of competition-
related provisions under the current WTO framework is ‘not easily and 
frequently consulted by competition authorities in Member States nor by market 
operators (which remain unfamiliar with current WTO proceedings that only 
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56
 S. Amarasinha, discussions on ‘WTO Core Principles and Trade/Competition Policies’, in B. 
Hawk, ed., (2004), note 55, p. 711. 
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concern Member States of that organization and not corporations)’.57  
 
Nevertheless, it is still possible for a WTO Member to challenge another WTO 
Member’s competition law under the existing WTO dispute settlement system.58 
Article XXIII (Nullification and Impairment) of the GATT applies to government 
measures which nullify or impair agreed market access or the attainment of the 
objectives of the Agreement. There is no doubt that national competition laws 
belong to government measures. Under the current WTO system, therefore, WTO 
Members could bring complaints on both the content and the enforcement of a 
Member’s national competition law to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body where 
the content or the enforcement of such competition law has the effect of 
impeding market access of foreign products or entry of foreign enterprises. 
 
In Japan- Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan-
Film) 59 , the Panel stringently interpreted Article XXIII(1)(b) of the GATT. It 
imposed a heavy burden of proof on the use of the non-violation complaint of 
Article XXIII(1)(b) as a mechanism for solving competition cases. It required that 
Members bringing complaints provide ‘a detailed justification’ that would 
address three issues: 
(1) whether the practices in question were government ‘measures’; (2) if 
so, whether the measure in question related to a benefit reasonably 
anticipated to accrue from prior tariff concessions by upsetting the 
competitive relationship between imports and domestic products; and (3) 
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whether the benefit accruing to the complainant state had in fact been 
nullified or impaired by the measure in questions (causality).60  
Despite this heavy burden of proof on the use of the non-violation complaint of 
Article XXIII(1)(b) imposed by the Panel in this case, the Panel did not reject the 
idea that a complaint on competition law could be brought in through Article 
XXIII(1)(b) of the GATT. 
 
In Japan-Film, the Panel did not examine the Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
(JFTC) Rule No. 1 under Article 6 of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law 
(International Contract Notification Requirement) and JFTC Notification No. 34 
on open lotteries (1971) under Article 2(7) of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law 
because they were not listed separately as measures challenged by the US in its 
Panel request.61 However, the Panel made it clear that the reason why the Panel 
dismissed these two measures was not because they were part of the Japanese 
competition law. It argued: ‘we see no reason why, as suggested by the United 
States, the nature of these measures precluded their specification by the United 
States in the Panel request’. 62  Moreover, the Panel did examine 1981 JFTC 
Guidance on Dispatched Employees under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law in this 
case despite the fact that this Guidance is part of Japan’s competition 
legislation.63 Thus, this case illustrated that some provisions of a WTO Member’s 
domestic competition law could be examined under the existing WTO framework, 
if another WTO Member brought a complaint specifically listing these provisions in 
its Panel request. Put another way, the nature of these provisions of a WTO 
Member’s competition law would not bar WTO Panels from considering them. 
 
In United States- Anti-Dumping Act of 1916-Complaint by the European 
Communities, the Panel claimed openly that Members’ national competition law 
could be covered by WTO provisions if the content or the implementation of 
national competition law had the effect of impeding market access of foreign 
products or entry of foreign enterprises by stating:  
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[T]he mere description or categorization of a measure under the domestic 
law as well as the policy purpose behind the measure cannot be a decisive 
factor in the categorization of that measure under the WTO Agreement.64  
It continued:  
[T]he scope of the WTO Agreement does not exclude a priori restrictive 
business practices.  Thus, the fact that the 1916 Act would be an anti-
trust law would not per se be sufficient to exclude the application of WTO 
rules to that law…panels under GATT 1947 and the WTO have addressed 
various aspects of restrictive business practices initiated by governments 
when such practices had the effect of impeding market access of foreign 
products or entry of foreign enterprises.65  
Therefore, the Panel concluded that the dichotomy trade law/anti-trust law, to 
the extent that it would be based on the assumption that WTO disciplines are 
not intended to apply to business restrictive practices, was not a limitation to 
the application of WTO rules and disciplines. 66 This illustrated that WTO 
Members’ national competition laws could be subjected to the WTO rules, if the 
content or the implementation of national competition laws has the effect of 
impeding market access of foreign products or entry of foreign enterprises. 
 
From these two cases, it can be seen that both the content and the 
implementation of a WTO Member’s national competition law could become 
subject to the WTO rules if the content or the implementation of national 
competition law has the effect of impeding market access of foreign products or 
entry of foreign enterprises. As Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring 
claimed, under existing WTO rules: 
[N]ational competition law and practice are not exempt from, but rather 
subject to, the application of the dispute settlement system. Both 
competition laws as such and their application in individual cases must 
comply with the current substantive standards of the WTO agreement, 
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and complaints can be brought against both.67  
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann was formerly a Member, and in 2001 Chairman, of the 
Appellate Body of the WTO. And from 1990 to 1995, he was Director-General of 
the Directorate-General of Competition of the European Commission. Lothar 
Ehring was formerly an official in the Appellate Body Secretariat. Given their 
background, therefore, their opinion carries huge weight on this issue. Moreover, 
they are not alone. Many scholars share their opinion. For example, Alberto 
Alvarez-Jiménez also claimed that ‘A new competition jurisprudence is emerging 
within the World Trade Organisation… and its Dispute Settlement Body’. 68 
Therefore, it seems clear that both the content and the enforcement of a WTO 
Member’s national competition law could be challenged under the existing WTO 
dispute settlement system if the content or the implementation of such 
legislation has the effect of impeding market access of foreign products/services, 
or entry of foreign firms. 
 
2 The WTO and China 
This section examines some general issues surrounding the WTO and China. First, 
it examines briefly the process of China’s accession to the WTO and China’s WTO 
commitments. Second, it surveys whether China is bound by its WTO 
commitments. Third, it explores how China is going to implement its WTO 
commitments.  
 
2.1 China’s Accession to the WTO and China’s WTO 
Commitments 
 
2.1.1 Entering the Dragon 
The process of China’s accession to the WTO has been examined extensively.69 
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Thus, what follows does not explore comprehensively this process. Instead, it 
explains briefly this process in order to provide necessary background for this 
study. 
 
Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement deals with accession. However, it neither 
gives guidance on the terms to be agreed, nor lays down any procedures to be 
used for negotiating these terms. The terms on which an applicant is accepted as 
a new member of the WTO are left to negotiations between the WTO Members 
and the applicant. The procedure for accession is left to individual Working 
Parties to agree. In practice, the accession follows closely the corresponding 
Article XXXIII of GATT 1947. The WTO has summarised the process.70 The WTO 
accession process formally begins when a country informs the WTO Director-
General of its desire to join. A working party of Members will then be formed by 
the WTO General Council to examine the application. After the working party has 
examined the basic principles and policies, individual WTO Members enter into 
bilateral negotiations with the applicant over the specific undertakings that the 
applicant will agree to as a condition of WTO membership. Although the 
negotiations are bilateral, the commitments apply to all WTO Members due to 
the most-favoured nation principle (MFN). The working party will finalize the 
accession terms in three documents after the completion of bilateral 
negotiations. They are: the working party report, the protocol of accession, and 
the attached schedules containing the new Member’s specific liberalization 
commitments. The final accession terms are presented to the WTO body for a 
vote. If two-thirds of WTO Members favour the accession, the applicant may sign 
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the protocol and accede to the WTO.71 
 
China’s accession was arguably in line with the above process for accession.72 
China was one of the 23 original signatories of the GATT in 1947. Due to some 
political reasons, however, the Chinese government represented by the Chinese 
Nationalist Party withdrew from the GATT on the 5th May 1950.73 The Chinese 
Communist Party then argued that the Chinese Nationalist Party had no right to 
represent the whole of China because it had lost its control over China at that 
time except Taiwan. 74  Based on this argument China, led by the Chinese 
Communist Party, has never recognised the withdrawal from the GATT by the 
Nationalist Party. Nevertheless, China applied for a resumption of membership to 
the GATT as a Contracting Party in 1986. Momentum for China’s accession 
application began to build in 1999 when the US and China concluded a bilateral 
agreement on China’s entry into the WTO.75 In 2000, China concluded a similar 
bilateral agreement with the EU. 76  In the same year, the US granted China 
Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR).77 China’s PNTR status cleared the way 
for the US to grant China the MFN, as required by Article I of the GATT. After the 
successful conclusion of the bilateral trade agreements with the US and the EU, 
China hastened its negotiation process for the accession to the WTO.  
 
After fifteen years of negotiations, the decision to accept China as a WTO 
Member was made by a consensus at the Doha Ministerial Meeting on the 10th 
                                         
71
 The Marrakesh Agreement, Art. XII (2). 
72
 See the Table I-1: Events Leading Up to China’s WTO Accession. 
73
 WTO Press Release, ‘WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s Entry’, 17th 
September 2001, pp. 3-4, www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm. 
74
 In 1950, the Nationalist Party retreated to Taiwan and lost control the Mainland China. 
75
 U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, 15th November 1999, 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/WTO-Conf-1999/factsheets/fs-004.html. 
76
 E.U.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, 19th May 2000, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/china/index_en.htm. 
77
 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C.§ 2432 (prohibiting the 
American government from granting unconditional most favoured nation (MFN) status to any 
non-market economy country that denies its citizens the freedom to emigrate). Until 2000, 
China’s MFN status had to be renewed by the American Congress every year. 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Chapter 1, 66 
November 2001. 78  The Chinese government accepted the Protocol on the 
Accession of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Protocol on China’s 
Accession) on the 11th November 2001.79 Consequently, it became the 143rd WTO 
Member on the 11th December 2001. This historical step was the result both of 
an arduous process within China and intensive negotiations with the world’s 
major trading nations. China’s accession to the WTO ‘constitutes a landmark 
decision for the Chinese economy reform comparable, to some extent, to the 
“open door policy” launched in December 1978’.80 It is widely considered as 
‘part of a larger strategy of massive and fundamental economic reform’ .81 The 
OECD also expressed a similar view. It notes that China’s accession to the WTO 
‘marks an important milestone along the reform path China has been following 
for more than twenty years, rather than a new direction…. WTO entry is a 
complementary aspect of the next phase of China’s reforms’.82 
 
China’s GATT/WTO negotiations lasted longer than any other Members’ 
negotiations. There are at least two reasons why it took China fifteen years to 
join the WTO. First, China had to convert its own economic system from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy in order to join the GATT/WTO. 
Although this transition is in line with China’s economic reform agenda, it was 
still not easy to transform China’s economic system in a short time due not only 
to political difficulties but also economic hardship. Second, China’s unique 
economic situation has also contributed to the prolonged negotiation. Its 
economy and trade are significant. In fact, it was the biggest economy and 
trading country that was outside of the WTO. In addition, some WTO Members, 
particularly the US, were worried about China’s potential growth. Thus, they 
required exceptionally severe terms from China. They argued that China should 
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join the WTO as a developed country, although many economic indicators 
suggested that it still fell within the category of a developing country, which 
would enable it to be in receipt of special and differential treatment and 
implement reforms over a longer period of time.83   
 
2.1.2 China’s WTO Commitments 
China’s WTO commitments comprise the consolidation of the thirty-seven 
bilateral agreements with thirty-seven WTO Members including the US and the 
EU, and several multilateral agreements with the WTO working party concerning 
modalities by which China carries out its obligations and responsibilities. The 
negotiations between China and the WTO Working Party on the Accession of 
China aimed to ensure that China would bring its trade regime into conformity 
with all the rules, practices, and obligations required by the WTO agreements. 
The results of these negotiations were finalised in the Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter Report of 
the Working Part on China’s Accession)84 and the Protocol on China’s Accession 
that outline the terms of China’s membership. 
 
The full list of China’s WTO commitments is in the Annexes of the Protocol on 
China’s Accession and is available at the WTO website. These commitments are 
extensive. For a comprehensive understanding of them, one could pore over the 
some 1,000 pages of the Protocol, the Report of the Working Party on China’s 
Accession, and Schedules of China’s Commitments on Goods and Services.85 The 
OECD published a summary of China’s WTO commitments.86 The Office of US 
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Trade Representative also summarised China’s WTO commitments. 87  Some 
academics also produced some summaries of China’s WTO commitments.88 
 
By becoming a full member of the WTO, China has in fact made three tiers of 
commitments. These three categories of commitments constitute China’s WTO 
accession package. The first category is the commitment to the principles of the 
WTO, such as free trade, MFN, national treatment and transparency. These 
principles are the spirit of the WTO and expounded in the various agreements 
setting up the WTO and its predecessor, the GATT. The second category is the 
multilateral agreements within the WTO. This is the basic requirement for 
joining the WTO. The third category is the commitment to the set of rules 
governing trade for specific sectors, such as agricultural goods, textile goods, 
information technology and telecommunications.  
 
2.2 Is China Bound by Its WTO Commitments? 
There is no doubt that the fundamental principle of treaty law is the proposition 
that treaties are binding upon the parties to them and must be performed in 
good faith.89 This principle is referred to as pacta sunt servanda and is arguably 
the oldest principle of international law. It was reaffirmed in Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 90  Article II of the Marrakesh 
Agreement provides: 
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2. The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 
2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’) are 
integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members. 
… 
3. The agreements and associalted legal instruments included in Annex 4 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of 
this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are 
binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not 
create either obligations or rights for Members which have not accepted 
them. 
 
Now the question is whether China’s WTO commitments are binding on China. 
The Protocol on China’s Accession provides: 
The WTO Agreement to which China accedes shall be the WTO Agreement 
as ratified, amended or otherwise modified by such legal instruments as 
may have entered into force before the date of accession. This Protocol, 
which shall include the commitments referred to in para. 342 of the 
Working Party Report, shall be an integral part of the WTO Agreement.91 
In essence, thus, the Protocol on China’s Accession is an agreement between 
China and other WTO Members.  
 
The Chinese Constitution 1982 stipulates that the State Council is responsible for 
‘conducting foreign affairs and conclude[ing] treaties and agreements with 
foreign states’.92  It also provides that the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) has the power to ‘decide on the ratification or 
abrogation of treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign 
states’. 93  Article 7 of the Law of Procedures for Concluding Treaties of the 
People’s Republic of China 1990, which concerns the procedures for negotiating 
and ratifying international legal instruments, including treaties (条约, Tiaoyue) 
and agreements (协定, Xieding), lists the conditions under which a treaty or 
agreement needs the approval of the Standing Committee of the NPC. In regard 
to WTO Agreements, the Report of the Working Party on China’s Accession clearly 
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provides: ‘the WTO Agreement fell within the category of “important 
international agreements” subject to the ratification by the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress’.94  
 
The Chinese Constitution does not require the publication of an international 
treaty as a precondition of its validity. Therefore, an international treaty that is 
signed by the State Council becomes effective upon ratification by the NPC 
Standing Committee. In theory, the NPC Standing Committee can refuse to ratify 
a treaty signed by the State Council. In practice, however, there has been no 
case so far in which the NPC Standing Committee refused to ratify a treaty that 
has been signed by the State Council. There is no exception for the ratification 
of China’s WTO commitments. The NPC Standing Committee ratified them at 
different times since these negotiations were not concluded at the same time. 
For instance, the US and China reached a bilateral agreement on the conditions 
of China’s WTO accession in 1999. Like other treaties and agreements that China 
has ratified, thus, all China’s WTO commitments, except the Protocol on China’s 
Accession, are binding on China. There is a procedural problem in regard to the 
ratification of the Protocol on China’s Accession. The 9th NPC Standing 
Committee ratified the Protocol on China’s Accession on the 25th August 2000, 
long before the Protocol on China’s Accession itself had taken its final form and 
been signed by the Chinese government’s representative in Doha. Thus, the act 
of the 9th NPC Standing Committee is virtually a before-the-fact authorization 
rather than an after-the-fact ratification. From this view, the ratification 
procedure for the Protocol on China’s Accession is defective. Does this imply that 
the Protocol on China’s Accession is ineffective?  
 
In regard to this issue, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties clearly 
provides:  
A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty 
has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding 
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that 
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of 
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fundamental importance.95  
Despite this procedural defect, therefore, the validity of the Protocol on China’s 
Accession is unquestionable as a matter of international law under Article 46 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 
Article II:2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO clearly sets out that ‘The 
agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 … 
are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members’. As a signatory and 
party to the WTO, China clearly accepts that the obligations contained in the 
WTO Agreements are legally binding upon it. How those obligations are to be 
given effect may be a matter of dispute, but their binding nature is not, and it is 
primarily the political institutions in China which must give effect to WTO law. If 
a Chinese action or measure is found to conflict with the provisions of the WTO, 
for example, it is up to China to find a solution.  
 
2.3 How Does China Implement its WTO Commitments? 
Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement requires that “Each Member shall 
ensure conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its 
obligations provided in the annexed Agreements”. 96  However, it does not 
stipulate how WTO Members shall ensure the conformity. As the Panel in United 
Sates- Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 claimed, the WTO had not so 
far been interpreted by WTO institutions as a legal order producing direct effect 
in WTO Members’ domestic law.97 Consequently, each WTO Member can decide 
its own means and ways to implement its obligations in its domestic legal system 
as long as they ‘ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with its obligations provided in the annexed Agreements’. 98  The 
implementation of this conformity obligation and the effect on domestic law are, 
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 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 46 (1). 
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 The Marrakesh Agreement, Art. XVI(4). 
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 Panel Report, United Sates- Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (US-Section 301 Trade 
Act), WT/DS152/R, adopted 27 January 2000, DSR 2000:II, 815, para. 7.72. 
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 J. Bourgeois, ‘The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges’, in J. 
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therefore, left to individual WTO Members to determine. What follows is to 
examine how China will implement its WTO commitments.  
 
2.3.1 WTO Members’ Approaches to Implement Their WTO 
Commitments 
Legal theory posits two basic solutions with respect to the relationship between 
international law and domestic law: monism and dualism. Monism means that 
both international law and domestic law form parts of the same legal order.99 
Exponents of monism generally agree that international law is directly applicable 
in domestic law and prevails over inconsistent domestic laws.100 Dualism means 
that international law and domestic law are separate systems of law.101 Neither 
international law nor domestic law has the power to alter the rules of the other. 
Each is supreme within its own sphere so that a domestic court would apply 
domestic law in the case of a conflict between domestic law and international 
law. According to the dualist view, international treaties are not self-executing 
with the domestic legal system. In order to take effect in the national legal 
regime, international treaties must be implemented by enactment of domestic 
legislation. In reality, however, neither monism nor dualism corresponds entirely 
with state practice. In fact, practice by most countries combines the monist and 
dualist approaches. 
 
The WTO Agreements can be applied directly within a WTO Member’s domestic 
legal system without further domestic legislation, where such Member follows 
monist approach.102 In practice, several WTO Members follow a monist approach 
to implement WTO Agreements. These countries include Chile, Mexico, the 
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 See, e.g., I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, (1998), pp. 31-33. 
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 See, e.g., H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., New York: Rinehart and Company, 
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 See, I. Brownlie, (1998), note 99, pp. 31-33. 
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monist approach, such as Chile, have enacted several new pieces of legislation in order to 
implement the WTO Agreements. 
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Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, and Venezuela. However, the situation is 
different where a WTO Member follows the dualist approach. The WTO rules 
cannot be applied in the domestic legal system unless there is further relevant 
legislation transforming the WTO agreements. In practice, the majority of the 
WTO Members, including the four major trading powers— the US,103 the EU,104 
Japan and Canada, follow a dualist approach.105  
 
There are two ways of implementing WTO Agreements where WTO Members 
follow the dualist approach. First, a WTO Member enacts an overarching statute 
in which the WTO Agreements are given effect in such Member’s domestic law. In 
practice, Brazil, Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and the US follow this approach. In 
the US, for instance, the WTO Agreements were given effect in the American law 
by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) on the 8th December 1994. In 
Canada, the WTO Agreements were given effect in Canadian law by the WTO 
Agreement Implementation Act on the 1st January 1995.  
 
Second, instead of enacting an overarching statute, a WTO Member may enact 
numerous new laws and amend existing laws in order to implement WTO 
agreements. In practice, Argentina, Australia, the EC, Hong Kong, India, Japan, 
Singapore, Switzerland, and Thailand adopt this approach. For example, the EC 
Council Decision 94/800/EEC promulgates the WTO Agreements.106 In addition to 
this Decision, the Community institutions have adopted several legislative 
instruments to ensure that Community law complies with the international 
obligations of the Community under the WTO law. The Community Customs 
Code 107  and its implementing legislation, as amended, 108  contain several 
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(1997), 175. 
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provisions that reflect the terms of the relevant WTO Agreements. Following the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the Community also enacted (or upgraded) a 
number of commercial policy instruments, such as Council Regulation 2026/97 on 
protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the EC.109 
 
2.3.2 China’s Approach to Implementing Its WTO Commitments 
The Chinese Constitution 1982 remains silent on whether a treaty shall be 
applied directly or through domestic law. Chinese practice in this regard is not 
consistent. Sometimes, China follows a monist approach. For example, Article 
142 of General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, provides: 
‘If any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of 
China contains provisions differing from those in the civil laws of the People’s 
Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail, except 
for those provisions to which China has declared its reservations’. Sometimes, 
China follows a dualist approach. In 1986, for instance, the 6th NPC Standing 
Committee adopted a special law ‘Regulations on Diplomatic Privileges and 
Immunity’ for the purpose of implementing the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations.110  
 
In regard to implementing the WTO rules, China follows a dualist approach. Thus, 
China’s WTO commitments need to be given further legislative effect in order to 
be applicable within China’s domestic legal system. There are several reasons for 
this. First, the WTO Agreements are very complicated. Thus, it is far from easy 
for China, like other WTO Members that follow a dualist approach, to implement 
the WTO rules automatically without further domestic legislation. Second, some 
WTO obligations are not clearly defined. It would be difficult to expect domestic 
courts to apply these obligations without further definition. Third, implementing 
WTO rules through further legislation gives China extra time to fulfil its WTO 
obligations. 
 
The Report of Working Party on China’s Accession lays down China’s approach to 
the implementation of its WTO commitments. It stated: 
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China would ensure that its laws and regulations pertaining to or affecting 
trade were in conformity with the WTO Agreement and with its 
commitments so as to fully perform its international obligations.  For this 
purpose, China had commenced a plan to systematically revise its 
relevant domestic laws.  Therefore, the WTO Agreement would be 
implemented by China in an effective and uniform manner through 
revising its existing domestic laws and enacting new ones fully in 
compliance with the WTO Agreement.111  
Thus, China has clarified that it will implement the WTO obligations through 
enacting new laws and amending existing legislation rather than enacting an 
overarching law. This involves the examination and review of all existing laws, 
regulations and rules. In principle, those which are found inconsistent with WTO 
Agreements have to be amended or repealed; where no provisions can be found 
corresponding to relevant WTO Agreements, new laws or regulations will be 
enacted pursuant to the WTO Agreements.  
 
This approach has been confirmed in the Secretariat Report of China’s first trade 
policy review under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) by claiming that 
China implements the WTO Agreement and the Protocol on China’s Accession 
through enabling legislation. 112  During the Meeting for China’s trade policy 
review, the Chinese delegate also claimed:  
To implement its accession commitment, the Chinese government 
reviewed its legal framework, including laws enacted by the NPC and its 
Standing Committee, administrative regulations by the central 
government, i.e. the State Council, and rules and measures promulgated 
by ministries and agencies of the central government. As depicted in the 
Secretariat Report, amendment and enactment of laws and regulations 
reflected the effort by the Chinese government to bring its legal 
framework in line with the WTO rules.113  
China’s approach to implementing the WTO rules has a disadvantage. According 
                                         
111
 The Report of the Working Party on China’s Accession, para. 67. 
112
 Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review - Report by the Secretariat – People’s Republic 
of China, WT/TPR/S/161, 28th February 2006, p. 34. 
113
 Trade Policy Review Body- Trade Policy Review of People’s Republic of China- Report by the 
Secretariat, WT/TPR/M/161/Add.2, 11th September 2006, p. 14. 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Chapter 1, 76 
to this approach, China has to review hundreds of if not thousands of pieces of 
legislation in order to bring such legislation into conformity to the WTO rules. 
Thus, Donald C. Clarke claimed: ‘It is well understood both inside and outside of 
China that the task of making China’s laws and regulations conform to World 
Trade Organization (WTO) requirements is a huge one’.114 
 
3 Conclusion 
In general, the adverse impact of anticompetitive practices on international 
trade has been widely recognised, although there is no unanimous agreement on 
what practices should be condemned in different competition regimes. In the 
absence of an effective competition policy, the benefits of trade liberalization 
could be nullified or at least reduced. In acknowledging this, the GATT/WTO has 
included a number of competition-related rules during the last five decades. 
However, there still lacks a general agreement on competition within the 
existing WTO framework. On the one hand, this leads to the situation that the 
WTO can have impact on the adoption and implementation of WTO Members’ 
national competition laws due to the existence of the competition-related WTO 
rules. On the other hand, the WTO impact has been limited due to the lack of a 
competition-specific agreement under the WTO. The WTO does not impose an 
obligation on its Members to enact a comprehensive domestic competition law. 
Because of this, some WTO Members, the EU in particular, tried to initiate a 
negotiation of a new agreement on competition within the WTO system. It is 
necessary to recognize the relevance and the limitations of the WTO to the 
development of WTO Members’ national competition policy and law in order to 
understand the following chapters (chapter three, four, five and six) that 
examine the impact of the WTO on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007. 
 
After fifteen years of negotiations, China joined the WTO in December 2001. As 
Karen Halverson summarized on China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), ‘No country has endured as lengthy an accession process to 
the GATT…/WTO as China, nor has any country acceding to the WTO been asked 
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to take on as many concessions as the price for admission.’115 Like other WTO 
Members, China is bound by its WTO commitments. Since the WTO does not 
specify how its Members should implement their WTO commitments, WTO 
Members adopt different approaches to implement their WTO commitments. 
China adopts the dualist approach and gives effects of its WTO commitments 
through amending existing legislation and enacting new one. 
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Table I-1: Events Leading Up to China’s WTO Accession 
 
Year Event 
1948 GATT went into effect and China was a Contracting Party 
1950 China (represented by Chinese National Party) withdrew from GATT 
1982 China was granted observer status in GATT 
1986 China notified GATT of intent to renegotiate terms of membership, Hong 
Kong became a GATT Contracting Party 
1987 Working party on China’s membership to GATT was established 
1989 Discussions of China’s membership was suspended until 1992 
1992 Working party on Taiwan’s accession established 
1994 Uruguay round of trade negotiations was completed 
1995 WTO entered into force, China applied for accession to WTO 
1999 United States and China signed bilateral agreement on China’s accession 
2000 U.S. Congress passed PNTR legislation, EU and China signed bilateral 
agreement on China’s accession 
2001 China’s accession to WTO becomes effective 
Sources: WTO website and the website of PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Chapter Two:                                      
China’s Competition Legislation 
This chapter examines the issues surrounding China’s competition legislation in 
order to provide a background for understanding the arguments in the following 
chapters. To this end, it is structured into two sections. The first section focuses 
on the history and the status of China’s competition-related legislation before 
the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007) on the 30th August 2007.1 The second 
section explores the reasons why China needs a comprehensive competition law 
and sets out the history of the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
1 The History and the Status of China’s 
Competition-Related Legislation before the 
Adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
1.1 The History of China’s Competition-Related 
Legislation before the Adoption of the Antimonopoly 
Law 20072 
The development of China’s competition-related legislation is closely related to 
the process of China’s Economic Reform and Open Door Policy in 1978.3 Before 
that, China applied a centrally planned economy where market mechanism was 
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denied as an efficient means to allocate resources. The development of 
competition-related legislation in China can be divided into three stages. 
 
1.1.1 Stage One: Planned Commodity Economy (From 1978 to 
1992) 
From 1978 to 1992, China applied a planned commodity economy.4 This means 
that the Chinese economy was operated in a market setting but did not amount 
to an overall market economy during that period. 5  Accordingly, market 
competition was allowed under the planned commodity economy. The 
underlying theory is that on the one hand, competition was no longer considered 
to be unique to capitalism, but could ‘stimulate the economy and benefit 
socialism’. 6  On the other hand, Chinese officials stressed that competition 
between the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) was ‘fundamentally different from 
that under capitalism’.7 Competition was discouraged when it posed a threat to 
other more favourable strategies to strengthen the SOEs, such as merger and 
horizontal co-operation.8 
 
Under these circumstances, China started its competition-related legislation. In 
1980, the Interim Regulation for the Promotion and Protection of Competition in 
the Socialist Economy (hereinafter the Interim Regulation for Competition 1980) 
was promulgated by the State Council.9 It is a set of general and abstract rules. 
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It aims to introduce a maximum degree of competition into the planned 
commodity economy. It represents the first legislative attempt to combat 
anticompetitive practices in China. It stipulates: ‘In economic life, apart from 
the products which are to be exclusively traded in by the departments or units 
designated by the state, no other products may be monopolized or exclusively 
traded in’.10 There are contradictions in this regulation. For example, on the one 
hand, it stipulates that necessary adjustments should be made to the pricing 
system in order to stimulate effective competition. On the other hand, it 
provides that enterprises need to apply for government approval to raise prices. 
Furthermore, it provides that prices of designated key products must remain 
‘stable’. 11  In addition, its contents are ‘proclamations rather than concrete 
provisions that could be applied by judges’ in courts.12 
 
Based on the Interim Regulation for Competition 1980,13 various competition-
related rules at the local level were promulgated in many provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities during the 1980s, such as the Provisional 
Rule of Wuhan City against Unfair Competition 198514 and the Provisional Rule of 
Shanghai Municipality against Unfair Competition 1987.15  
                                                                                                                           
Huaian et al. eds., Collection of Laws of the People’s Republic of China 1949-1989 [中华人民共
和国法律全书 1949-1989, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Falu Quanshu 1949-1989], (1989), 
pp. 1137-1138. It ceased into force in 2000. 
10
 The Interim Regulation for Competition 1980, Art. 3. 
11
 Id., Art. 5. 
12
 C. Jin and W. Luo, Competition Law in China, New York: William S. Hein & Co., (2002), p. 6. 
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 The Provisional Rule of Wuhan City against Unfair Competition, [武汉市制止不正当竞争暂行办法
，Wuhan Shi Zhizhi Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Zanxing Banfa] . It came into force on the 29th 
November 1985, http://www.law-
star.com/showtxt?dbsType=lar&dbsText=????????&multiSearch=false&multiSearch=false&dbs
Type=lar&dbsText=????????&isopen=1&keywords=&dbn=lar&fn=lar_17.086.txt&upd=1. 
15
 The Provisional Rule of Shanghai Municipality against Unfair Competition, [上海市制止不正当竞
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on the 15th October 1987, http://www.law-
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On the 12th April 1986, the 6th National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted the 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter 
the General Principles of Civil Law 1986). 16  Article 58 (4) invalidates acts 
performed through malicious collusion and are detrimental to the interests of 
the State, a collective or a third party. On the 11th September 1987, the State 
Council promulgated the Regulation on the Administration of Prices of the 
People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Regulation of Prices 1987),17 which 
prohibits enterprises and industrial institutions from negotiating on and 
monopolizing prices. 
 
Except Article 58 (4) of the General Principles of Civil Law 1986, all the 
competition-related rules during this period were promulgated by the State 
Council and some ministries. During this period, therefore, competition-related 
legislation remained at relatively low level. In addition, it was sporadic. This 
illustrated that competition-related legislation was not considered as the top 
legislative priority by Chinese policy-makers during this period, because 
competition was only allowed in a limited sphere during this period. In sum, 
China’s competition-related legislation was at the beginning stage during this 
period. 
 
1.1.2 Stage Two: Socialist Market Economy (From 1992 to 2001) 
During the 14th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in 1992, China 
further readjusted the goal of its economic reform to establish a socialist market 
economy, under which the market mechanism replaces the planning system as 
the means to allocate resources. 18  In response to this new development of 
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 The General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, [中华人民共和国民法
通则, Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Minfa Tongzhe] came into force on the 1st January 1987, 
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http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shixheng/252/5089/index.html. 
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economic reform, the Chinese Constitution 1982 was amended in 1993. It 
stipulates: ‘The state has put into practice a socialist market economy’.19 
In 1993, the 8th NPC Standing Committee enacted the Anti Unfair Competition 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the LAUC 1993).20 As its name 
illustrates, the LAUC 1993 mainly focuses on unfair competition practices, such 
as false advertising, forgery, and defamation. In theory, anticompetitive 
practices should not be the subject of the LAUC. However, at the time when the 
LAUC was enacted, the draft Antimonopoly Law failed to be enacted. Due to this 
reason, a few provisions regarding anticompetitive practices were incorporated 
into the LAUC. From this view, thus, the LAUC 1993 is a significant piece of 
legislation in the history of the Chinese competition-related legislation. It signals 
a desire by Chinese officials to incorporate some competition rules into the 
Chinese legal system. However, it is inadequate to deal with all types of 
anticompetitive practices due to its limited competition-related provisions. 
Thus, Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao argued: ‘As the LAUC is limited in scope and 
its implementing regulations have little authority, anti-monopoly provisions have 
appeared in legislation beyond the reach of the LAUC’.21 
On the 24th December 1993, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC),22 which is the enforcement authority of the LAUC 1993, promulgated 
Certain Rules on Prohibiting Public Utility Enterprises from Committing 
Restrictive Acts against Competition.23 These rules are based on Article 6 of the 
LAUC 1993. They provide more details on prohibiting statutory monopolies, since 
the purpose of these rules is to facilitate the application of Article 6 of the LAUC 
1993. 
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 The Chinese Constitution 1982 (as amended in 1993), Amend. Two, Sec. 7. 
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In 1997, the 8th NPC Standing Committee adopted the Price Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (hereinafter the Price Law 1997).24 The purpose of the Price 
Law 1997 is to combat price wars and predatory pricing in China, particularly in 
consumer goods markets. The Price Law 1997 replaced the Regulation of Prices 
1987. The State Planning Commission was the enforcement authority before 
March 2003. After that, the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) replaced the State Planning Commission and thus became the 
enforcement authority of the Price Law 1997.25 
 
On the 30th August 1999, the 9th NPC Standing Committee adopted the Bid-
Inviting and Submitting Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the 
Bidding Law 1999).26 It provides regulations in regard to bidding and inviting 
bids. It prohibits collusive tendering practices.27 On the 20th September 2000, 
the State Council issued the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on 
Telecommunications (hereinafter the Telecommunications Regulation 2000). 28 
Article 17 of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 provides: ‘the dominant 
operator in telecommunication service shall not refuse requests of the 
interconnection by other operators and the special-purpose net operators’. It 
also defines the term ‘dominant operator in telecommunication service’.29 
This period is, therefore, significant in regard to China’s competition-related 
legislation. It witnessed the enactment of several key competition-related 
                                         
24
 The Price Law of the People’s Republic of China came into force on the 1st May 1998. An 
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national laws, such as the LAUC 1993, the Price Law 1997 and the Bidding Law 
1999. These national laws and the administrative rules issued by the relevant 
ministries in order to implement such laws replaced most of the previous 
competition-related regulations, administrative rules and local rules issued 
during 1978-1992, such as the Regulation of Prices 1987 and the Provisional Rule 
of Wuhan City against Unfair Competition 1985. Compared to the previous stage, 
both the quality and quantity of the Chinese competition-related legislation 
were improved during this period. 
 
1.1.3 Stage Three: After China’s Accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (From 2001 to Present) 
Since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s transition from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy was deepened and broadened.30 Under 
its WTO commitments, China is opening its previously protected sectors and 
liberalizing its trade and investment policies. In order to implement its WTO 
commitments, China is amending its existing laws and enacting new laws. 
China’s competition-related legislation is no exception. 
 
On the 18th June 2003, the Interim Rule on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing 
Behaviour was issued by the newly established NDRC.31 It came into force on the 
1st November 2003 and is based on the Price Law 1997.32 It aims to ‘promote fair 
competition and to protect the legal rights and interests of operators and 
consumers’.33 Despite its name, it focuses on both abuses of dominant positions34 
and horizontal restraints,35 which are collectively referred to as ‘monopolistic 
pricing activities’. It not only reiterates the existing prohibitions in other laws 
and regulations but also further explains such laws and regulations. According to 
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the press release dated 30th June 2003 on the website of the NDRC, it was 
declared to be a ‘preliminary exploration of antitrust legislation’.36 
1.2 The Status of China’s Competition-Related Legislation 
before the Adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, China’s competition-related 
legislation was scattered in different laws, administrative regulations and 
departmental or local government rules. The major national laws that contain 
competition rules were the LAUC 1993, the Price Law 1997, and the Bidding Law 
1999. There were some administrative rules based on these three national laws, 
such as the Interim Rule on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing Behaviour 2003. 
There were also numerous competition-related rules at the local level, which 
are based on these three national laws. For example, more than 25 provinces in 
China had promulgated detailed rules based on the LAUC 1993 before the 
adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. In addition, there were some sector 
regulations on competition, such as the Telecommunication Regulation 2000. 
 
What follows focuses on the LAUC 1993, the Price Law 1997, the Bidding Law 
1999 and administrative rules based on these three national laws because they 
were the most important competition-related legislation in China before the 
adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. The comments regarding China’s 
competition-related legislation are provided in the next sub-section. 
1.2.1 Prohibiting Anticompetitive Agreements 
Article 14 (1) of the Price Law 1997 prohibits horizontal price fixing. It stipulates 
that operators must not ‘collude with others in controlling market prices, 
thereby harming the lawful rights and interests of other operators or 
consumers’. Article 4 of the Interim Rules on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing 
Behaviour 2003 further expands Article 14 (1) of the Price Law 1997. It prohibits 
price cartels by stipulating: 
Operators shall not conduct any of the following acts of price monopoly 
through agreements, decisions or coordination: (1) Uniformly determining, 
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maintaining or changing prices; (2) Controlling prices by limiting the 
production or supply quantities; (3) Controlling prices in bid invitation and 
bid tendering, or auction; (4) Other acts of controlling prices. 
 
The Bidding Law 1999 prohibits collusive tendering practices by stipulating: 
Bidders shall not collude on the bid price, preclude fair competition from 
other bidders or prejudice the lawful rights and interests of the bid inviting 
party or other bidders. Bidders and the bid inviting party shall not collude in 
the submission of bids in order to harm the interests of the State, the public 
interest or the lawful rights and interests of a third party.37 
In fact, it reiterates Article 15 of the LAUC 1993 which provides: 
Tenderers shall not submit tenders in collusion with one another to force the 
tender price up or down. A tenderer shall not collaborate with the party 
inviting tenders to exclude competitors from fair competition.38 
 
1.2.2 Abuses of Dominance 
1.2.2.1 Abuses of Dominance through Pricing Practices 
Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Interim Rule on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing 
Behaviour 2003 prohibit abuses of dominance through pricing practices. Article 5 
prohibits resale price setting. Article 6 prohibits exploititive pricing. Article 7 
prohibits predatory pricing and making price below costs through rebates, 
subsidies and rewards. Article 8 prohibits price discrimination under similar 
transaction situations. 
 
The Price Law 1997 stipulates that business operators must not act: 
To engage in dumping sales (except the cases of sales of fresh and live 
merchandise, seasonal merchandise and stockpiled merchandise at 
discount) at below cost prices in order to force out competitors or 
monopolise the market and disrupt the normal production and operation 
order to great detriment to the interests of the State or the lawful rights 
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and interests of other business operators.39 
But this provision does not specially stipulate that it is only applicable to 
dominant firms. Thus, the enforcement agencies do not need to consider first 
whether a company has a dominant position in the relevant market in order to 
apply this provision. 
 
Article 11 of the LAUC 1993 can be used to combat the abuses of dominance 
through predatory pricing. It provides that a business operator may not, for the 
purpose of forcing out his competitors, sell his commodities at prices lower than 
cost.40 However, it is not designed specially for combating abuses of dominance. 
Thus, the enforcement agencies do not need to consider first whether a 
company has a dominant position in the relevant market in order to apply to 
Article 11. Moreover, Article 11 does not define costs. But the Price Law 1997 
suggests that costs include production and operation costs. 
 
1.2.2.2 Abuses of Dominance through Non-Pricing Practices 
The LAUC 1993 stipulates: 
Public utility enterprises or other operators having monopolistic status 
according to law shall not force others to buy the goods of the operators 
designated by [the public utility enterprises or other operators] so as to 
exclude other operators from competing fairly.41 
Thus, it only prohibits a particular type of abuse by statutory monopolies. There 
is no mention of other types of abuses by statutory monopolies, such as refusal 
to supply and price-fixing. Moreover, there is no mention of monopolistic firms 
other than statutory monopolies. In order to facilitate the application of Article 
6 of the LAUC 1993, the SAIC issued the Provisions on the Prohibition of Public 
Utility Enterprises from Committing Restrictive Acts against Competition in 1993. 
As a guidance of Article 6 of the LAUC 1993, these Provisions prohibit various 
abuses of dominance by statutory monopolies.42 
                                         
39
 The Price Law 1997, Art. 14 (2). 
40
 The LAUC 1993, Art. 11. 
41
 Id., Art. 6. 
42
 The Provisions on the Prohibition of Public Utility Enterprises from Committing Restrictive Acts 
against Competition 1993, Art. 4. 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Chapter 2, 89 
 
Article 12 of the LAUC 1993 can be used to combat certain types of abuses of 
dominance. It stipulates that a business operator may not, against the will of the 
purchasers, conduct a tie-in sale of commodities or attach any other 
unreasonable conditions to such a sale. Like Article 11 of the LAUC 1993, 
however, Article 12 of the LAUC 1993 is not specially designed for combating 
abuses of dominance. Thus, the enforcement agencies do not need to consider 
whether a company has a dominant position in the relevant market in order to 
apply to Article 12. 
 
2 The Antimonopoly Law 2007 
What follows focuses on three issues: (1) Why China needs a comprehensive 
competition law; (2) how the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was drafted; (3) why it 
took so long for China to enact the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
2.1 Why Does China Need A Comprehensive Competition 
Law? 
There are a number of reasons why China needs a comprehensive competition 
law.43 What follows focuses on two most significant reasons. 
 
2.1.1  Increasing Anticompetitive Practices in China 
The central theme of China’s Economic Reform and Open Door Policy is the 
switch from the centrally planned economy to the market economy. The advent 
of this policy witnessed far-reaching market-oriented reform leading to 
considerable diminution in the direct role of the State in economic activity. This 
policy has been associated with the deregulation of prices, the privatization of 
the SOEs, and the liberalization of trade and investment.44 With the introduction 
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of market economy, have anticompetitive practices emerged in China? 
 
One of the arguments that support China not adopting a comprehensive 
competition law is that Chinese companies are relatively small and do not 
possess dominant positions in the relevant markets.45 This claim underestimates 
the extent of dominance possessed by some Chinese companies. At the 
international level, there were no less than 20 Chinese firms among the Fortune 
global 500 list in 2006.46 Aluminum Corp of China (Chalco) is the second-largest 
maker of alumina in the world.47 Lenovo, a Chinese personal computer (PC) 
manufacturer, is the third largest PC maker in the world. Four Chinese 
companies now supply the majority of the global demand for vitamin C. At the 
domestic level, Chinese companies are dominant players in some sectors, such as 
telecommunications, alumina, oil mining, lottery machines, insurance, banking, 
computer, and TV manufacture. 48  In the telecommunications sector (mobile 
service), for instance, China Mobile and China Unicom together had 100% market 
share in 2005.49 Chalco had 100% market share in the Chinese alumina market in 
2005.50 Currently, the Chinese oil mining industry is monopolized by Petrochina, 
Sinopec and CNOOC. Therefore, these examples demonstrate that some Chinese 
companies do possess dominant positions in the relevant markets. 
 
With the existence of dominant Chinese companies, anticompetitive practices 
have also emerged in China. In June 2000, for example, top managers of nine 
Chinese TV manufacturers, which accounted for more than 80% of the market at 
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that time, held a summit and agreed to form an alliance. The top TV producer, 
Changhong, did not join the alliance. The alliance agreement covers, among 
other deals, setting minimum prices for TVs sold domestically.51 
 
Five big shopping malls in Jinan city boycotted Changhong colour TVs in 1997, 
forcing the producer to lower its price.52 In June 2002, seven gas companies in 
Xinyang city jointly raised gas prices by 60% (from 29 RMB per unit to 48 RMB). 
One term of the agreement even required each company to deposit 5,000 RMB as 
a good faith pledge, which would be forfeited upon violation of the price 
cartel.53  
 
In February 2005, Animal Science Products and Ranis Company filed petitions 
against six Chinese vitamin C producers, including Bulk vitamin C manufacturer 
China Pharmaceutical Group, at the Supreme Court of California.54 They claimed 
that vitamin C customers in the United States (US) paid more for vitamin C as a 
result of the alleged cartel. When these cases were filed, Chinese vitamin C 
producers made 60% of the world’s vitamin C supply, and about 80% of this was 
exported.55 Although these cases were filed in the US and focused on the damage 
in foreign countries, 20% products by these Chinese producers were still sold in 
the Chinese domestic market. Thus, their practice could have an impact on 
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Chinese consumers. 
 
The latest example is in the telecommunications sector in China. As of 2007, 
there are only four landline providers in China: China Telecom, China Netcom, 
China Unicom and China TieTong.56 China Telecom is the largest landline provider 
in China, while China Netcom is the second largest landline provider. China 
Unicom and China TieTong are much smaller than China Netcom and China 
Telecom. Geographically, China Telecom covers 21 provinces in Southern China, 
while China Netcom covers 10 provinces in Northern China.57 In February 2007, 
China Netcom and China Telecom signed an agreement not to compete for 
landline customers in the other’s territory.58 This agreement is the result of two-
year preparation by these two companies. It is even described as a gentleman’s 
agreement.59 
 
With China’s continuing trade liberalization, more and more international 
companies have invested in China. On the one hand, the entry of foreign 
companies has many positive effects on the Chinese economy, such as bringing in 
much needed investment, increasing employment and improving technology. On 
the other hand, China has also become the target of anticompetitive practices 
that are carried out by foreign companies. According to a report by the SAIC, 
there were a number of industries where free competition could have been 
limited by multinationals.60 The affected industries included sectors of software, 
photosensitive materials, mobile phones, cameras, vehicle tires, and soft 
packaging. 
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These are just a few examples of the existence of anticompetitive practices in 
China. According to the statistics provided by the SAIC, 1459 cases regarding 
restrictions by public utilities, predatory pricing, tie-in sales, and bid rigging 
were investigated by the SAIC in 2002, while there were 172 such cases in 
1995.61 In particular, the number of the cases in regard to restrictions by public 
utilities was increased from 55 in 1995 to 1089 in 2002.62 However, it is not 
possible to know the exact number of anticompetitive practices in China because 
many types of anticompetitive practices are not prohibited under the existing 
Chinese competition-related legislation. The lack of legislation on competition 
leads to a lack of awareness of the existence of anticompetitive practices. 
Nevertheless, these data still demonstrate that anticompetitive practices are 
rising in China as a result of introducing a market economy. 
 
2.1.2 China’s Competition-Related Legislation Cannot Effectively 
Combat Anticompetitive Practices 
In order to combat anticompetitive practices, China has adopted a number of 
pieces of competition-related legislation. Why does China need a comprehensive 
competition law? 
 
2.1.2.1 Inadequacies 
First, the existing competition-related legislation in China does not provide a 
general ban on anticompetitive practices. 63  Many types of anticompetitive 
practices, such as agreements on market share, boycott, quotas and other 
restrictions on production, are not prohibited. Neither the LAUC 1993 nor the 
Price Law 1997 provides a general ban on anticompetitive practices. 
 
Second, the existing competition-related legislation in China is not specifically 
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designed for the purpose of preventing anticompetitive practices. Most of the 
existing competition regulations are simply principles rather than applicable 
legal provisions. 64  It also lacks procedural provisions. There are no clear 
provisions dealing with complaints of anticompetitive practices. 
 
Third, some key terms under a competition regime are not defined in the 
existing Chinese competition-related legislation. For instance, the term 
‘monopoly’ is not defined in China’s competition-related legislation, although it 
is used in several pieces of legislation, such as the LAUC 1993. The term 
‘dominant position’ is only defined in the Interim Rule on Prohibiting 
Monopolistic Pricing Behaviour 2003, which only applies to pricing-related abuses 
of dominant positions. 65  Thus, there is no general definition of ‘dominant 
position’. 
 
Fourth, some terms which are used in the existing Chinese competition-related 
legislation are not always consistent. For example, Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 in the 
Interim Rule on Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing Behaviour 2003 use the term 
‘dominance’, while Article 6 of the LAUC 1993 use the term ‘monopoly’. It is 
unclear whether there are any differences between dominance and monopoly 
under the existing Chinese competition-related legislation. 
 
2.1.2.2 Ineffective Sanctions 
First, the sanction provisions under the existing Chinese competition-related 
legislation are too light to prevent anticompetitive practices. Under the LAUC 
1993, for instance, violators can be fined between RMB 50,000 (less than £3,400) 
and RMB 200,000 (less than £14,000) and can also attract the confiscation of 
between 100 per cent and 300 per cent of the illegally acquired revenues.66 This 
fine cannot deter business operators and is not suitable to the situation of 
economic development. 
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Second, the sanction provisions under the existing Chinese competition-related 
legislation are too complicated to be applicable in practice. Under the Price Law 
1997, for instance, the maximum fine is up to five times of illegal gains. 67 
However, it is extremely difficult for the enforcement agency to find out the 
exact gains from anticompetitive practices because lots of relevant information 
cannot be easily accessed. In practice, thus, such a provision does not work very 
well.  
 
Third, criminal punishment is only available to one type of anticompetitive 
practice under the existing Chinese competition-related legislation. Under 
Article 50 of the Bidding Law 1999, bidder collusion can lead to imprisonment. 
Article 223 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China provides that 
bidders and tenderers who collude can be fined and put into prison up to 3 
years.68 Therefore, hard-core cartels do not lead to imprisonment under the 
existing Chinese competition-related legislation. 
 
2.1.2.3 Ineffective Enforcement Agencies 
The impact of the existing Chinese competition-related legislation on combating 
anticompetitive practices has been further reduced due to the overlapping 
jurisdiction of enforcement agencies. At present, more than ten governmental 
agencies are responsible for interpreting and enforcing the competition-related 
legislation in China. These agencies include the NDRC for the area of pricing 
practices, the SAIC for overall regulation of business activities including the 
enforcement of the LAUC 1993, and the Ministry of Commerce as the regulator of 
domestic and foreign trade and inward investment. Such overlapping 
jurisdictions, compounded with the lack of coordination among the government 
agencies, have made it difficult to efficiently enforce the existing competition-
related legislation. 
 
Current enforcement agencies lack authority. They are normally departments of 
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the State Council. Combating anticompetitive practices needs an agency that has 
the power to oversee and monitor different sectors. Abuses of dominance are 
committed by giant companies. Without enough power, the agencies cannot 
effectively combat abuses of dominant positions. Current competition-related 
enforcement agencies are incapable to investigate abuses of dominant positions, 
not to mention enforcing their decisions. 
 
The current enforcement agencies are decentralized. The NDRC and the pricing 
administration department at local government level are responsible for the 
Price Law 1997. 69  The SAIC and its local branches are the enforcement 
authorities for the LAUC 1993. In the case of the SAIC, there are no more than 
four levels from the national level to the county level. Because there is no 
central enforcement agency, the implementation of the existing Chinese 
competition-related legislation is fragmented. 
 
Finally, the judicial system does not play a significant role in the enforcement of 
the existing Chinese competition-related legislation. Very few anticompetitive 
cases have been brought to courts. This is partly due to the lack of procedural 
rules in the existing Chinese competition-related legislation. This leads to the 
failure of the Chinese courts to gain experiences of handling competition cases. 
 
2.1.3 Sub-Section Conclusion 
From the above discussion, we can see that after nearly thirty years of economic 
reform, China has shifted its economy from a centrally planned system to a 
market mechanism. Competition is the main means to allocate resources in the 
current Chinese economy. Domestic firms have started to restrain competition 
through carrying out anticompetitive practices. These practices are increasing 
due to the improvement of the level of industry concentration. With the 
liberalization of Chinese investment policies, more and more foreign companies 
have invested in China. The increased presence of foreign companies in China 
has also brought anticompetitive concerns into the Chinese economy. 
 
In the last two decades, China has combated anticompetitive practices through 
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enacting some specified laws and regulations, such as the enactment of the 
LAUC 1993, the Price Law 1997 and the adoption of the Interim Regulations on 
Prohibition of Monopolistic Pricing Acts 2003. This approach worked well during 
the time when there were very few anticompetitive practices in China. With the 
increasing anticompetitive practices in China, however, this approach cannot 
accommodate the need of combating anticompetitive practices since the 
existing Chinese competition-related legislation is not systematic and specific 
enough and does not ban all types of anticompetitive practices. The absence of a 
comprehensive competition law is proving to be a source of major concern. Both 
domestic and foreign companies are exploiting the situation and curbing 
competition through engaging anticompetitive practices. Therefore, it is 
necessary and essential for China to adopt a comprehensive competition law in 
order to effectively combat the increasing anticompetitive practices. 
 
2.2 The Process of Formulating the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 
In order to understand the Antimonopoly Law 2007, it is instructive to consider 
how this law was formulated. Thus, what follows explores the process of the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
2.2.1 Stage One: Before China Joined the WTO in 2001 
As early as 1987, the SAIC and five other authorities set up a drafting group to 
draft a competition law (including both an antimonopoly law and unfair 
competition law).70 In the following year, a draft entitled ‘Interim Regulation 
against Monopoly and Unfair Competition’ was provided.71 As its name illustrates, 
this draft includes both antimonopoly and unfair competition. On the 4th March 
1989, the State Council issued the Circular on Key Points of Economic System 
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Reform. 72  Article 20 of the Circular calls for the ‘establish[ment] and 
improve[ment of] the market supervisory system made up of relevant 
government agencies, propaganda units and non-governmental institutions…rapid 
enact[ment] of Antimonopoly Law, Law against Unfair Competition Law’. In 
September 1993, the 8th NPC Standing Committee adopted part of the draft of 
Interim Regulation against Monopoly and Unfair Competition as the LAUC 1993. 
In general, the rest of the draft of Interim Regulation against Monopoly and 
Unfair Competition, which prohibits anticompetitive practices, failed to 
materialize, although some provisions were incorporated into the LAUC 1993. 
 
In 1994, the 8th NPC Standing Committee listed the Antimonopoly Law in its five-
year legislative plan for the first time. It authorized the State Economic & Trade 
Commission (SETC) and the SAIC to set a Drafting Group in order to work on 
drafting an antimonopoly law.73 This Drafting Group also included members of 
the NPC legislative affairs committee and other ministries, such as the Ministry 
of Railway. 
 
In the process of drafting the Antimonopoly Law, domestic opinions were 
consulted by the Drafting Group. The Ministries that are responsible for tobacco, 
construction, pharmaceuticals, metallurgy, telecommunications, posts, 
electricity generation and distribution, chemicals and civil aviation gave their 
views and inputs to the Drafting Group in 1994. Many of them tried to make a 
case for special treatment or exemption from the forthcoming Antimonopoly Law 
based on the national interest, the need to take advantage of economies of scale, 
or the disastrous consequences of cut-throat price competition. Industries were 
also worried about local protectionism, the demarcation line between 
permissible and impermissible competition, and the need to have a clear 
distinction between acceptable economies of scale and monopolisation. 
Academics worried that making a distinction between economic monopoly and 
administrative monopoly would not be suitable considering the difficulties of 
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implementation. 
 
Not only were domestic opinions considered during the process of formulating 
the Antimonopoly Law, but also recommendations from governmental 
organizations (including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)), non-governmental organizations and several 
countries (including the U.S., Germany, Japan, Australia, and South Korea) were 
consulted. In 1994, the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies, the Directorate 
General (DG) of the European Commission, and the Japan Fair Trade Commission 
submitted comments and proposed revisions to the Drafting Group. Chinese 
officials convened two conferences on competition policy. The first conference, 
which was sponsored by the UNCTAD, convened in Shenzhen on the 21st March 
1994. The second conference, which was organized under the joint auspices of 
the Center for International Studies of the University of Toronto and China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, was held in Beijing on the 25th 
April 1994. 
 
In 1998, the Antimonopoly Law was again listed in the five-year legislative 
agenda of the 9th NPC Standing Committee. During 8th –10th November 1998, the 
OECD held a conference in Beijing named ‘Forum on China’s Draft Antimonopoly 
Law’ attended by Chinese government officials and academics.74 In October 1999, 
a Chinese delegation including high-level officials and members of the Drafting 
Group visited the headquarters of the OECD in Paris. This visit provided the 
opportunity for further discussion of the draft law. During the visit, the Chinese 
delegation and the OECD also planned a conference in Shanghai on ‘Legislating 
China’s Antimonopoly Law’ in December 1999. The Shanghai Conference marked 
a significant step forward in the process of adopting the Antimonopoly Law in 
China. It brought together top officials from Chinese government and expertise 
from major OECD countries for what all participants found to be a very 
productive discussion of the most substantive provisions of the draft 
Antimonopoly Law, as well as an important contribution to the understanding of 
the relevance of competition policy to China’s ongoing economic reform 
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process.75 
 
Originally the Drafting Group planned to complete a draft at the end of 1995. 
But this was too optimistic to be true. The original timetable slipped significantly. 
The first outline of the Antimonopoly Law ‘the 1999 Draft’ was not finalized until 
the 30th November 1999 just before the Shanghai Conference.76 The 1999 Draft 
consists of eight chapters and fifty-six articles. It is a milestone in the process of 
formulating China’s Antimonopoly Law because it lays down the basic structure 
of the forthcoming Antimonopoly Law.  
 
Both the US and the European Union (EU) and its Member States tried to 
influence the design of the 1999 Draft. In general, the 1999 Draft is based on the 
model of EU competition law.77 There are several reasons why China prefers the 
model of EU competition law.78 First, since China is a civil law country, it is 
difficult for China to adopt the American court-based antitrust system. China’s 
legal tradition determines that China has to follow the model of EC competition 
law. Second, China’s court system would not be able to accommodate the 
demands of applying the Antimonopoly Law, if China followed the US model.79 In 
1999, judges were not required to have a law degree. Only after 2003, have 
judges been required to pass a specially designed exam. Since then, the quality 
of judges in China has been improving. However, the complexity of competition 
issues can still be overwhelming to most of them. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect 
Chinese courts to be the core organs to enforce the forthcoming Antimonopoly 
Law at least at the early stage. Third, considering the level of economic 
development and other social conditions, China cannot adopt ‘economic 
efficiency’ as the sole objective of its forthcoming Antimonopoly Law at this 
moment, like the US. In fact, the US changed the objectives of its antitrust laws 
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over the past century.80 In other words, it does not always only apply ‘economic 
efficiency’. Thus, the multi-objective model of the EU competition law is more 
suitable for China’s Antimonopoly Law. 
 
Compared to the US antitrust laws, the most distinctive feature of the 1999 
Draft is that it differentiates economic anticompetitive practices and 
administrative anticompetitive acts. The US antitrust laws do not regulate 
administrative or regulatory anticompetitive acts. 81  Under the 1999 Draft, 
Chapters two, three and four deal with economic anticompetitive practices, 
while Chapter five prohibits administrative anticompetitive acts.  
 
In sum, the economic conditions for enacting a comprehensive competition law 
were emerging during this period. However, these conditions were far from 
mature for enacting a competition law. Generally, anticompetitive behaviour was 
not a major concern in China during this period. Consequently, it was not widely 
supported to adopt an antimonopoly law. Due to these factors, the enactment of 
a competition law failed to materialise. 
 
2.2.2 Stage Two: After China’s Accession to the WTO  
China joined the WTO in December 2001. This historical event hastened the 
process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law in China. Xiaoye Wang claimed that 
‘the call for the speedy adoption and promulgation of an antimonopoly law’ was 
‘now much louder’ with China’s accession to the WTO.82 In general, the interests 
of enacting a competition law have grown and activities of drafting such a law 
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were intensified after China’s WTO accession. 
 
China continued studying other competition regimes. In May 2002, for instance, 
officials from the SETC visited Australia and New Zealand to study their 
competition regimes. 83  In September 2002, they visited Russia, Finland and 
Sweden to study their competition regimes.84 
 
During the 5th Plenary Session of the 9th NPC held in March 2002, 31 deputies of 
the NPC submitted a bill to urge the government to adopt an antimonopoly law 
as soon as possible.85 This action demonstrated the recognition of the urgency of 
enacting an antimonopoly law after China’s accession to the WTO. It also 
illustrated that some deputies were not impressed by the progress of formulating 
a competition law.  
 
After the 5th Plenary Session of the 9th NPC, the process of formulating China’s 
Antimonopoly Law was accelerated. In April and October 2002, the April 2002 
Draft and the October 2002 Drafts were circulated respectively.86 These two 
drafts addressed some concerns raised in regard to the 1999 Draft. Compared to 
the 1999 draft, for example, the 2002 drafts do not contain blanket exemption 
provisions. Such improvements were confirmed by the note submitted by China’s 
officials to the OECD Global Forum on Competition that was held during 10th-11th 
February 2003.87 Some commentators even argued that these two drafts could be 
adopted as an antimonopoly law subject to only minor changes.88 However, the 
later development proved that this opinion was too optimistic to be true. 
Dramatic changes emerged in the later drafts. 
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In December 2003, the Antimonopoly Law was not only listed on the 10th NPC 
legislative agenda, but also treated as key economic legislation by the 10th NPC 
Standing Committee.89 It was listed as a first class legislation by the 10th NPC 
Standing Committee in 2003. In general, first class legislation means that this 
legislation is the most urgently needed law for China. 
 
In March 2003, the SETC and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation merged into a new ministry called the Ministry of Commerce.90 The 
introduction of a comprehensive competition law became a priority for the 
Ministry of Commerce.91 In July 2004, the Ministry of Commerce submitted the 
2004 Submitted Draft to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council for 
further consideration.92 The big difference between the 2004 Submitted Draft 
and previous drafts, particularly the 1999 draft, is that the former does not 
provide an independent agency to oversee implementation or to report 
violations of the Antimonopoly Law. It took a step back on this critical issue by 
proposing that the competition enforcement authority is a sub-organ under the 
Ministry of Commerce. 93  This could be because the 2004 Submitted Draft is 
submitted by the Ministry of Commerce. 
 
In early 2005, it was widely reported that the Ministry of Commerce, the SAIC 
and the NDRC each released independent and conflicting suggestions relating to 
the structural framework of the Antimonopoly Law.94 The Ministry of Commerce 
even had to publicly deny these reports that differences regarding the draft 
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antimonopoly law existed among these three ministries.95 This illustrates the 
fierce competition among these three ministries in order to be the designated 
competition enforcement authority once a competition law was adopted. 
 
The April 2005 Draft that was based on the 2004 Submitted Draft was released on 
the 8th April 2005.96 Compared to the 2004 Submitted Draft, one of the major 
changes of the April 2005 draft is that the competition authority is revised to be 
an organ under the State Council rather than a sub-organ under the Ministry of 
Commerce. This means that the forthcoming anticompetitive agency will be 
equal to a ministry, while the competition enforcement agency is under a 
ministry under the 2004 Submitted Draft. It is a significant change because this 
change will lead to the increase of the authority of the forthcoming competition 
enforcement agency.  
 
On the 23rd and 24th May 2005, the Legal Affairs Office of the State Council, the 
Ministry of Commerce and the SAIC hosted a conference on the enactment of 
China’s Antimonopoly Law in Beijing.97 Some officials from other competition 
regimes, such as the deputy minister of the American Department of Justice and 
the head of the DG Competition of the EC attended this conference. Shortly 
before the seminar, the American Bar Association’s Sections on Antitrust Law, 
Intellectual Property Law and International Law jointly submitted comments on 
the April 2005 Draft.98 In June 2005, Chinese officials held another conference on 
its Antimonopoly Law in Beijing. Representatives from some multinational 
companies, such as Microsoft Corp., Intel Corp., General Electric Co., Cisco 
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Systems Inc., Eastman Kodak Co. and Dow Chemical Co. attended this meeting 
and discussed the April 2005 Draft with Chinese officials and academics.99 
 
Based on the recommendations from other governments, companies, 
organisations and academics regarding the April 2005 Draft, the July 2005 Draft 
was circulated on the 27th July 2005.100 About five months later, on the 11th 
November 2005, the November 2005 Draft was issued by the State Council, which 
further revised previous drafts.101 Under the November 2005 Draft, the chapter 
for the prohibition of administrative monopoly and the provisions on penalties 
for administrative monopoly were entirely deleted. After this revision, only one 
provision was kept in regard to administrative monopoly. It provides that 
administrative authorities and other organizations with public affairs 
management functions are prohibited from abusing their administrative powers 
and eliminating or restraining competition.102 Some scholars believed that this 
was because China wanted its Antimonopoly Law to be consistent with the 
practices of major competition regimes and focused on economic 
anticompetitive behaviour, 103  while others argued that this was because the 
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government aimed to reduce the resistance of adopting the Antimonopoly Law 
since the incorporation of administrative monopoly was considered as one of the 
reasons why China delayed adopting a competition law.104 
 
On the 7th June 2006, the State Council discussed and approved in principle the 
June 2006 Draft. 105  This was the final stage before the 10th NPC Standing 
Committee considered the draft. Consequently, the 10th NPC Standing 
Committee deliberated the June 2006 Draft for the first time at the 22nd session 
of the 10th NPC Standing Committee, which was held from the 24th to the 29th 
June 2006.106 This illustrated that the process of adopting an antimonopoly law 
entered the final stage of being enacted.107 The 10th NPC Standing Committee 
did not adopt the Antimonopoly Law in June 2006.  
 
On the 4th November 2006, Shengming Wang, vice head of legislative affairs work 
for the 10th NPC Standing Committee, said that the Antimonopoly Law would be 
deliberated for the second time in the first half of 2007 and the State Council 
would establish an antimonopoly law committee. 108  In March 2007, the 
Antimonopoly Law was listed in the legislation plan 2007 of the 10th NPC 
Standing Committee.109 
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On 24th June 2007, the 10th NPC Standing Committee deliberated the June 2007 
Draft for the second time. Compared to the June Draft 2006, the June 2007 
Draft includes six new provisions. 110  One of them is Article 7 that clearly 
prohibits big SOEs from abusing their dominant positions and harming consumers’ 
interests.111  The June 2007 Draft was improved so much that many scholars 
believed that it only needed minor changes before it was adopted. The further 
development proves that they are right. 
 
After more than a decade of drafting, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was finally 
adopted by the 10th NPC Standing Committee on the 30th August 2007 by 150 out 
of the 153 votes.112 The adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is a landmark in 
the history of the Chinese economic legislation. James Zimmerman, the 
chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, stated that the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 is a ‘defining moment in the development of China’s 
legal system, which establishes a basic framework to build a fair, uniform and 
national competition law system that benefits consumers by recognizing and 
preserving the incentives to compete’.113  
 
The Antimonopoly Law 2007 contains eight chapters and 57 provisions. Article 13 
and Article 14 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 ban monopolistic arrangements, 
such as cartels and other forms of collusion. Article 15 grants exemptions to 
monopolistic arrangements that promote innovation and technological 
advancement. Article 17 prohibits monopolies from using their dominant status 
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in the market to curb competition, fix prices, enforce package sales, and refuse 
or enforce trade. Chapter Four of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 deals with mergers 
and acquisitions. In addition, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 also bans the so-called 
administrative monopoly.114 
 
It will improve the existing competition regime in China in four aspects once it 
comes into force on the 1st August 2008. First, it will bring some coherence to 
China’s competition regime through uniting all the existing Chinese competition-
related legislation into one piece. Second, it will provide a systematic legal basis 
for combating anticompetitive practices. Third, it will provide a general ban on 
all types of anticompetitive practices which are normally prohibited by a 
competition law in most competition regimes, such as hard-core cartels. Four, it 
will improve the enforcement of competition legislation through centralizing 
enforcement by setting up an Antimonopoly Commission under the State Council 
which will be responsible for organization, coordination and supervision of the 
enforcement of this Law. 
 
2.3 Why Has It Taken China Nearly 20 Years to Adopt the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007? 
There are several reasons why it has taken China nearly 20 years to enact the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007.115 What follows summarises some of these reasons. 
 
First, political elements delayed the adoption of an antimonopoly law. Despite 
its aim to establish a market economy, China has not abandoned its socialist 
political system. Before China adopted the Antimonopoly Law 2007, Vietnam was 
the only communist country which had adopted a competition law. Considering 
its relatively small size, Vietnam does not provide a useful solution for China. 
Moreover, Vietnam’s competition law itself suffers from criticism as well. From 
this view, no comparable example can be considered for the Chinese officials in 
order to formulate the Antimonopoly Law. Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, therefore, 
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claimed that: 
In tune with its ambition to achieve a market economy without 
completely abandoning the socialist political system, China is 
experimenting with what may be referred to as a ‘third way’ in framing 
competition law, which rejects both pure capitalism and socialism.116  
 
Second, Chinese culture is not very helpful to formulate a comprehensive 
competiton law. The word ‘competition’ originates from the Latin word ‘con-
curro’ (‘concurr’ ere’), which refers to running together, emulation and rivalry. 
However, the translation of ‘competition’ into Chinese varies from the Latin 
meaning. It is translated as 竞争 [Jingzheng] in Chinese, a creation with two 
Chinese characters. The first character 竞 [Jing] refers to emulation and race. 
The second character 争 [Zheng] stands for the negative meaning of dispute, 
quarrel, conflict and fight. From this translation, we can see that competition or 
‘Jingzheng’ does not reflect the traditional understanding of the harmonization 
[和谐, Hexie] culture. For more than 2,000 years, Chinese society has been 
influenced by Confucianism.117 According to Confucianism, harmonization is the 
basis of a society. This concept has also influenced the way in which businessmen 
operate their business. Businessmen believe in harmonious cooperation among 
themselves over competition. A harmonization culture exists not only in China, 
but also in other East Asian countries, such as Japan whose culture is also 
dominated by Confucianism.118 Although China has been governed by the Chinese 
Communist Party for nearly sixty years, the influence of the concept of 
‘harmonization’ still exists in Chinese Society. For example, building a socialist 
harmonious society is one of the aims of China’s Eleventh Five-year Plan.119 
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Traditionally, therefore, China does not have a favourable culture for 
competition as understood in the west. 
 
Third, there was a struggle for power among different ministries during the 
process of adopting the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Some ministries have huge 
power in regard to some industries, although such power is diminishing in recent 
years. For example, the Ministry of Railway is still in charge of the daily business 
of trains. Adopting a competition law could reduce the power possessed by these 
ministries. During the process of adopting the Antimonopoly Law 2007, therefore, 
they were anxious to either seek exemption from this Law or try to block the 
adoption of this Law in order to protect their own existing interests and power. 
For example, the 1999 Draft provides that this Law shall not apply, within five 
years after its promulgation, to behaviour ratified by the competition authorities 
under the State Council in natural monopolies or public utilities such as the 
postal service, railroads, electricity, gas, and water. This hostile attitude 
towards a competition law delayed the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Fourth, there were disagreements regarding the establishment of a competition 
authority or competition authorities during the process of adopting the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. The administrative enforcement authority will play a 
key role in implementing China’s Antimonopoly Law. It will play the part of law-
maker, policeman, investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury. Thus, the Ministry of 
Commerce, the SAIC, and the NDRC, which are in charge of drafting the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, compete with each other in order to be chosen as the 
designated competition enforcement authority. For example, the 2004 Submitted 
Draft submitted by the Ministry of Commerce provides that the competition 
authority is a sub-organ under the Ministry of Commerce. The power struggle 
among these three ministries seriously delayed the adoption of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007, particularly during the final stage. 
 
                                                                                                                           
‘The Roles Played by the Antimonopoly Law in Establishing Harmoney Society’ [反垄断法在构
建和谐社会中的作用, Fanlongduan Fa zai Guojian Hexie Shehui zhong de Zuoyong], 21st 
November 2006, http://www.ccaj.net/html1/2006/11/21/f329093.shtml. 
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3 Conclusion 
China started to combat anticompetitive practices nearly 30 years ago when the 
State Council promulgated the Interim Regulation for Competition 1980. Since 
then, it has adopted a number of pieces of competition-related legislation. 
However, these pieces of competition-related legislation became insufficient to 
combat the increasing anticompetitive practices during China’s market-oriented 
economic reform and its rapid integration into the global economy particularly 
after China’s accession to the WTO. Hence, China needed a comprehensive 
competition law. It started to draft an antimonopoly law in the late 1980s. The 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 was adopted on the 30th August 2007. As China’s first 
comprehensive competition law, it unites the existing competition-related 
legislation in China and provides a general ban on all anticompetitive practices. 
It will change the landmark of China’s competition regime once it takes effect 
on the 1st August 2008. Moreover, it will inevitably have international reach due 
to China’s increasingly significant role in the global economy. 
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Table II-1: Market Share of Top Three Companies in Sector in China 
Market Share of top three companies in sector (%) 
Telecoms (mobile) 100.0 China Mobile, China Unicom 
Telecoms (fixed-
line) 
100.0 China Telecom, China Netcom, China Unicom 
Alumina 100.0 Calco 
Oil mining 100.0 Petrochina, Sino pec, CNOOC 
Lottery machines 100.0 China Lotsynergy 
Insurance (property) 89.7 PICC, China Pacific, Ping An 
Insurance (life) 86.7 China Life, Ping An, China Pacific 
Instant noodles 60.0 Master Kong, Uni-president, Hualong 
Dairy products 60.0 Yili, Mengniu, Bright 
Banking 58.5 ICBC, CCB, Aboc 
Notebook PCs 54.0 Lenovo+IBM, Dell, Hewlett-Packard 
Desktop PCs 52.5 Lenovo+IBM, Founder, Tongfang 
Colour TVs 50.0 Konka, Changhong, TCL 
Cars  27.5 Shanghai GM, Shanghai Volkswagen, Beijing 
Hyundai 
Aluminium 23.1 Chalco, Qingtongxia, Jiaozhowanfang 
Sportswear 15.0 Nike, Adidas, Li Ning 
Steel 12.2 Bao Steel, Wugang Steel, Shougang Steel 
Coal mining 12.0 Shenhua, Shanxi Coking, Datang 
Source: Deutsche Bank (quoted from Financial Times, ‘Challenging Change: Why 
an ever fiercer battle hinders China’s march to the market’, p.15, 28 February, 
2006) 
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Table II-2: Competition Cases Concluded by the SAIC 
Type of Case 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Restrictions by 
public utilities 
55 102 94 131 432 758 1,614 1,089 
Predatory 
pricing 
10 59 32 19 26 39 31 43 
Tie-in sales 91 42 85 44 84 64 110 139 
Bid rigging 16 23 37 77 51 210 316 188 
Total number 
of 
anticompetitive 
cases 
172 226 248 271 593 1071 2071 1459 
Total number 
of cases 
5,288 11,388 14,891 14,646 18,199 26,053 35,371 40,851 
The percentage 
of 
anticompetitive 
cases in the 
whole cases 
concluded by 
the SAIC 
About 
3.25% 
About 
1.98% 
About 
1.665% 
About 
1.85% 
About 
3.258% 
About 
4.11% 
About 
5.855% 
About 
3.572% 
 
Source: SAIC, there is English version at 
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China.html#Statistics 
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Chapter Three:                                        
The Impact of the National Treatment 
Principle under the WTO on the Formulation 
of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This chapter examines the impact of the national treatment principle under the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007).1 To this 
end, it is structured into two sections. The first section explores whether a WTO 
Member’s competition law needs to be consistent with the WTO national 
treatment principle. The second section examines, if so, to what extent the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced by such an 
obligation. 
 
Before that, it has to be acknowledged that it is always far from easy to apply 
general principles even at domestic level. Peter M. Gerhart and Michael S. Baron 
argued: ‘Rules against discrimination are easy to state at a general level but are 
devilishly difficult to apply in particular cases; the gulf between articulating 
principles of non-discrimination and applying them is wide’. 2 This becomes even 
more difficult to apply the national treatment principle at the international 
level considering the weaknesses of international law.  
 
                                         
1
 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
2
 P. Gerhart and M. Baron, ‘Understanding National Treatment: The Participatory Vision of the 
WTO’, Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 14(3), (2003), 505, p. 505. 
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1 The WTO National Treatment Principle and WTO 
Members’ National Competition Laws3 
This section examines whether, and if so, to what extent, and how the WTO 
national treatment principle matters to WTO Members’ national competition 
laws. 
 
1.1 The WTO National Treatment Principle4 
What follows focuses on the meaning, the purpose and the exceptions of the 
WTO national treatment principle. 
 
1.1.1 The Meaning of the WTO National Treatment Principle 
The principle of national treatment has long been ‘a cornerstone of the world 
                                         
3
 For more discussions on the matter of the relevance of the WTO national treatment principle to 
competition law and policy, see, e.g., the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy (WGTCP), Communication from the European Community and Its member 
states -The Relevance of Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Transparency 
and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment to Competition Policy and Vice Versa, 
WT/WGTCP/W/115, (1999); WGTCP, Communication from Switzerland, WT/WGTCP/W/117, 
(1999); WGTCP, Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/119, (1999); WGTCP, 
Communication from Japan, WT/WGTCP/W/120, (1999); WGTCP, Communication from the 
United States, WT/WGTCP/W/131, (1999); and E.-U. Petersmann, ‘WTO Core Principles and 
Trade/Competition’, in B. Hawk, ed., International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate 
Law 2003, New York: Juris Publishing Inc., (2004), 669. 
4
 For more discussions of the WTO national treatment principle, see, WGTCP, The Fundamental 
WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment- Background Note by 
the Secretariat, WT/WGTCP/W/114, (1999); J. Jackson, The World Trading System, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge: MIT Press, (1997), pp. 213-245; J. Jackson, W. Davey and A. Sykes, eds., Legal 
Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text, 4th ed., St. Paul: 
West Group, (2002), pp. 479-531; P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organisation: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005), pp. 
326-369; M. Matsushita, T. Schoenbaum and P. Mavroidis, eds., The World Trade 
Organisation: Law, Practice, and Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2006), pp. 233-256. 
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trading system that is served by the WTO’. 5  It is set out in the following 
provisions of the three main WTO Agreements: Article III of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)6, Article XVII of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) 7  and Article 3 of the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)8. In addition, it is incorporated in various 
other WTO Agreements, such as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) 9 , the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 10  and the 
Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP).11 
 
The WTO national treatment principle requires a WTO Member to treat foreign 
products, services or persons not less favourably than it treats ‘like’ domestic 
products, services and service suppliers. Put another way, a WTO Member is not 
allowed to discriminate against foreign products, services and service suppliers. 
The WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition 
Policy (WGTCP) claimed: ‘The essence of the principle of national treatment is 
to require that a WTO Member does not put the goods or services or persons of 
other WTO Members at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis its own goods or 
services or nationals’.12 The national treatment principle is a significant rule 
under the WTO framework that has given rise to many trade disputes.13 
                                         
5Appellate Body Report, United States- Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (US-
Section 211 Appropriations Act), WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002, DSR 2002:II, 589, 
para. 241. 
6
 The GATT is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm. 
7
 The GATS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm. 
8
 The TRIPS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm. 
9
 The TBT is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm. 
10
 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm. 
11
 The AGP is a plurilateral agreement and available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_01_e.htm. 
12
 WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/114, note 3, para.13, p. 4. 
13
 See, e.g., GATT Panel Report, Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery 
(Italy-Agricultural Machinery), L/833, adopted 23 October 1958, BISD 7S/60; GATT Panel 
Report, Canada-Foreign Investment Review Act (Canada - FIRA), L/5504, adopted on 7 
February 1984, BISD 30S/140; GATT Panel Report, United States- Section 337 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930 (US-Section 337 Tariff Act), L/6439, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345; GATT 
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1.1.2 The Purpose of the WTO National Treatment Principle 
The purpose of the national treatment principle under the GATT/WTO has been 
interpreted by Panels and the Appellate Body. In Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages (Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II), for example, the Appellate Body 
claimed:  
The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism 
in the application of internal tax and regulatory measures. More 
specifically, the purpose of Article III ‘is to ensure that internal measures 
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production.’ Toward this end, Article III obliges 
Members of the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for 
imported products in relation to domestic products… Article III protects 
expectations not of any particular trade volume but rather of the equal 
competitive relationship between imported and domestic products.14 
This anti-protectionist thrust is supported by Article III:1 of the GATT which 
reads: 
Members recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges and 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and 
internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use 
                                                                                                                           
Panel Report, European Economic Community- Regulation on Imports of Parts and 
Components (EEC-Parts and Components), L/5155, adopted 16 May 1990, BISD 37S/132; 
Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II), 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:1, 97; 
Panel Report, EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC-Bananas 
III), WT/DS27/R, circulated 22 May 1997, DSR 1997:II, 943; Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS27/AB/R, EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC-Bananas 
III), adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591; Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC-
Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, 3243; Appellate Body 
Report, United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’—Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities (US-FSC), WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 
January 2002, DSR 2002:I, 55; and Appellate Body Report, US-Section 211 Appropriations Act, 
note 5. 
14
 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, note 13, p. 15. 
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of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to 
imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production.15 
In European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products (EC-Asbestos), the Appellate Body re-emphasized: ‘there must be 
consonance between the objective pursued by Article III, as enunciated in the 
“general principle” articulated in Article III:1, and the interpretation of the 
specific expression of this principle in the text of Article III:4’.16 
 
Hence, Peter M. Gerhart and Michael S. Baron argued:  
[T]he Appellate Body has developed an interpretive framework for the 
national treatment provision of Article III that is consistent with the 
process-oriented role of the WTO, and re-emphasizes it as an institution 
whose central mission is to insure that when a member country takes 
regulatory action affecting foreigners, the interests of the foreigners are 
not ignored in the decision-making process.17  
In general, therefore, the purpose of the WTO national treatment principle is as 
a legal yardstick to scrutinize the appropriateness of a WTO Member’s domestic 
legislation to see whether or not such legislation is consistent with the values 
that make up the WTO’s free trade regime. 18  The inclusion of the national 
treatment principle in the WTO Agreements helps to define the appropriate 
balance between the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members that is part of state 
sovereignty and the suppression of hidden protectionism.19 From this point of 
                                         
15
 The GATT, Art. III :1. 
16
 Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, note 13, para. 98. 
17
 P. Gerhart and M. Baron, (2003), note 2, p. 549. 
18
 Generally, the WTO rules limit the WTO Members’ domestic regulatory power in trade-related 
areas. 
19
 See generally, J. Jackson, (1997), note 4, p. 212, (referring to the ‘clash of policies’ inherent in 
the national treatment provision); F. Roessler, ‘Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral 
Trade Integration’, in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization, vol. 2, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, (1996), 1, p. 1 (stating: ‘the rules of [GATT] primarily aim at the 
reduction of barriers between markets, not at the harmonization of competitive conditions in 
markets. They therefore impose in principle only constraints on trade policies, but leave the 
contracting parties free to conduct their domestic policies’.); G. Verhoosel, National Treatment 
and WTO Dispute Settlement: Adjudicating the Boundaries of Regulatory Autonomy, Oxford: 
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view, thus, its function is similar to the so-called Commerce Clause of the United 
States (US) Constitution that has helped define the balance of power between 
the federal government and individual states.20 This could be the reason why 
Gaetan Verhoosel claimed that: ‘Defining National Treatment means determining 
the constitutional function of the WTO’.21 
 
1.1.3 Exceptions to the Application of the WTO National 
Treatment Principle 
Under the WTO Agreements, there are some exceptions where the national 
treatment principle is not applicable. Moreover, the scope of the application of 
the national treatment principle varies in different WTO Agreements. What 
follows focuses on the GATT and the GATS since they are the most important 
agreements under the WTO framework. 
 
The GATT only covers goods and does not apply to producers, while the GATS 
applies to both services and service providers. From this sense, the national 
treatment principle under the GATS has a broader scope than under the GATT. 
The GATT requirement is also limited to ‘internal’ measures. The corresponding 
requirement in the GATS is dependent on specific commitments having been 
scheduled by the WTO Member concerned. In other words, the national 
treatment principle is not applicable automatically under the GATS.  
 
In addition, there are also a number of other permissible exceptions to the 
national treatment principle under the GATT and the GATS. First, it is not 
applicable to government procurement of goods and services under Article III:8(a) 
of the GATT and Article XIII of the GATS. Under the AGP which is a plurilateral 
                                                                                                                           
Hart Publishing, (2002), p. 2 (portraying the national treatment analysis as turning on the desire 
to liberalize trade without requiring deeper market integration or harmonization).  
20
 The United States (US) Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3 (stipulating: ‘The Congress shall 
have Power… To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes’). Peter Gerhart and Michael Baron argued: ‘The national treatment 
provision, like its counterpart in the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine of the US Constitution, 
is designed to oversee the political process in member countries to ensure that the interests of 
foreigners are not denigrated or ignored’. See, P. Gerhart and M. Baron, (2003), note 2, p. 517. 
21
 G. Verhoosel, (2002), note 19, p. 7. 
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agreement, however, it applies to some WTO Members in regard to a large 
proportion of their government procurement of goods and services.22 Second, it 
is not applicable to such matters as measures necessary to protect public morals 
or maintain public order, to protect human, animal, or plant life or health and to 
secure compliance with laws and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions 
of the agreement in question under Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV of the 
GATS. Such general exceptions are subject to the requirement that measures 
taken pursuant to them are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same (GATT) or like (GATS) conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. Third, the national treatment principle is not applicable to 
the measures regarding security issues under Article XXI of the GATT and Article 
XIVbis of the GATS. 
 
1.2 Whether, and If So, To What Extent Is the WTO 
National Treatment Principle Applicable to WTO 
Members’ Competition Laws? 
Despite the existence of exceptional provisions, the national treatment principle 
under the WTO framework could still have significant effects on WTO Members’ 
domestic legislation. This is why some commentators think the national 
treatment principle is the gatekeeper for the WTO’s constitutional function.23 
What follows explores whether, and if so, to what extent the WTO national 
treatment principle is applicable to WTO Members’ competition laws.  
 
1.2.1  Is the WTO National Treatment Principle Applicable to WTO 
Members’ Competition Laws? 
In order to apply the national treatment under the GATT or the GATS, two 
conditions must be fulfilled. First, a piece of domestic legislation must fall 
within either the term ‘all laws, regulations and requirements’ under the GATT 
or the term ‘measures’ under the GATS. Second, such legislation must have 
                                         
22
 Currently 25 WTO Members are parties to the Agreement on Government Procurement.  
23
 See, G. Verhoosel, (2002), note 19, pp. 1 ff, particularly, p. 4. 
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effects on ‘internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution 
or use’ of goods under the GATT or services or service providers under the GATS.  
 
1.2.1.1 Terms ‘Laws, Regulations and Requirements’ and ‘Measures’  
Under the GATT, Article III: 4 applies to ‘all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting [the] internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use’ of products of national origin. In general, the GATT/WTO 
case law consistently interprets the term ‘laws, regulations and requirements’ 
broadly. In Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery (Italy-
Agricultural Machinery), the GATT Panel emphasized that the application of 
Article III was not intended to be limited to measures that were overtly focused 
on regulating the conditions of trade. Instead, it claimed that ‘laws, regulations 
and requirements’ could cover ‘any laws or regulations which might adversely 
modify the conditions of competition between domestic and imported products 
on the internal market’.24 This case signals the start of a broad approach to the 
meaning of ‘laws, regulations and requirements’. Subsequent GATT/WTO cases 
have followed this trend. In the Canada-Foreign Investment Review Act (Canada 
- FIRA), for instance, the GATT Panel considered that written and legally binding 
purchase and export undertakings submitted by investors were covered by 
Article III, although the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act did not make 
the submission obligatory.25 In European Economic Community- Regulation on 
Imports of Parts and Components (EEC-Parts and Components), the GATT Panel 
considered that requirements which an enterprise voluntarily accepted in order 
to obtain an advantage from the government came within the scope of Article 
III: 4.26 In addition, in United States- Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (US-
Section 337 Tariff Act), the GATT Panel made it clear that Article III: 4 applies 
to both procedural and substantive laws, regulations and requirements.27  
 
Under the GATS, the national treatment principle applies to ‘measures affecting 
the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own 
                                         
24
 GATT Panel Report, Italy-Agricultural Machinery, note 13, para. 12. 
25
 GATT Panel Report, Canada - FIRA, note 13, para. 5.4. 
26
 GATT Panel Report, EEC-Parts and Components, note 13, para. 5.21. 
27
 GATT Panel Report, US-Section 337 Tariff Act, note 13, para. 5.10. 
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like services and service suppliers’. Article XXVIII of the GATS defines the term 
‘measure’ as ‘any measure by a Member, whether in the form of a law, 
regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form’. 
Article XXVIII(c) of the GATS defines ‘measures by Members affecting trade in 
services’ to include measures in respect of:  
(i) the purchase, payment or use of a service; (ii) the access to and use 
of, in connection with the supply of a service, services which are required 
by those Members to be offered to the public generally; and (iii) the 
presence, including commercial presence, of persons of a Member for the 
supply of a service in the territory of another Member.  
Thus, the scope of application of the national treatment principle under the 
GATS is relatively clearer than it is under the GATT, because it is defined in the 
GATS. Like the approach to the meaning of ‘laws, regulations and measures’ in 
Article III: 4 of the GATT, WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have taken the 
view that the term ‘measures’ as defined in the GATS must be given a broad 
scope of application 28 , although there is less experience in applying this 
provision in particular cases than there is in respect of Article III of the GATT. In 
fact, the scope of the application of national treatment in GATS could be 
broader than in the GATT, because the GATS provisions make no distinction 
between measures which directly govern or regulate services and measures that 
otherwise affect trade in services. In EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas (EC-Bananas III), the WTO Panel argued that if the 
drafters of the GATS had intended to impose a similar limitation on the scope of 
the application of national treatment in the GATS to the GATT, they would have 
provided for the limitation explicitly in the text of the GATS itself or in the 
provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.29 These Panel findings were 
upheld by the Appellate Body.30  
 
1.2.1.2 Term ‘Affecting’ 
As discussed above, both GATT/WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have taken a 
                                         
28
 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas III, note 13, para. 220; also, Appellate Body 
Report, US-FSC, note 13, paras. 209 and 210. 
29
 Panel Report, EC-Bananas III, note 13, paras. 283-284. 
30
 Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas III, note 13, paras. 217-222. 
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broad approach to interpret the meaning of ‘laws, regulations and requirements’ 
under the GATT and the meaning of ‘measures’ under the GATS. However, this is 
not enough to claim that all domestic regulatory measures are covered by the 
national treatment principle within the WTO. In order to apply the national 
treatment principle, the term ‘affecting’ has to be examined. A domestic 
regulatory measure would not be covered by the national treatment principle 
under the WTO, if the term ‘affecting’ were interpreted narrowly. Fortunately, it 
is not the case here. In Italy-Agricultural Machinery, the GATT Panel found that, 
due to the verb ‘affecting’, Article III: 4 covered ‘any laws or regulations which 
might adversely modify the conditions of competition’ of imports.31 In US-FSC, 
the Appellate Body confirmed that the word ‘affecting’ in Article III: 4 had ‘a 
broad scope of application’.32 
 
The interpretation of the term ‘affecting’ in the GATS has followed the approach 
adopted by the case law in GATT. In EC-Bananas III, for instance, the Appellate 
Body claimed:  
The ordinary meaning of the word ‘affecting’ implies a measure that has 
‘an effect on’, which indicates a broad scope of application. This 
interpretation is further reinforced by the conclusions of previous panels 
that the term ‘affecting’ in the context of Article III of the GATT is wider 
in scope than such terms as ‘regulating’ or ‘governing’. (emphasis 
added).33  
In US-FSC, the Appellate Body confirmed that like the word ‘affecting’ in Article 
III of the GATT, the word ‘affecting’ in Article XVII of the GATS had also had a 
similar ‘broad scope of application’.34 
 
                                         
31
 GATT Panel Report, Italy-Agricultural Machinery, note 13, para. 12. 
32
 Appellate Body Report, US-FSC, note 13, paras. 209-210 (referring to Appellate Body Report, 
EC-Bananas III, note 13, para. 220 and Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada-Autos), WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 
19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VII, 3043, para. 150). 
33
 See, Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas III, note 13, para. 220. 
34
 See, Appellate Body Report, US-FSC, note 13, para. 210. 
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1.2.1.3 National Competition Laws Could Be Covered by the WTO National 
Treatment Principle 
Because the terms ‘laws, regulations and requirements’, ‘measures’, and 
‘affecting’ have been interpreted broadly, a WTO Member’s competition law 
could easily fall into the scope of the national treatment principle under the 
WTO. The WTO Secretariat has itself confirmed this conclusion. It claimed that 
competition ‘laws would fall within the scope of the national treatment rule of 
Article III:4 to the extent that they affect the internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of goods’.35 Furthermore, it also 
claimed that among WTO Members there is a ‘general recognition that the 
fundamental principles of the WTO [including the national treatment principle] 
are already applicable… to the field of competition law and policy’.36 In addition, 
Claus-Dieter Ehlerman, a former Chairman of the Appellate Body, and Lothar 
Ehring, a former member of the Appellate Body Secretariat, also argued: 
There can be no doubt that a piece of national competition legislation 
belongs to those provisions that have to comply with Article III:4 of the 
GATT. A national competition act falls within the category of ‘laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting (the) internal sale, offering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use’ of goods.37 
This opinion is also shared by other leading scholars. Bernard Hoekman and 
Petros Mavroidis, for instance, argued that WTO Members’ national competition 
laws were covered by the WTO national treatment principle as the enforcement 
of national competition laws was a ‘requirement affecting’ trade.38 
 
                                         
35
 WTO, ‘Special Topic: Trade and Competition’, in WTO, Annual Report 1997, Geneva: WTO, 
(1997), p. 69. 
36
 WGTCP, Core Principles, including Transparency, Non-Discrimination and Procedural Fairness-
Background Note by the Secretariat, WT/WGTCP/W/209, (2002), p. 7. 
37
 C.-D. Ehlermann and L. Ehring, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the 
Perspective of the Appellate Body’s Experience’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 26, 
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1.2.2 To What Extent Is A WTO Member’s National Competition 
Law Covered by the WTO National Treatment Principle?  
Although a WTO Member’s domestic competition law is covered by the WTO 
national treatment principle, it has to be recognised that this coverage has 
limitations. The obvious one is that the national treatment principle has 
inherent limitations in regard to its application to WTO Members’ domestic 
competition laws because of the scope of the application of the national 
treatment principle under the WTO generally. 39  What follows explores two 
limitations in regard to the application of the national treatment principle to 
WTO Members’ domestic competition laws.  
 
1.2.2.1 Existing Competition Laws 
Article III: 4 of the GATT expressly applies only to existing governmental 
treatment accorded in respect of ‘laws, regulations and requirements’. Article 
XVII of the GATS only applies to existing governmental measures. Under the 
current WTO law, therefore, it does not seem that the national treatment 
principle can be a possible yardstick of legal scrutiny where WTO Members’ 
competition laws are totally non-existent. In other words, the WTO national 
treatment principle cannot be used as a tool to force WTO members to adopt 
competition laws, if they have not done so. It can only be applicable to the WTO 
Members’ domestic competition laws that already exist. 
 
1.2.2.2 Affecting Trade 
As discussed above, in order to apply the WTO national treatment principle to 
national competition law, provisions or the enforcement of WTO Members’ 
competition laws must affect ‘internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use’ under the GATT or ‘the supply of services’ or 
service providers under the GATS. This has been made clear by the Appellate 
Body in the US-FSC.40 In this case, the Appellate Body stated that Article III:4 of 
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 WTO Appellate Body Report, US-FSC, note 13, para. 208. 
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the GATT did not cover all laws, regulations and requirements.41 Instead, it ruled 
that only the laws, regulations and requirements which affected the specific 
transactions, activities and uses mentioned in Article III of the GATT. 42 Thus, the 
GATT/WTO case law has made it clear that the national treatment principle 
cannot be applicable to a WTO Member’s competition law if the enforcement of 
such law has no effects on trade, although the term ‘affecting’ has been 
interpreted broadly by GATT/WTO Panels and the Appellate Body. 
 
1.3 The Potential Areas under A WTO Member’s National 
Competition Law Where Violations of the National 
Treatment Principle Could Arise 
Thus far the discussion has advanced to the point of recognizing that the WTO 
national treatment principle can reach WTO Members’ domestic competition 
laws. That means, the national treatment principle, such as Article III:4 of the 
GATT, prohibits WTO Members from applying their competition laws in a manner 
that discriminates against foreign goods, services or service providers. The above 
discussion also illustrates that the scope of the application of the national 
treatment principle to WTO Members’ domestic competition laws is limited. Not 
all aspects of a WTO Member’s domestic competition law are covered by the 
national treatment principle. Now, the question is what the potential areas are 
under a WTO Member’s national competition law where violations of the WTO 
national treatment principle could arise.  
 
GATT/WTO case law has made it clear that the national treatment principle 
applies to both procedural and substantive laws, regulations and requirements 
under the GATT and measures under the GATS.43 Thus, a violation of the national 
treatment principle could arise through both procedural and substantive 
provisions of a national competition law. In addition, the GATT/WTO case law 
has already clarified that the national treatment principle covers cases of both 
de facto and de jure discrimination, although Article III of the GATT itself is not 
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Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Chapter 3, 127 
clear on this issue. In Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry (Canada-Autos), for instance, the Appellate Body claimed:  
In approaching this question, we observe first that the words of Article I:1 
do not restrict its scope only to cases in which the failure to accord an 
‘advantage’ to like products of all other Members appears on the face of 
the measure, or can be demonstrated on the basis of the words of the 
measure. Neither the words ‘de jure’ nor ‘de facto’ appear in Article I:1. 
Nevertheless, we observe that Article I:1 does not cover only ‘in law’, or 
de jure, discrimination. As several GATT panel reports confirmed, Article 
I:1 covers also ‘in fact’, or de facto, discrimination. 44 
Unlike Article III of the GATT, Article XVII of GATS clearly provides that the 
national treatment principle does not require formally identical treatment of 
domestic and foreign suppliers: formally different measures can result in 
effective equality of treatment; just as formally identical measures can in some 
cases result in less favourable treatment of foreign suppliers (de facto 
discrimination). Thus, a violation of the national treatment can exist through 
both de jure and de facto discrimination in a national competition law.  
 
What follows explores the potential areas under a national competition law 
where a violation of the national treatment principle might exist from the angle 
of substantive issues: objectives and exemptions. It then focuses on each of 
these two substantive issues from the angle of both de jure and de facto 
discrimination.  
  
1.3.1 Objectives 
The objectives of a national competition law are significant for the enforcement 
and application of the law because:  
1. They inform the enforcement and application of the law. 2. They help 
identify and explain differences in legal standards and outcomes in 
individual cases. 3. They increase transparency and facilitate reasoned 
debate to the extent that they make explicit the rationales for decisions 
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in individual cases.45  
Nowadays, many competition laws adopt multiple objectives. Barry Rodger and 
Angus MacCulloch argued that multi-objectives were likely to bring uncertainty 
and unpredictability in the enforcement of competition law. 46  Deunden 
Nkikomborirak also claimed: ‘the broader the objective of the competition law, 
the greater the discretionary power the administration has in granting exception 
to competition cases’.47 What follows is to examine the objects which could 
present a risk of violating the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
1.3.1.1 Public Interest 
The concept of public interest has always arisen whenever competition law 
reforms take place. Michal Gal argued that virtually all competition regimes in 
developing countries included public interest as one of the objectives of their 
competition legislation.48 The term ‘public interest’ generally refers to domestic 
public interest. So far, no competition law in the world defines ‘public interest’ 
as a global public interest or an international public interest. Thus, when they 
consider public interest as the reason for granting exemptions, competition 
authorities are likely to discriminate against companies according to their 
nationality. Thus, it is questionable how the term ‘public interest’ can be 
consistent with the national treatment principle since such a term could be 
applied discriminately against foreign firms. In practice, however, it is far from 
easy to prove such violations. There is no such case in the GATT/WTO case law 
to date. 
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1.3.1.2 Development of the National Economy 
It is not unusual to include the development of the national economy as one of 
the objectives of a competition law. 49  In Japan, for example, one of the 
objectives of the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance 
of Fair Trade 1947 is ‘to promote… wholesome development of the national 
economy’.50 In India, one of the objectives of the Competition Act 2002 is to 
keep ‘in view the economic development of the country’.51 
 
However, the practice of incorporating the development of the national economy 
into competition laws is not popular among some developed countries. Ratnakar 
Adhikari claimed: ‘The question of the development dimension is largely a 
Southern phenomenon’. 52 However, Terry Winslow argued:  
[O]ne reason why the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development] countries are increasing their emphasis on efficiency and 
decreasing their use of competition law and policy to promote non-
competition goals is that they have other policy mechanisms that are 
more effective to promote such goals. Developing countries may not yet 
have alternative effective policy mechanisms for dealing with non-
competition goals.53  
 
It is not clear where the inclusion of the development of the national economy 
as a primary objective of competition law is a de jure violation of the WTO 
                                                                                                                           
Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries’, in 
UNCTAD, (2004), note 47, 21, p. 52. 
49
 About the issue of development dimension of competition law and policy, see, e.g., R. Adhikari, 
‘Prerequisite for Development-Oriented Competition Policy Implementation: A Case Study of 
Nepal’, in UNCTAD, (2004), note 47, 53; also, W. Lachmann, The Development Dimension of 
Competition Law and Policy, Geneva and New York: United Nations, (1999). 
50
 The Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade 1947, 
Sec. 1. The official English version is available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-
page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf. 
51
 It is available at http://www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/Act/competition_act2002.pdf. 
52
 See, R. Adhikari, (2004), note 49, 53, p. 68. 
53
 T. Winslow, ‘Preventing Market Abuses and Promoting Economic Efficiency, Growth and 
Opportunity’, OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, vol. 6(1), (2004), 7, p. 48. 
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national treatment principle. However, inclusion of the development of the 
national economy as an objective of a national competition law could leave the 
doors open for de facto discriminations when the term ‘national economy’ is 
applied. Competition authorities could protect domestic firms in the name of 
promoting national economic development. However, it has to be acknowledged 
that such violation of the national treatment principle is far from easy to prove. 
There is no such case in the GATT/WTO case law to date. 
 
1.3.2 Exceptions and Exemptions 
As Pamela Sittenfeld claimed, ‘one of the most controversial issues in 
competition and international trade is that of exceptions and exemptions’.54 
Very few competition laws cover all aspects of a national economy.55 Instead, 
exemptions are common practices in major competition regimes. In general, 
exemptions can be divided into sector and non-sector exemptions. Generally 
speaking, it is very rare that an exemption provided by a competition regime 
explicitly refers to different treatment to be accorded on the basis of nationality. 
In other words, a violation normally arises from de facto discrimination rather 
than de jure discrimination. A violation of the national treatment principle in the 
WTO could arise either from the case where less favourable treatment exists 
because the application of the exemption has been more burdensome for 
imported goods or services, or from the case where the design of the overall 
competition law is intended to exempt sectors where only domestic firms 
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benefit or few foreign firms benefit.56  
 
1.3.2.1 Non-Sector Exemptions 
Many competition regimes grant exemptions from the prohibition against cartels. 
These exempted cartels normally include export cartels, crisis cartels, and 
cartels involving small and medium-sized businesses. These exemptions could be, 
on their face, discriminatory where they are available only to domestic firms. 
Export cartels provide an example to illustrate how granting non-sector 
exemptions could violate the national treatment principle under the WTO.57 
 
An export cartel here refers to a group or association of firms ‘that cooperate in 
the marketing and distribution of their product to foreign markets’. 58  The 
anticompetitive conduct by associations or combinations of exporters affects 
exports and hurts foreign customers. According to the study by Simon Evenett, 
Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow, virtually all competition regimes grant 
exemptions to export cartels from prosecution by domestic authorities.59 The 
argument here is not about whether export cartels can be justified from a 
competition point of view60 but whether the exemptions of export cartels violate 
the WTO national treatment principle. These are two different issues. Whether 
export cartels violate the WTO national treatment principle does not depend on 
whether such cartels are harmful to domestic consumers. Export cartels could 
violate the WTO national treatment principle even if they can benefit domestic 
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consumers. Thus, whether or not the WTO national treatment principle is 
violated by granting exemptions to export cartels depends on how the firms 
which benefit from such exemptions are selected. Put another way, the violation 
of the WTO national treatment principle by exemption provisions under national 
competition regimes could happen where foreign-invested export firms are 
treated less favourably than domestic export firms either de jure or de facto 
under an export cartel exemption. 
 
In practice, domestic firms can generally have more chances to be granted 
exemptions than foreign-invested companies. Through export cartels, a domestic 
competition regime provides ‘legal privileges and immunities to their own 
nation’s firms that are members of export cartels’.61 It is very rare that foreign-
invested firms are the majority of the firms which benefit from an export cartel 
exemption. Instead, the majority, if not all, of the firms which benefit from an 
export cartel exemption are domestic firms. In addition, it is debatable whether 
or not the WTO national treatment obligation is violated when imports, which do 
not enjoy the exemption, are obviously treated less favourably than the 
exempted exports.  
 
From the examination of export cartels, therefore, it can be seen that whether a 
non-sector exemption is consistent with the WTO national treatment principle 
depends on how such a non-sector exemption is selected and what kind of 
companies benefit from such an exemption. If such an exemption is granted 
based on some criteria which discriminate against foreign companies or only 
domestic companies can benefit from such an exemption, the concern of 
violation of the WTO national treatment principle might be raised. In practice, 
however, it is far from easy to examine such a violation because it is very 
difficult to argue why only domestic companies benefit from a non-sector 
exemption. 
 
1.3.2.2 Sector Exemptions 
Some economic sectors are exempted from the application of a national 
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competition law through either this law itself or other sector legislation. Labour 
organisations, agriculture and transportation are the most common sectors that 
are exempted by a national competition law. 62  Other sectors that could be 
exempted from a national competition law are energy, telecommunications, 
postal services, media and publishing industries. 
  
As the European Union (EU) argued, ‘Broad sectoral exclusions from the 
application of competition law are a matter of concern’ from the point of view 
of discrimination.63 Sector exemptions could violate the WTO national treatment 
principle under the following circumstances. First, the absence of effective 
competition law disciplines in a sector of economic activity can result in 
anticompetitive practices by domestic firms, which can lead to deny access to 
the domestic market to foreign competitors.  Second, when a sector exemption 
is granted, the scope and criteria could discriminate against foreign firms. For 
example, competition law or other legislation can grant exemptions to the 
sector where domestic firms dominate the market, while at the same time it 
refuses to grant exemptions to the sector where foreign firms dominate the 
market. Thus, the application of sector exemption could de facto discriminate 
against foreign firms. In practice, however, it is far from easy in reality to argue 
that a WTO Member should not grant an exemption to a sector because the 
result of implementing such an exemption could benefit domestic firms only. 
 
2 To What Extent Has the Formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 Been Influenced by the 
WTO National Treatment Principle? 
The national treatment principle in international law is not an unfamiliar 
obligation and dates back to earlier centuries.64 But certainly it is not a happy 
application of this principle for China during the late nineteenth and the early 
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twentieth centuries.65 China was first forced to accept the national treatment 
principle in 1842 because it was defeated by the UK in Opium War. Nevertheless, 
China is bound by the WTO national treatment principle since its accession to 
the WTO. China has confirmed its commitment regarding the WTO national 
treatment principle.66 This section examines to what extent the formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced by such an obligation. To this 
end, it is structured into three sub-sections. First, it surveys the general impact 
of the WTO national treatment principle on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007. Second, it explores the impact of the WTO national treatment 
principle on the formulation of the objectives of the Law. Third, it examines the 
impact of the WTO national treatment principle on the formulation of the 
exemption provisions of it.  
 
2.1 The General Impact: Recognising the Relevance of 
the WTO National Treatment Principle in the 
Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
As discussed before, the WTO national treatment principle matters when WTO 
Members formulate their competition laws because such competition laws have 
to be consistent with the WTO national treatment principle once they are 
adopted. Initially, the WTO national treatment principle was not an issue of 
concern for the Chinese government in regard to the formulation of China’s 
competition law before it joined the WTO in 2001. However, it became relevant 
after China joined the WTO. It is far from easy for China to recognise the role 
played by the national treatment principle in the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 partly due to the painful experience of the application 
of the national treatment in China during the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries. What follows is to analyze the general impact of the WTO 
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national treatment principle on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
by exploring how China has gone through from denying or ignoring to recognising 
the relevance of the WTO national treatment principle to its competition 
legislation. This journey can be divided into three stages. However, there is no 
black and white line between each stage. In fact, these three stages are 
sometimes mixed with each other. The reason why this journey is divided into 
three stages is purely for convenience. 
 
2.1.1 Stage One: Denying or Ignoring the WTO National Treatment 
Principle 
After a year of investigation, the Chinese corporation watchdog, the SAIC, 
published a report in 2004.67 This report listed a number of industries where free 
competition may be threatened by multinationals. The list included industries 
that produced software, photosensitive materials, mobile phones, cameras, 
vehicle tires, and soft packaging. In addition, it also named some foreign 
companies which had a ‘market edge or even a monopoly’ in the Chinese market. 
According to this report, Microsoft enjoyed a 95% market share of computer 
operating system in China. Tetra Pac held 95% market share in the sterilized 
packaging market. Nokia and Motorola together took up for 70% of Chinese 
mobile phone market. Eastman Kodak, which had already held more than 50% of 
China’s roll film market, strengthened its dominant position after taking 20% of 
its sole major Chinese rival, Lucky Film.68  
 
This report not only listed some foreign monopoly companies but also accused 
them of abusing their dominant positions. On the eve of the release of WPS97, 
the report cited, a set of computer programs developed by a Chinese company, a 
multinational company hurriedly brought forward its versions of similar products 
at much lower prices. Some companies set different prices for the same kinds of 
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products, with the Chinese goods costing twice as much as the equivalents in 
their countries of origin. The report also indicated that foreign companies that 
owned rights to advanced technology or other intellectual properties squeezed 
the market by refusing to sell their services or products to Chinese companies. 
Based on these reasons, the report concluded that China needed to adopt an 
antimonopoly law in order to combat anticompetitive practices by foreign firms. 
 
One of the major concerns of foreign officials and companies in regard to China’s 
competition law is whether foreign companies will be treated no less favourably 
than domestic firms under the new law. Some multinational companies, such as 
Microsoft, have frequently given comments on the drafts of China’s 
Antimonopoly Law.69 Thus, it is not surprising that this report sparked outcries 
from foreign firms, particularly the ones whose names were mentioned. These 
firms requested explanations from Chinese officials through their own 
governments.70   
 
This report did not represent an exceptional example during that period. Some 
Chinese officials and Chinese scholars also argued that China should adopt a 
competition law as a means of fending off competition from multinational 
companies in order to protect domestic companies. For example, the head of 
China’s statistics bureau called for action to limit ‘malicious’ attempts by 
multinational companies that wanted to buy local companies to establish market 
monopolies.71 Some Chinese companies were also keen to lobby the Chinese 
government to adopt a competition law as a tool to protect them from the 
competition of foreign companies. 72  To some extent, these comments and 
lobbies denied or ignored the relevance of the WTO national treatment principle 
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to China’s forthcoming competition law, despite the fact that the Protocol on 
China’s Accession clearly provides: ‘foreign individuals and enterprises and 
foreign-funded enterprises shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to other individuals and enterprises’.73 
 
2.1.2 Stage Two: Struggling Period 
Gradually, the argument shifted. Some scholars started to argue that a 
competition law should not be used as a means against foreign companies.74 It 
also seemed that the Chinese government started to be aware of its WTO 
commitment regarding the national treatment principle.75 During this period, 
however, the Chinese government still did not fully recognise the relevance of 
the WTO national treatment principle to the formulation of China’s Antimonopoly 
Law. This was reflected in the words of the Chinese delegate at the WGTCP. On 
one hand, he stated:  
China’s current Anti-Unfair Competition Law places domestic and foreign 
firms on an equal footing, thereby observing the principle of non-
discrimination. We believe in the philosophy that the enforcement of 
competition law should reflect the competitive nature of the market as a 
whole.76  
On the other hand, he argued:  
[M]ore flexibility is needed for developing countries in applying the 
principle of non-discrimination, the aspect of national treatment in 
particular, in their legislation on competition and the implementation 
thereof.  This flexibility should also be reflected in any future multilateral 
framework on trade and competition policy.77  
He continued:  
The flexibility for developing members as provided in the existing WTO 
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Agreements related to competition policy is inadequate.  Due to the big 
gap and contrast between the developing countries and the developed 
ones in terms of economic systems, economic sizes, economic structures, 
levels of economic development as well as the sizes and competitiveness 
of various industries and enterprises, many specific de jure and de facto 
distinctions by the developing countries in the treatment offered to 
domestic enterprises as compared to that to foreign enterprises as 
referred to in the paper of the OECD will not be completely avoidable.78  
This comment clearly illustrates that on the one hand, China generally accepted 
the applicability of the WTO national treatment principle to its competition 
legislation; on the other hand, China argued that discrimination both de jure and 
de facto should be allowed to protect some domestic firms due to China’s 
economic conditions. Thus, it clearly demonstrates that, during this period, 
China was still struggling to fully recognise the relevance of the national 
treatment principle in the formulation of its competition law.  
 
2.1.3 Stage Three: Recognising the Relevance of the National 
Treatment Principle in the Formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 
After more than five years as a WTO Member, China is gaining the confidence of 
implementing WTO rules in general. This has had an impact on the 
implementation of the national treatment principle as well. China started to 
accept the WTO national treatment principle despite its previous unhappy 
experience. Moreover, China started to realise that it was not possible to ignore 
the relevance of the WTO national treatment principle in the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. As a WTO Member, China has a duty to make sure that 
its competition law is not inconsistent with the WTO national treatment 
principle. Otherwise, it could face complaints from other WTO Members and thus 
possibly unfavourable rulings by a WTO Panel or the Appellate Body. This 
potential risk of facing complaints was recognised by the Chinese government. It 
changed its tune to accept the relevance of the WTO national treatment 
principle to the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. This is illustrated by 
a recent comment from the Chinese delegate to the WTO. During China’s trade 
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policy review, some WTO Members were concerned whether foreign companies 
would be treated equally in China’s forthcoming competition law. In response to 
such concerns, the Chinese delegate reassured WTO Members that the 
forthcoming Antimonopoly Law ‘would strictly follow the principle of national 
treatment and would not be discriminatory against foreign enterprises’.79 Unlike 
the previous comment given in the WGTCP, this comment makes it very clear 
that China’s Antimonopoly Law will strictly follow the WTO national treatment 
principle without any reservation. Thus, this illustrates that China has finally 
recognised the relevance of the WTO national treatment principle in the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. This general impact of the WTO 
national treatment on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has also 
been reflected in the formulation of some of its provisions, which are examined 
in the following two subsections. 
 
2.2 The Impact of the WTO National Treatment Principle 
on the Formulation of the Objectives of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 
All drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law adopt multi-objectives. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 adopts multi-objectives.80 During the 
process of formulating the Law, some foreign government officials and 
companies were not convinced that some of the objectives would not be used as 
a means to protect inefficient domestic companies. What follows explores the 
impact of the WTO national treatment principle on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. To this end, it focuses on two objectives: development 
of the national economy and public interest because these two areas could 
present a risk of violating the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
2.2.1 Development of the National Economy 
All the drafts of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 emphasize that one of the 
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objectives of China’s Antimonopoly Law is to ensure the development of the 
Chinese economy. This might be because ‘Maintaining adequate growth is 
arguably the central challenge for China’s macroeconomic policy in the coming 
decade’.81 China’s competition law inherently aims to promote China’s economy. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the objectives of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 is to ensure ‘the healthy development of the socialist market 
economy’.82  
 
During the drafting process, however, the continued inclusion of the 
development of the national economy as an objective raised concerns from other 
WTO Members because the meaning of the development of national economy 
could be very flexible to competition enforcement agencies and courts. As some 
commentators pointed out, this language could provide a basis for unsuccessful 
competitors to attempt to seek shelter from competition and they therefore 
stressed the need to avoid the use of competition law to protect competitors, as 
opposed to the competitive process.83 If that happened, domestic companies 
could be more likely to benefit from this flexible application of competition law 
than foreign companies due to the influence of protectionism and national 
interests. Thus, the inclusion of such an abstract concept as an aspirational goal 
in the Antimonopoly Law 2007 presents a risk that competition enforcement 
agencies and courts may resort to this objective as a ground for protecting 
inefficient domestic companies against efficient foreign ones.84 In other words, 
the concept of the development of the national economy could be used as a tool 
for implementing the Antimonopoly Law 2007 against foreign companies. This 
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could lead to complaints of a violation of the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
Whether the concept of the term ‘development of the national economy’ is used 
as a means to protect domestic firms depends on how such concept is 
interpreted and applied by competition enforcement agencies and courts. It 
cannot be pre-judged that the inclusion of the development of the national 
economy as an objective is inconsistent with the national treatment principle 
under the WTO automatically. The term ‘development of the national economy’ 
is not inconsistent with the WTO national treatment principle as long as it is 
interpreted and applied in a way in which foreign firms are not treated less 
favourably than domestic firms. In practice, the interpretation and enforcement 
of Chinese laws is rarely grounded in the term ‘development of the national 
economy’, despite the fact that virtually every Chinese law includes such a term. 
Thus, it could be the case that the term ‘development of the national economy’ 
will not be applied in practice. However, the Chinese competition enforcement 
authorities should be aware of the potential risk of violating the WTO national 
treatment principle through applying the term ‘development of the national 
economy’. Further guidance or administrative rules are needed in order to make 
sure that this term is not interpreted and applied as a means to protect 
inefficient domestic companies. 
 
2.2.2 Public Interest 
The term ‘public interest’ is clearly mentioned in Article 1 of the 1999 Draft,85 
Article 1 of the February 2002 Draft,86 Article 1 of the 2004 Submitted Draft,87 
Article 1 of the April 2005 Draft,88 Article 1 of the July 2005 Draft,89 Article 1 of 
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the November 2005 Draft,90 Article 1 of the June 2006 Draft,91 and Article 1 of 
the June 2007 Draft.92 This illustrates that the term ‘public interest’ routinely 
appears in the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that Article 1 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 stipulates: ‘This Law is enacted for 
the purposes of… safeguarding … public interest’. 
 
Unlike the term ‘development of national economy’, the term ‘public interest’ 
has been interpreted and applied widely in practice in China. As Youngjin Jung 
and Qian Hao pointed out, ‘“Public interest”, used as a Chinese legal term, is a 
catch-all routinely subject to wide interpretations to the fullest possible 
degree’. 93  Public interests could ‘be exploited to prevent inefficient local 
companies from deservedly winding up as “roadkill”’.94  In a submission to the 
2003 OECD Global Forum on Competition, the Chinese government indicated that 
‘public interest’ could include the protection of employment and the 
preservation of the general ‘economic situation’.95 As with the development of 
national economy, there is a lack of guidance in the drafts of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 on how public interest will be interpreted and implemented. However, 
it cannot be ruled out that public interest will not be used to protect inefficient 
domestic companies against foreign ones. Thus, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
could be interpreted and implemented by competition enforcement authorities 
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and courts against foreign companies under the provision of protecting the 
‘public interest’. This could lead to the violation of the WTO national treatment 
principle. Thus, the Chinese competition enforcement authorities should be 
aware of such potential inconsistence to the national treatment principle when 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is interpreted and implemented. Further guidance or 
administrative rules are needed to make sure that this term is not interpreted 
and applied as a means to protect domestic firms. 
 
2.3 The Impact of the WTO National Treatment Principle 
on the Formulation of the Exemption Provisions of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
As discussed above, exemption provisions in a competition law can be areas 
where the WTO national treatment principle could be violated. Thus, it is 
necessary to draft such exemption provisions carefully in order to avoid potential 
violations of the WTO national treatment principle. What follows examines to 
what extent the formulation of the exemption provisions of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 has been influenced by the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
2.3.1 Sector Exemptions 
Article 2 (Scope of Application) of the February 2002 Draft provides: ‘Unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law, activities restricting competition in 
market transactions in the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall be 
governed by this Law’. This article sends a worrying signal because many 
anticompetitive practices can be exempted through this article. It has the 
potential to violate national treatment where these exemptions are provided 
according to the nationality of the companies concerned. This provision was 
changed in the 2004 Submitted Draft. Article 2 of this draft provides: 
‘Monopolistic behaviours in market transactions in the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China shall be governed by this Law’. Thus, this provision does not 
provide blank sector exemptions. It is an incredible change given the fact that 
many competition regimes do provide sector exemptions.96 
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However, this encouraging change did not last very long. In the April 2005 Draft, 
an article which is similar to Article 2 of the 1999 Draft was included. Article 55 
(Inapplicability to Legitimate Conducts) of the April 2005 Draft provides: ‘This 
law is not applicable to any conduct which is taken according to other laws and 
regulations’. Thus, Articles 2 and 55 together are similar to Article 2 of the 
February 2002 Draft.  
 
Article 2 of the July 2005 Draft provides: ‘This Law does not apply where other 
laws or administrative regulations provide for special regulation of an industry or 
a sector, but applies to the market competition conducted by undertakings’. It is 
very similar to Article 55 of the April 2005 Draft and Article 2 of the February 
2002 Draft.  Article 2 of the November 2005 Draft and Article 2 of the June 2006 
follow this trend. Article 2 of the June 2006 Draft provides: ‘As for monopolistic 
conduct prohibited by this Law, this Law does not apply where other laws or 
administrative regulations provide provisions’. This trend was confirmed by the 
Chinese government during China’s first policy review in 2006 by stating: ‘The 
current draft of the Antimonopoly Law does not explicitly provide the industries 
or areas that are exempt from its application. Therefore the law will be 
applicable to all industries and areas’. 97 However, such an exemption provision is 
like a blank cheque. It leaves the door open for future sector exemptions 
through sector legislation. Thus, this presents a risk that such an exemption 
provision may be resorted to as a means to protect domestic firms and 
discriminate against foreign firms through sector legislation. This could lead to 
the violation of the WTO national treatment principle.  
 
It seems that the Chinese government was aware of such a potential violation 
because the Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not include such an exemption 
provision. Article 2 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 stipulates:  
This Law is applicable to monopolistic conduct in economic activities 
within the territory of the People’s Republic of China; This Law is 
applicable to monopolistic conduct outside the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China that have eliminative or restrictive effects on 
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competition in the domestic market of the People’s Republic of China.  
This is remarkable because this provision does not provide sector exemptions 
through a blank provision and thus reduces the risk of violating the WTO national 
treatment. Therefore, this is a good example of recognising the relevance of the 
WTO national treatment principle and responding to it accordingly in the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
2.3.2 Non-Sector Exemptions 
In general, all drafts of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 include non-sector 
exemptions. However, the exemptions granted by the non-sector exemption 
provision under different drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 are not exactly 
the same. What follows is to examine the impact of the WTO national treatment 
principle on the formulation of the exemption provisions of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 by analysing the changes of these provisions. 
 
Article 11 of the 2004 Submission Draft grant exemptions from the application of 
Article 8 to:  
(1) Joint activities by operators to improve product quality, enhance 
efficiency, reduce cost, unify commodity specifications or models; (2) 
Joint activities by operators to prevent significant decline of sales or 
obvious overproduction in order to adapt themselves to economic distress; 
or (3) Joint activities by small and medium-sized enterprises to enhance 
operational efficiency and competitiveness; (4) Joint activities by 
operators to upgrade technology, improve product quality, develop new 
commodities and market; (5) Other activities that may eliminate or 
restrict competition, but are beneficial to the development of the 
national economy and the social and public interests. 
This provision was criticised due to the broadness of these exemptions. Under 
Article 9 of the 2004 Submitted Draft, for instance, members of horizontal price-
fixing conspiracy are exempted from the prohibitions of the law if such price 
fixing is ‘beneficial to the development of the national economy and the social 
and public interests’. Such criteria for non-sector exemptions could be used to 
protect domestic firms against foreign firms.  In addition, crisis cartels are 
exempted in this draft. It could be used by the competition authority and the 
courts to apply the exemption to favour domestic firms while denying the 
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benefit of the exemption to foreign companies if the law was implemented 
selectively.98 
 
Recognising the potential risk of violating the WTO national treatment principle 
by Article 11 of the 2004 Submitted Draft, some changes were made in Article 9 
of the April 2005 Draft, which provides:  
Agreements among undertakings with one of the following objectives shall 
be exempted from application of Article 8 if the agreements can enable 
consumers to share impartially the interests derived from the agreements, 
are necessary for achieving the objectives and will not substantially 
eliminate competition in the relevant market: (i) Agreements for the 
purpose of product quality upgrading, cost reduction and efficiency 
improvement; (ii) Agreements to cope with economic depression, to 
moderate serious decrease in sales volumes or distinct production surplus; 
(iii) Agreements by small and medium-sized enterprises to improve 
operational efficiency and to enhance their competitiveness; (iv) 
Agreements to enhance the competitiveness of exports in the global 
market; (v) Agreements to improve technology, develop new products or 
explore new markets.  
From this provision, it can be seen that the April 2005 Draft has made 
improvements regarding the criteria for granting non-sector exemptions. This 
provision deletes broader national interest loopholes from the 2004 Submitted 
Draft. This change can be explained as a response to the WTO national 
treatment principle because this criterion is very broad and could be used easily 
as a means to discriminate against foreign firms in order to protect domestic 
firms. In addition, Article 9 of the April 2005 Draft limits the exemptions to 
anticompetitive actions that are intended and necessary for the achievement of 
the exempt objectives— ‘enable consumers to share fairly’ in the benefits of the 
agreement, and do not ‘substantially eliminate competition in the relevant 
market’. This will reduce the potential chance that this provision will be used as 
a means to protect inefficient domestic firms against efficient foreign ones. To 
some extent, thus, it illustrates the recognition of relevance of the WTO national 
treatment principle to the Antimonopoly Law.  
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Article 15 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 stipulates: 
If the undertakings can prove that the concluded agreements belong to 
one of the following situations, Article 13 and Article 14 shall not apply: (1) 
to improve technology, research and develop new product; (2) to upgrade 
the product quality, reduce cost, enhance efficiency, and unify the 
specifications and standards of product; (3) to improve operational 
efficiency and enhance competition capacity of small and medium-sized 
undertakings; (4) to realize the social public interests such as to save 
energy, protect environment, and contribute for disaster; (5) during the 
period of economic depression, to moderate serious decreases in sales 
volumes or distinct production surpluses; (6) to ensure the legitimate 
interests in foreign trade and economic cooperation; (7) the other 
situations provided by law or the State Council. 
In addition, it requires that such agreements should enable consumers to share 
impartially the interests derived from the agreements and not substantially 
eliminate competition in order to qualify for exemption under Article 15(1)-(5). 
 
The difference between Article 15 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 and Article 9 of 
the April 2005 Draft is that the former includes a blanket provision for granting 
exemptions. Thus, Article 15 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is much broader than 
Article 9 of the April 2005 Draft. Although it does not violate the WTO national 
treatment principle automatically, Article 15(7) does present a risk of violating 
the WTO national treatment principle. In the future, thus, the Chinese 
government needs to be aware of the risk that Article 15 (7) of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 could violate the WTO national treatment principle if such a provision 
is applied in a way which foreign undertakings are treated less favourably than 
domestic ones. Any further administrative rules or guidelines regarding the 
interpretation and enforcement of this provision must be consistent with the 
WTO national treatment principle. 
 
The rest of the exemptions granted under Article 15 are common practices 
among other competition regimes. Thus, it is highly unlikely that WTO Members 
will challenge the Antimonopoly Law 2007 because this Law adopts such 
exemptions. However, violations of the national treatment principle could arise 
if China applies these exemptions in a way which foreign companies are treated 
less favourably than domestic firms. But it will be far from easy to justify such 
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complaints. To date, there have been no such complaints under the WTO 
national treatment principle. 99  Nevertheless, the Chinese competition 
enforcement authorities need to be aware of such potential violations of the 
national treatment principle under the WTO and provide clear criteria in further 
administrative rules or guidelines for enforcing non-sector exemption provisions 
under the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
3 Conclusion  
As a cornerstone of the WTO system, the WTO national treatment principle 
functions as a legal yardstick to scrutinize the appropriateness of a WTO 
Member’s domestic legislation. It is applicable to WTO Members’ competition 
laws insofar as such laws exist and the enforcement of such laws affects trade. 
Due to this significant role played by the WTO national treatment principle on 
WTO Members’ competition laws, even the US, which arguably has the most 
advanced competition regime, has to defend how its antitrust laws are 
consistent with the WTO national treatment principle.100  Particularly, violations 
of the WTO national treatment principle could be raised in regard to the 
interpretation and implementation of the objectives and the exemptions under a 
WTO Member’s national competition law. 
 
This chapter has showed that it was not easy for China to recognise the 
relevance of the WTO national treatment principle in the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 partly due to its previous unhappy experience regarding 
the national treatment principle. As a WTO Member, however, China has to make 
sure that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is not inconsistent with the WTO national 
treatment principle. In particular, it would be hard for China to justify any de 
jure discrimination under the Antimonopoly Law 2007 without the risk of 
violating the WTO national treatment principle. During the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, certain provisions have been changed in order to be 
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consistent with the WTO national treatment provisions. In general, the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not provide de jure discrimination against foreign 
firms. In particular, Article 2 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not provide a 
blank exemption to protect domestic firms in particular sectors, as most 
previous drafts do. These changes reduce the risks that the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 could violate the WTO national treatment principle. 
 
However, it has to be borne in mind that the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 is only the start of this issue. Whether the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will be 
used as means to protect domestic firms against foreign firms depends on how 
such law is interpreted and applied. In particular, the interpretation and 
implementation of the concept of public interest under Article 1 of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 could present a risk of violating the WTO national 
treatment principle. Traditionally, both Chinese authorities and courts enjoy 
broad discretion to interpret and apply laws. Moreover, it is not the case that 
Chinese courts interfere with Chinese agencies’ interpretations of laws. 
Therefore, the uncertainty of whether the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will be used 
as a tool to against foreign companies will be continued. In the future, thus, the 
Chinese competition enforcement authorities need to be aware of the risk of 
potential violations of the WTO national treatment principle and make sure that 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is interpreted and applied in a way in which is 
consistent with the WTO national treatment principle. 
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Chapter Four:                                      
The Impact of Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, 
and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper on the 
Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This chapter examines the impact of Articles VIII and IX of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 1  and Section 1.1 of the 
Telecommunications Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles of the Negotiating 
Group on Basic Telecommunications (thereinafter the Reference Paper)2 on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007).3 To this end, it is structured into two 
sections. The first section examines the impact of Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, 
while the second section focuses on the impact of Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper. 
 
1 The Impact of Articles VIII and IX of the GATS on 
the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This section explores whether the enactment of a competition law could help 
China to implement the obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS and, if 
so, to what extent the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been 
influenced by the possibility of helping China to implement such obligations. 
 
                                         
1
 The GATS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm. 
2
 The Reference Paper is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm. 
3
 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Chapter 4, 151 
1.1 Articles VIII and IX of the GATS 
1.1.1 Article VIII of the GATS 
As its title ‘Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers’ illustrates, Article VIII of 
the GATS deals with monopolies. In particular, Article VIII:2 of the GATS clearly 
stipulates: 
Where a Member’s monopoly supplier competes, either directly or through 
an affiliated company, in the supply of a service outside the scope of its 
monopoly rights and which is subject to that Member’s specific commitments, 
the Member shall ensure that such a supplier does not abuse its monopoly 
position to act in its territory in a manner inconsistent with such 
commitments. 
The key term ‘abuse’ is not defined under the GATS. The Chief American GATS 
negotiator during the Uruguay Round noted: ‘After considerable debate, “abuse” 
was left undefined’.4 It is not surprising that the term ‘abuse’ is left without 
definition since it is far from easy for negotiators to agree any such definition. 
However, further explanation of the term ‘abuse’ is still possible through Panels 
and the Appellate Body in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 
It is quite common, although less so now with privatisation, that one national 
company is invested with monopoly rights for services supply in one or several 
segments of the market. For example, the electricity sector is often divided into 
generation, transmission and distribution segments. The government often 
grants the monopoly of services supply in the transmission sector to one state-
owned company or one private company. Normally, this company is also directly 
or indirectly the distributor or producer of electricity. When it competes outside 
the transmission sector, it can easily abuse its monopoly position. It can stop 
supplies for its competitors or supply insufficient quantities with poor quality 
and discriminatory prices. Another example is postal services. Many countries 
grant the monopoly of certain postal services, such as carrying addressed letter-
mail, to one state-owned supplier. This supplier also competes in non-
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monopolized markets, such as express parcel delivery. When it competes outside 
its monopoly areas, it can easily abuse its monopoly, for example by cross-
subsidy. Article VIII is designed to deal with these situations. According to it, if a 
WTO Member’s monopoly supplier acts in a manner inconsistent with its 
obligations in or outside the scope of its monopoly rights, other WTO Members 
can request information on these practices. It is also applicable when a WTO 
Member authorises or establishes a small number of services suppliers and 
prevents competition among them. Therefore, it imposes obligations on WTO 
Members regarding preventing certain monopolies in services.  
 
So far, no complaint has been filed to a WTO Panel in regard to the issue of 
breaching Article VIII of the GATS. On the 2nd May 1997, however, the United 
States (US) did request consultations with Belgium in respect of certain measures 
governing the provision of commercial telephone directory services. 5  These 
measures include the imposition of conditions for obtaining a license to publish 
commercial directories, and the regulation of the acts, policies, and practices of 
Belgacom N.V. with respect to telephone directory services. One of the 
allegations by the US in this case is that Belgium violated Article VIII of the 
GATS.6 In June 1997, the US held consultations with Belgium in order to address 
its concerns.7 However, the US decided not to proceed further because, after a 
change in ownership interests in the Belgian directory services industry, the 
American interests were no longer substantially affected.8 Consequently, there is 
no Panel report on it. 
 
1.1.2 Article IX of the GATS 
Not only does the GATS prohibit certain restrictive practices of monopoly service 
providers, but it also addresses restrictive business practices of non-monopoly 
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service suppliers. Article IX :1 of the GATS provides: ‘Members recognize that 
certain business practices of service suppliers, other than those falling under 
Article VIII, may restrain competition and thereby restrict trade in services’. 
Article IX:2 deals with the procedure where restrictive business practices of non-
monopoly service suppliers exist. It requires WTO Members to enter into 
consultations at the request of any other WTO Member with a view to 
eliminating such practices referred to in Article IX:1. It is strict because it 
foresees the elimination of the trade constraints. However, it requires only ‘full 
and sympathetic consideration’ of requests for consultations, and supply of 
‘publicly available non-confidential information’. 9  It is not clear what will 
happen after the consultation if Members fail to reach an agreement. Is it 
possible for a WTO Member to file a complaint to a WTO Panel? This has to wait 
for clarification by WTO Panels or the Appellate Body in future WTO cases. To 
date, no such case has been filed. However, it is highly unlikely that no 
complaint is allowed to a WTO Panel if Members fail to reach an agreement 
during the consultation period because this is against the purpose of the 
establishment of the WTO dispute settlement system. Therefore, the potential 
risk of facing a complaint and possibly leading to a ruling by a WTO Panel or the 
Appellate Body exists. This implies that Article IX, like Article VIII, imposes 
obligations on WTO Members to address restrictive business practices by non-
monopoly service suppliers. 
 
1.1.3 Summary 
In sum, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS recognize that certain business practices 
may restrain competition and thus trade in services. Therefore, Article VIII 
obliges WTO Members to ‘ensure that such a supplier does not abuse its 
monopoly position to act in its territory in a manner inconsistent’ with Article II 
(the most-favoured-nation principle) and specific commitments. Article IX 
addresses a broad range of anticompetitive practices across all service sectors by 
non-monopoly service providers and obliges WTO Members to enter into 
consultations at the request of other WTO Members where such a potential 
violation of Article IX exists with a view to eliminating such practices. To some 
extent, thus, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS establish obligations for WTO 
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Members to pro-actively create internally competitive markets in services. In 
addition, they also require WTO Members to take action or provide remedies 
against private operators engaging in the anticompetitive practices that affect 
the trade in services of other Members. This implies that, unlike the majority of 
the WTO rules which concern government measures, Articles VIII and IX of the 
GATS relate to private anticompetitive practices. 
 
Conduct that is specially prohibited under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS is also 
normally subject to control under WTO Members’ national competition laws, if 
they have already adopted competition laws. To some extent, for example, 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS have similar functions to Articles 81 and 82 EC 
and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, if we ignore the fact that Articles VIII 
and IX are only applicable to trade in services. 
 
1.2 Impact on the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 
1.2.1 The Insufficiency of China’s Competition-Related 
Legislation before the Adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 Regarding the Implementation of Articles VIII and IX of 
the GATS10 
What follows examines whether the Chinese competition-related legislation 
before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was sufficient for China to 
implement Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. 
 
1.2.1.1 Abuse of A Dominant Position 
Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the Interim Rule on 
Prohibiting Monopolistic Pricing Behaviour 2003 was the major legislation which 
prohibits monopolistic behaviour through pricing. 11  Article 5 prohibits resale 
price setting. Article 6 prohibits exploitive pricing. Article 7 prohibits predatory 
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 For more details on China competition-related legislation before the adoption of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, see Chapter Two. 
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pricing and making price below costs through rebates, subsidies and rewards. 
Article 8 prohibits price discrimination under similar transaction situations. In 
addition, Article 14 (2) of the Price Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the Price Law 1997) prohibits firms from selling products at below 
cost price in order to force out competitors or monopolise the market and 
disrupt the normal production and operation order to the great detriment of the 
interests of other companies.12 Article 11 of the Anti Unfair Competition Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the LAUC 1993) prohibits predatory 
pricing by stipulating that a business operator may not, for the purpose of 
forcing out his competitors, sell his commodities at prices lower than cost.13 
However, neither Article 14(2) of the Price Law 1997 nor Article 11 of the LAUC 
1993 is designed specially for the purpose of combating abuses of dominance. In 
other words, the enforcement authorities do not need to consider first whether 
a company has a dominant position in the relevant market in order to apply 
these two provisions. 
 
Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the LAUC 1993 was the 
major legislation which prohibits monopolistic behaviour through non-pricing 
practices. Article 6 of the LAUC 1993 prohibits a particular type of abuses by 
statutory monopolies. It stipulates: 
Public utility enterprises or other operators having monopolistic status 
according to law shall not force others to buy the goods of the operators 
designated by [the public utility enterprises or other operators] so as to 
exclude other operators from competing fairly. 
However, it is only applicable to statutory monopolies. There is no mention of 
abuses by monopolistic firms other than statutory monopolies. 
 
Although Article VIII of the GATS does not define the term ‘abuse’, it seems that 
this term could refer to all abusive behaviours that are condemned in most 
competition regimes. It has to be acknowledged that it is not possible to give an 
exclusive list which includes all abusive practices. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible to agree that some abusive behaviour, such as price discrimination, is 
commonly recognised to be illegal under many competition regimes. Before the 
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adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, there was no general ban on abuses of 
dominance in China’s competition-related legislation. For example, there was no 
ban on cross-product subsidies in the non-telecommunications sector in China14, 
while such subsidies might be prohibited by Article VIII of the GATS. Put another 
way, some abusive behaviour could be legal under the Chinese competition-
related legislation, but such a practice could breach Article VIII of the GATS. 
Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, therefore, China’s legislation 
regarding abuses of dominance was insufficient for China to implement the 
obligation under Article VIII, which requires China to take action against the 
anticompetitive practices prohibited by Article VIII of the GATS. As a WTO 
Member, China should ensure that its monopoly service suppliers do not abuse 
their monopoly position to act in a manner inconsistent with Article VIII of the 
GATS. Otherwise it could face complaints from other WTO Members. 
 
1.2.1.2 Anticompetitive Agreements 
Article 14 (1) of the Price Law 1997 prohibits horizontal price fixing. It is further 
expanded by Article 4 of the Interim Rules on Prohibiting Monopolistic Price 2003. 
Article 32 of the Bid-Inviting and Submitting Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (hereinafter the Bidding Law 1999) prohibits collusive tendering 
practices.15 Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, however, there 
was no general ban on anticompetitive agreements in China. Many types of 
restrictive agreements were not prohibited. For instance, there was no ban on 
anticompetitive agreements regarding market share, boycott, quotas and other 
restrictions on production. The lack of legislation prohibiting such 
anticompetitive agreements did not imply that there were no such 
anticompetitive practices in China. On the contrary, there were such restrictive 
practices in China. For instance, at the beginning of 1993, ten brickyards in a 
city reached an agreement after consultation to reduce 30% of their production 
and mutually determine a minimum selling price.16  In April 1999, under the 
                                         
14
 Article 42 (2) of the Telecommunications Regulation of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the Telecommunications Regulation 2000) prohibits irrational cross-product 
subsidies in the telecommunications sector). An English edition of this regulation is available at 
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 See Legal Daily[法制日报, Fazhi Ribao], 31st May 1993. 
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pressure of more than ten trade competitors of Shandong Jinan Guangming 
Machinery Co., Ltd., the organizing committee of 99’s China Exhibition of Tube 
and Panel Products and Machinery for Construction Doors and Windows was 
forced to refuse to provide Shandong Jinan Guangming Co., Ltd. the exhibition 
stand originally arranged for it.17 On the 23rd May 1999, eight colour picture tube 
manufacturers whose output exceeded 90% of the total amount of colour picture 
tubes in China jointly made a decision that from the 28th June 1999 they would 
stop production for a month and reduce the output by three million tubes.18 In 
regard to the problem of the lack of regulation of certain anticompetitive 
agreements in China, some scholars argued that China’s existing competition 
regime was unable to prevent anticompetitive agreements. For instance, 
Chaowu Jin and Wei Luo claimed:  
Legal regulation of conspired restrictive competition practices in China is far 
from orderly and comprehensive. The relevant legal provisions are scattered 
among laws, regulations and departmental rules. Most of them are simply 
principles rather than applicable legal provisions… the absence of 
appropriate regulation of conspired restrictive competition practices remains 
a critical problem in the competition law of China.19 
 
In the same way that Article VIII of the GATS does not list monopolistic practices, 
Article IX of the GATS does not list anticompetitive agreements. However, it does 
not expressly exclude any special type of anticompetitive agreements. Thus, it 
seems that Article IX of the GATS could prohibit all types of anticompetitive 
agreements that are prohibited in major competition regimes. Before the 
adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, China’s competition-related legislation 
did not prohibit all types of anticompetitive agreements. For example, 
boycotting certain services was not clearly banned under the Chinese 
competition-related legislation, while it breaches Article IX of the GATS. Like the 
situation of abuses of dominant positions, therefore, some anticompetitive 
agreements could be legal under current Chinese competition-related legislation, 
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while they could breach Article IX of the GATS. If that happened, China could 
enter into consultations at the request of any other WTO Member with a view to 
eliminating the practices referred to in Article IX:1 of the GATS. It would be very 
difficult for China to do so due to its lack of legislation providing a general ban 
on such practices. This illustrates that Article IX imposes obligations on China 
regarding combating certain anticompetitive agreements. 
 
1.2.1.3 The Insufficiency of China’s Competition-Related Legislation 
Thus far, not all anticompetitive practices prohibited under Articles VIII and IX of 
the GATS were illegal under the Chinese competition-related legislation before 
the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. For example, restrictive distribution 
systems and exclusionary boycotts were not illegal in China because there was 
no ban on such anticompetitive practices under the Chinese competition-related 
legislation. However, these anticompetitive practices could be banned under 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS if they have impacts on trade in services. 
Therefore, China could face complaints from other WTO Members due to its lack 
of legislation prohibiting the anticompetitive practices which are banned under 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. It had two options to implement the obligations 
under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS.20 The first option was that China could 
amend its existing competition-related legislation. However, it was not easy to 
insert a general ban on anticompetitive practices into the existing competition-
related legislation because none of the existing legislation was specially 
designed to combat anticompetitive practices. Even if it had been provided in 
China’s existing competition-related legislation, such a provision would not have 
been implemented efficiently due to the lack of systematic design of the 
competition-related legislation. Therefore, this option was not an ideal solution 
for China to implement Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, although there is no 
doubt that it would have been helpful. The second option was to adopt a new 
piece of legislation providing a general ban on anticompetitive practices. The 
new legislation could provide a systematic solution regarding Articles VIII and IX 
of the GATS.  
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1.2.2 Impact on Formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Enacting a comprehensive competition law belongs to the second option for 
China to implement its obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. If it 
provides a general ban on anticompetitive practices which include the practices 
prohibited by Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, a comprehensive competition law 
could help China to implement its obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the 
GATS.  
 
As China’s first comprehensive competition law, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 does 
provide a general ban on anticompetitive practices. Article 3 of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 refers to monopolistic conduct as: (i) ‘undertakings 
concluding monopoly agreements’ (monopoly agreements here means 
‘agreements, decisions or other concerted practices that eliminate or restrict 
competition’); (ii) ‘abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings’; (iii) 
‘concentration of undertakings that have or are likely to have the effects of 
eliminating or restricting competition’. In fact, all the drafts included a similar 
provision on prohibiting anticompetitive practices during the process of 
formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007. In particular, Article 3 of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 is exactly the same as Article 3 of the June 2006 Draft21 
and Article 3 of the June 2007 Draft.22 From this, we can see that providing a 
general ban on anticompetitive practices was always included in the drafts 
through the process of drafting China’s Antimonopoly Law. There was no 
controversy in regard to providing a general ban on anticompetitive practices. 
During the drafting process, therefore, there was no doubt that China’s 
forthcoming competition law would provide a general ban on anticompetitive 
practices even without considering the impacts of Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. 
 
However, China’s WTO membership strengthened the expectation that China’s 
forthcoming competition law needed to provide a general ban on 
anticompetitive practices because by doing so, such legislation could help China 
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to implement the obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. After China’s 
accession to the WTO, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS are binding on China. 
Because the Chinese competition-related legislation did not ban all 
anticompetitive practices which are prohibited by Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, 
it became urgent for China to enact a national competition law that provided a 
general ban on anticompetitive practices in order to implement Articles VIII and 
IX of the GATS. During the process of formulating China’s Antimonopoly Law, 
therefore, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS did positively have an impact on 
broadening the scope of China’s forthcoming competition law, although they 
might not play a decisive role in this issue. In the future, it is important for the 
Chinese competition enforcement authorities to be aware of the need to 
implement the obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS through 
enforcing the Antimonopoly Law 2007 in a way that such benefits are 
materialised. 
 
2 The Impact of Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper 
on the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This section examines whether the enactment of an antimonopoly law could help 
China to implement the obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, and 
if so, to what extent the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been 
influenced by the possibility of helping China to implement such an obligation. 
 
2.1 Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper  
2.1.1 Background 
2.1.1.1 The Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA) 
When the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation 
(hereinafter the Marrakesh Agreement) was signed in April 1994, no agreement 
was reached in regard to basic telecommunications.23 In the telecommunications 
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sector, however, a major issue is the abuse of a dominant position by existing 
suppliers, often in the public sector or legally sanctioned private monopolies, to 
block the entry of new competitors. Because it is costly and wasteful for each 
supplier to install its own wire network, one way in which an incumbent can 
block competition is to deny new entrants access (interconnection) to its pre-
existing network. In respect of this issue, Article VIII of the GATS is limited in 
scope. Thus, negotiations on basic telecommunications were continued after the 
establishment of the WTO in order to ensure that monopolistic suppliers would 
not undermine market access commitments. 24  Andreas F. Lowenfeld claimed: 
‘The [telecoms] negotiations in the WTO were consistent with the general wave 
of privatisation and deregulation, which in turn was consistent with opening up 
of at least some competition within states and across national frontiers’.25  
 
On the 15th February 1997, sixty-nine WTO Members comprising more than 91 
percent of global telecommunications revenues at that time reached the Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement (BTA).26 The BTA governs the liberalization of 
basic telecommunications services among WTO Members that have signed it.27 It 
took effect in February 1998. 28  It covers ‘basic telecommunications’, which 
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 For a brief introduction of the negotiations on basic telecommunications, see M. Bronckers and 
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includes local, long distance, and international services, for public and non 
public uses, offered through any technology, such as cable, satellite, wireless, 
on a facilities basis or by resale. It aims to provide an additional measure in the 
telecommunications sector within the GATS. This purpose is illustrated by the 
last sentence of § 1 of the BTA, which expressly stipulates: ‘this Annex provides 
notes and supplementary provisions to the Agreement [GATS]’. Thus, the BTA is 
not a free-standing WTO agreement but a series of commitments that compose 
part of the GATS.29 It is only binding on the WTO Members who signed it. 
 
2.1.1.2 The Reference Paper 
During the early stage of the negotiations of the BTA, the negotiators recognised 
that it was necessary to set up competitive safeguards against anticompetitive 
practices.30 The reason behind this recognition is that most telecommunication 
regulations and laws did not foster competitive markets and had been dominated 
by state-owned companies.31 The purpose of such competitive safeguards would 
be to ensure monopolies or former monopolies of basic telecommunications not 
to exploit their monopolistic position to impede the ability of competitors to 
supply networks or services for which commitments would be made. In addition, 
the negotiators also recognised the need for establishing independent regulators 
for telecommunications sectors whose function was separated from the basic 
telecommunications operators.32 Based on this recognition, the US convened a 
meeting of selected delegates to initiate a dialogue on regulatory objectives in 
December 1994. This group met regularly to draft what later became the 
Reference Paper. A draft of the Reference Paper was circulated to all 
participants of the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications in December 
                                                                                                                           
the 30th November 1997, the target date established by the WTO. After further negotiations in 
January 1998, signatories agreed to implement the BTA on the 5th February 1998. 
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 L. Sherman, (1998), note 24, 61, p. 64. 
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 See, WTO, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications - Review of Outstanding Issues - 
Note by the Secretariat, TS/NGBT/W/2, 8th July 1994, para. 15. 
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 L. Sherman, (1998), note 24, 61, p. 80. 
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 See, WTO, TS/NGBT/W/2, note 30, para. 16. 
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199533 and January 1996.34 
 
During the negotiations, a number of ways were considered in order to make the 
Reference Paper binding obligations and subject to WTO dispute settlement 
system. One of the options is to amend the text of the GATS to include the 
Reference Paper. However, it is far from easy to do that because such 
amendment needs ratification by two-thirds of WTO Members.35 Thus, the most 
feasible way to ensure the Reference Paper to be binding is to include it as 
‘additional commitments’ permitted by Article XVIII of the GATS. As a result, it 
was agreed to include the Reference Paper in their Schedules in the additional 
commitments column.36 Consequently, the Reference Paper is only binding on 
the WTO Members which include the Reference Paper in their Schedules in the 
additional commitments column. 
 
The purpose of the Reference Paper is: (i) to provide the requisite safeguards in 
domestic law for market access and foreign investment commitments to be truly 
effective; and (ii) to anchor these safeguards in the WTO system. It lays down six 
guiding principles: competitive safeguards, interconnection, universal services, 
public availability of licensing criteria, independent regulation, and allocation 
and use of scarce resources.37 The principle of competitive safeguards aims to 
prevent anticompetitive practices in the telecommunications sector. 38  It is 
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designed to impose pro-competitive regulatory principles on some WTO members 
by being incorporated into WTO Members’ special commitment schedules. In 
particular, Section 1 of the Reference Paper is designed to have a pro-
competitive function, as illustrated by its title, ‘Competitive Safeguards’. 
 
2.1.2 Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld argues: ‘because the history of telecommunication services 
had been heavily based on monopolies—indeed many thought of telephone and 
related services as natural monopolies—major attention had to be paid to the 
rules of competition’.39 Thus, Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper aims to prevent 
anticompetitive practices in the telecommunications sector, which is clearly 
expressed in its title, ‘Prevention of Anti-competitive Practices in 
Telecommunications’. It provides: ‘Appropriate measures shall be maintained for 
the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier 
from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices’. Section 1.2 of the 
Reference Paper gives a list of anticompetitive practices which includes: (a) 
engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization; (b) using information obtained 
from competitors with anti-competitive results; and (c) not making available to 
other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information about essential 
facilities and commercially relevant information which is necessary for them to 
provide services.  
 
Compared to Section 1 of the Reference Paper, the original US proposal was a 
more detailed set of competitive safeguards.40 According to the US proposal, 
dominant carriers were prohibited from cross-subsidizing non-regulated services. 
Certain dominant carriers were required to adopt structural separation or cost 
accounting safeguards. A dominant carrier was required to make publicly 
available network information which was necessary to facilitate interconnection 
or the supply of competitive telecommunications services. However, these 
proposals were not accepted and the idea underling the Reference Paper is to 
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establish broad principles to regulate telecommunications. Thus, the negotiating 
countries agreed to a general competitive principle rather than a fairly detailed 
set of competitive safeguards.41 
 
In Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico-Telecoms), 
the Panel claimed: ‘Section 1 is a voluntary, additional commitment to maintain 
certain “appropriate” measures, which reserves a degree of flexibility for 
Members in accepting and implementing such an additional commitment’. 42 
However, a Member will lose its certain regulatory autonomy in regard to the 
telecommunications sector, once it accepts the Reference Paper. The WTO 
Members which have accepted the Reference Paper must both enact 
competition-related legislation and effectively enforce such legislation in order 
to maintain ‘appropriate measures’ ‘for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, 
alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-
competitive practices’ in telecommunications sectors. Laura Sherman, however, 
argued: ‘Failure to adopt or maintain measures that would prevent 
anticompetitive conduct could be cause for dispute settlement, but failure to 
enforce those measures would not’, because the language used in Section 1.1 of 
the Reference Paper was ‘very different from that used in other contexts in 
which positive measures have been required in order to ensure particular 
results’.43 It is true that the language used in Section 1.1 is not exactly the same 
as other contexts in which positive measures have been required in order to 
ensure particular results, such as Section 2 of the Reference Paper which uses 
the language ‘will be ensured’. However, Section 1.1 clearly provides that the 
purpose of maintaining appropriate measures is to prevent ‘suppliers who, alone 
or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices’. In Mexico-Telecoms, the Panel reaffirmed that such appropriate 
measures should be ‘suitable for achieving their purpose’ of ‘preventing a major 
supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices’.44 If such 
measures were not effectively implemented, how could the purpose of 
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‘preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging 
in or continuing anti-competitive practices’ be achieved? Moreover, failure to 
implement such measures will have the similar result of the lack of such 
measures. Thus, failure to enforce the measures that prevent anticompetitive 
practices could be cause for dispute settlement. 
 
In sum, adopting appropriate measures is the first step to implement Section 1.1 
of the Reference Paper. Without the existence of competition-related legislation, 
it would not be possible for WTO Members to maintain the appropriate measures 
to combat anticompetitive practices. For the WTO Members that have included 
the Reference Paper into their Schedules in the additional commitments column 
but have not adopted appropriate competition-related measures. Therefore, the 
first task is to enact competition-related legislation in order to fulfil their WTO 
commitments. Such legislation can be a general competition law which applies 
to the telecommunications sector or sector legislation in the telecommunications 
sector which prohibits anticompetitive practices. For the WTO Members that 
have included the Reference Paper into their Schedules in the additional 
commitments column and have adopted appropriate competition-related 
measures, the obligation is to enforce such measures effectively.  
 
2.2 Case Study: Mexico-Telecoms45 
2.2.1 The Facts46 
Telmex, a Mexican telecommunications company, is the biggest basic 
telecommunications provider in Mexico. The Rules for the Provision of 
International Long-Distance Service To Be Applied by the Licensees of Public 
Telecommunications Networks Authorized to Provide this Service (ILD Rules) 
entered into force on the 12th December 1996. It grants Telmex, alone among 
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Mexican basic telecommunications service suppliers, the authority to negotiate 
the charge that foreign basic telecommunications suppliers must pay their 
Mexican counterparts to interconnect telephone calls originating abroad. By law, 
all Mexican basic telecommunications suppliers must incorporate this connection 
rate in their interconnection agreements with foreign cross-border basic 
telecommunications service suppliers and therefore cannot make independent 
decisions on the rates they charge. 
 
On the 17th August 2000, the US requested consultations with Mexico in respect 
of Mexico’s commitments and obligations under the GATS with respect to basic 
and value-added telecommunications services. On the 17th April 2002, the 
Dispute Settlement Body established a Panel at the request of the US to resolve 
the dispute between the US and Mexico with regard to the dispute in the 
telecommunications sector. On the 26th August 2002, the Panel was composed. 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, European Communities, Guatemala, Honduras, 
India, Japan, and Nicaragua joined as third parties in this case. The Panel Report 
of this case was circulated on the 2nd April 2004 and adopted on the 1st June 
2004. 
 
2.2.2 Key Arguments Regarding Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper 
One of the main allegations in this case is whether Mexico’s failure to maintain 
measures to prevent Telmex from engaging in anticompetitive practices was 
inconsistent with its obligations under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper.47 
 
The US claimed that Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper provided for the 
maintenance of appropriate measures to prevent major suppliers from engaging 
in or continuing anticompetitive practices.48 It recalled that the purpose of those 
appropriate measures was to prevent anticompetitive practices by suppliers who 
‘alone or together’ are a major supplier. 49  It claimed that Mexico failed to 
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 See the United States’ first written submission in Mexico-Telecoms, para. 191.  
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implement its commitments under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper50 because 
Mexico’s ILD rules empowered Telmex to engage in monopolistic practices in 
respect of interconnection rates for basic telecom services supplied on a cross-
border basis and to create an effective cartel dominated by Telmex to set rates 
for such interconnection.51  
 
In response, Mexico argued that the obligation in Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper was to maintain ‘suitable or proper’ measures with the object or the 
intention of preventing Telmex from engaging in anti-competitive practices.52 
Thus, it claimed that Section 1.1 should not be interpreted to mean that Mexico 
was required to prevent all suppliers from even engaging in or continuing 
anticompetitive practices.53 Instead, Section 1.1 should be interpreted to allow 
Mexico a large measure of discretion in deciding what measures would be 
suitable or proper to accomplish the intended objectives.54  It further argued 
that Section 1.1 created not an obligation of result, but an obligation of 
means.55 This argument was supported by the EU.56 
 
In addition, Mexico also argued that its ILD Rules were domestic legislation. 
Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper should not apply to anticompetitive measures 
implemented or maintained by a WTO Member.57 The EU supported this argument 
by claiming that it was not possible for a Member to restrict competition where 
competition is not allowed.58 Thus, it argued that the fixing of a uniform price 
and revenue sharing system were not anti-competitive practices because they 
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were mandated by law.59 
 
2.2.3 Panel Finding in Regard to Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper 
One of the key findings in the Panel Report was that Mexico had failed to 
maintain appropriate measures to prevent ‘anti-competitive practices’ in 
violation of Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper.60 
 
In regard to the argument that the ILD Rules were domestic legislation and thus 
not subject to Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, the Panel reinforced a 
longstanding international legal principle stipulated in Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties that a government must bring its domestic 
laws and regulations into conformity with the treaty obligations it undertakes. It 
noted that Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, along with other commitments 
under the GATS, was ‘designed to limit the domestic regulatory powers of WTO 
Members’.61 It continued: 
In accordance with the principle established in Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention, a requirement imposed by a Member under its internal law on a 
major supplier cannot unilaterally erode its international commitments made 
in its schedule to other WTO Members to prevent major suppliers from 
‘continuing anti-competitive practices’. The pro-competitive obligations in 
Section 1 of the Reference Paper do not reserve any such unilateral right of 
WTO Members to maintain anticompetitive measures.62 
Thus, the Panel claimed that uniform settlement rates and proportional returns 
required Mexican operators to engage in practices that were tantamount to a 
cartel and hence were anticompetitive, despite the fact that they were 
mandated by Mexican law.63 Therefore, the Panel found:  
Mexico has failed, in violation of Section 1.1 of its Reference Paper, to 
maintain ‘appropriate measures’ to prevent anti-competitive practices by 
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maintaining measures that require anti-competitive practices among 
competing suppliers which, alone or together, are a major supplier of the 
services at issue.64 
 
2.2.4 Commentary 
This is the first case that Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper has been examined. 
The Panel Report was criticised by some academics due to the way in which the 
Panel adopted the competition concepts in international trade. 65  However, 
neither Mexico nor the US disagreed with the Panel Report. They did not appeal 
to the Appellate Body. Consequently, the Panel Report was adopted on the 1st 
June 2004. In practice, therefore, the Panel Report is not as controversial as 
some academics argued. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann summarised the potential 
impact of Mexico-Telecoms on competition issues by claiming that this case: 
[C]ould trigger a large number of similar WTO disputes once the contested 
interpretation of the GATS commitments has been clarified through WTO 
jurisprudence. The pro-competitive obligations in the ‘Reference Paper’ 
accepted by more than 70 WTO Members include open-ended, general 
obligations to prevent ‘anti-competitive practices’ that are likely to lead—
similar to the broad competition rules in the domestic competition laws of 
many WTO Members—to progressive judicial clarification of specific 
obligations to prevent price fixing, market sharing and other anticompetitive 
practices.66 
 
In respect of WTO Members’ domestic competition law and policy, the most 
interesting and significant finding in this case is that the Panel reinforces that 
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Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper imposes obligations on Members in respect of 
maintaining appropriate measures ‘for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, 
alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-
competitive practices’ by concluding that Mexico had the obligation to maintain 
appropriate measures to prevent Telmex, a major supplier, from engaging in 
‘ant-competitive practices’. As mentioned previously, the majority of the WTO 
rules focus on governmental measures rather than private activities. Like 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, however, Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper 
clearly requires WTO Members to take action against private activities. In this 
case, Mexico was required to prevent Telmex, which is a company, from engaging 
in anticompetitive practices. 
 
2.3 Impact on the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 
When it joined the WTO in 2001, China accepted the principles of the Reference 
Paper by including the Reference Paper in its schedules of WTO commitments 
and thus made commitments to implement pro-competitive regulatory policy in 
the telecommunications sector.67 In other words, the Reference Paper is binding 
on China. 
 
2.3.1 2.3.1 Current Measures and Problems Regarding Preventing 
Anticompetitive Practices in China’s Telecommunications 
Sector 
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2.3.1.1 The Chinese Telecommunications Sector68 
Although general economic reforms had been started in China in 1978, the 
Chinese telecommunications sector remained almost untouched until the early 
1990s. In 1993, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which was 
both the regulator and sole service provider, started to loosen its regulation by 
permitting the SOEs other than those under the MPT to provide a few value-
added telecommunications services. In 1994, China Unicom, the second 
telecommunications company, was established in order to compete with China 
Telecom. It signalled the initial introduction of competition in the Chinese 
telecommunications sector. In 1997, the telecommunications and postal services 
were separated. In March 1998, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) was 
established by merging the MPT and the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI). 
Consequently, the MII replaced the MPT as China’s regulatory authority for the 
telecommunications sector. In 1999, China telecom was split into four companies: 
the New China Telecom, China Mobile, China Satellite and the Guoxin Paging Co., 
which was later merged into China Unicom. Again, the New China Telecom was 
split into two: China Telecom and China Netcom. In 2000, China Tietong was 
established. Among the six national basic telecom service providers, China 
Telecom, China Netcom and China Tietong are fixed-line service providers, China 
Mobile and China Unicom are licensed mobile communications service providers 
and China Satellite is the only company providing satellite-based services. 
 
Upon its accession to the WTO in 2001, China agreed to a six-year schedule in 
direct foreign participation in value-added and basic telecommunications 
services, and to establish an independent and transparent regulatory authority 
and pro-competitive regulatory regime in the telecommunications sector. Under 
Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, China should maintain appropriate measures 
for the purpose of preventing telecommunications suppliers in China with market 
power from engaging in anticompetitive practices, such as cross-subsidization, 
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concealing technical information and specifications about network and services. 
 
2.3.1.2 Current Measures 
On the 25th September 2000 just before China completed its negotiations to join 
the WTO, the Telecommunications Regulation of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the Telecommunications Regulation 2000) became effective.69 So far, 
it is the most important piece of legislation regarding the Chinese 
telecommunications sector. China has been drafting a telecommunications law 
for more than nine years.70 But at the end of July 2007, the draft was still not 
sent to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC). 
 
Article 17 of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 provides ‘the dominant 
operator in telecommunication service shall not refuse requests for 
interconnection by other operators and the special-purpose net operators’. 
Article 41 of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 provides: 
Telecommunications operators shall not commit the following acts in the 
course of providing telecommunications services: (1) Restricting 
telecommunications subscribers in any manner in the use of services 
designated by them; (2) Restricting telecommunications subscribers to 
purchasing telecommunications terminal equipment designated by them or 
rejecting the use of telecommunications terminal equipment with which 
telecommunications subscribers have equipped themselves and for which 
network access licenses have been procured; (3) Altering without 
authorization or changing by means of disguise the fee rates, and increasing 
without authorization or increasing by means of disguise the fee rates in 
violation of the provisions of the State; (4) Rejecting, delaying or 
terminating the provision of telecommunications services to 
telecommunications subscribers without a proper reason; (5) Failing to 
perform undertakings made publicly to  telecommunications subscribers or 
carrying out false promotion that is easily misleading; (6) Causing difficulties 
for telecommunications subscribers by improper means or retaliating against 
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telecommunications subscribers who lodge complaints. 
Article 42 of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 provides: 
Telecommunications operators shall not commit the following acts in the 
course of conducting telecommunications businesses: (1) Restricting 
telecommunications subscribers in any manner in selecting 
telecommunications services run by other telecommunications operators in 
accordance with law; (2) Cross-subsidizing in an unreasonable manner the 
various businesses they conduct; (3) Engaging in improper competition by 
providing telecommunications businesses or services at a price lower than 
the cost. 
From these provisions, we can see that the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 
does include some pro-competitive provisions.  
 
However, the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 has several shortcomings. 
First, some of its provisions are drafted loosely. For instance, Article 43.3 
prohibits ‘engaging in improper competition by providing telecommunications 
businesses or services at a price lower than the cost’. There are at least two 
problems with this provision. First, the term ‘improper competition’ is used 
without any further definition. This term is not common language that is used by 
any major competition regime. In its further administrative legislations, there is 
no explanation of the term. It could be partly because China had not adopted a 
competition law when this regulation was formulated and there was no standard 
term for anticompetitive practices. Second, it is notoriously difficult to decide 
when the price is lower than the cost. And it is not very convincing that this 
provision will benefit consumers directly. These loosely drafted provisions make 
it very difficult to use the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 to combat 
anticompetitive practices in the telecommunications sector. 
 
Second, some provisions in the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 are not 
consistent with the Reference Paper. For instance, it contains a number of 
provisions which deal with the setting of telecommunications charges. Under the 
Regulation, telecommunications charges are divided into three types: market-
decided price, government-guided price and government-fixed price. 71  The 
government-guided price and government-fixed price could raise some concerns 
                                         
71
 The Telecommunications Regulation 2000, Art. 24. 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Chapter 4, 175 
from a competitive point of view. It is notoriously difficult for the government to 
decide when the price is fair. The price should be decided by the market rather 
than the government. Moreover, other WTO Members could bring some 
complaints regarding the government-guided price and government-fixed price 
under the BTA and the Reference Paper. Due to these reasons, from October 2005, 
the Chinese government does not set prices for each telecommunications service 
but sets ceiling prices for all telecommunications services and allow 
telecommunications carriers to set their own service prices. 
 
Third, the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 lacks well designed, self-
executing and reliable enforcement procedures and mechanisms.72 Like other 
existing competition-related legislation in China, the liabilities and punishments 
under the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 against anticompetitive practices 
are very light.73 They range from condemnation by the competent regulating 
authority to the most severe measures, such as fines or suspension of operations. 
The maximum amount of fines is one million RMB, which is equal to about 
£70,000. This is even less than the annual salary of a Chief Executive Officer in a 
multinational company. Thus, these punishments are too light to prevent 
anticompetitive practices in the Chinese telecommunications sector. 
 
2.3.1.3 Problems 
China’s telecommunications sector has experienced changes for the last decade. 
China has taken ‘appropriate measures’, such as dividing up the old China 
Telecom and adopting the Telecommunication Regulation 2000, to prevent 
‘suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or 
continuing anti-competitive practices’. These measures have promoted 
competition in the telecommunications sector. Under Section 1.1 of the 
Reference Paper, the Chinese government should effectively prevent China’s 
telecommunications carriers with market power from engaging in 
anticompetitive behaviour such as cross-subsidy. Now the question is whether 
these measures are enough to prevent suppliers who, alone or together, are a 
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major supplier from engaging in or continuing anticompetitive practices in the 
telecommunications sector. 
 
Chinese telecommunications users had been subject to high telecommunications 
charges and a poor quality of service particularly during the time when China 
Telecom monopolized the telecommunications sector before it was broken up. In 
recent years, particularly after China’s WTO accession in 2001, 
telecommunications charges (e.g., initial connection charges and rates for long 
distance telephone calls) have been significantly reduced and service quality has 
been improved by domestic telecommunications operators. In order to gain a 
larger share of the local market, however, some telecommunications operators 
have resorted to anticompetitive practices, such as cross-subsidy of different 
types of services by the dominant operators. In 1999, for example, a local 
branch of China Unicom in Chengdu City lowered the price in mobile service in 
order to expand its local market share. In response, a local branch of the old 
China Telecom in the same city cut the charges for mobile network access from 
RMB 800 yuan (US$96) to RMB 10 yuan (US$1.2).74 In 1999, the old China Telecom 
and China Unicom were the only two suppliers for mobile services. And the 
former was far bigger than the latter. That is one of the reasons why the branch 
of the old China Telecom was able to respond to the price cut of China Unicom in 
an aggressive way. The adoption of the Telecommunications Regulation 2000 does 
help to address anticompetitive problems by prohibiting certain anticompetitive 
practices in the telecommunications sector. However, the Telecommunications 
Regulation 2000 alone is far from enough to effectively curtail all 
anticompetitive practices in the Chinese telecommunications sector due to its 
shortcomings. Currently, the telecommunications sector in China is still 
dominated by a few SOEs.  
 
In sum, there has been no well-established and coherent competition legislation 
in the telecommunications sector to safeguard competition with the result that 
cross-subsidy, distorted tariffs, and highly concentrated markets are significant 
barriers to entry for potential foreign competitors. Thus, the existing legislation 
on the telecommunications sector in China is not enough to prevent ‘suppliers 
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who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing 
anticompetitive practices’ in the sector. A gap exists between the existing 
Chinese legislation on anticompetitive practices in the telecommunications 
sector and the obligation under 1.1 Section of the Reference Paper. Rui Kang and 
Xiaoju Feng argued: 
[B]ecause China is still in a transitional period, moving from a central- 
planning mechanism towards a pro-competitive market orientation, it is not 
surprising that there exists a large gap between the present reality and the 
principles in the WTO Reference Paper.75 
 
2.3.2 Impact of Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper on the 
Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
As demonstrated above, the existing measures in the Chinese 
telecommunications sector, such as the Telecommunications Regulation 2000, are 
insufficient as appropriate measures ‘for the purpose of preventing suppliers 
who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-
competitive practices’ in the Chinese telecommunications sector. Thus, further 
measures are needed for China to implement its obligation under Section 1.1 of 
the Reference Paper. To this end, one of the actions that China is taking is to 
adopt a national telecommunications law. Currently, however, the process of 
formulating the Telecommunications Law is very slow and no draft has been 
deliberated by the NPC Standing Committee. In fact, no plan has been set for 
the NPC Standing Committee to deliberate a draft telecommunications law. 
 
Now the questions are whether a competition law could help China to implement 
the obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, and if so, how the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced by Section 1.1 of 
the Reference in order to accommodate such a purpose. 
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2.3.2.1 Could A Competition Law Help China to Implement the Obligation 
under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper? 
In Mexico-Telecoms, the Panel held: 
The word ‘appropriate’, in its general dictionary sense, means ‘specially 
suitable, proper’. This suggests that ‘appropriate measures’ are those that 
are suitable for achieving their purpose – in this case that of ‘preventing a 
major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices’.76  
From the Panel’s view, thus, a WTO Member’s national competition law could be 
considered as an appropriate measure as long as it suitable and proper to 
prevent ‘suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in 
or continuing anti-competitive practices’ in the telecommunications sector. 
Moreover, in Mexico-Telecoms, Mexico’s Federal Law of Economic Competition 
(which is the Mexican national competition law) and Code of Regulations to 
Federal Law on Economic Competition were listed as factual aspects. 77  In 
addition, the Panel in Mexico-Telecoms explained the reason why Mexico’s 
Federal Law of Economic Competition was not examined. It held:  
As Mexico has not claimed that its general competition law is applicable 
to the anti-competitive practices mandated by the ILD rules, we do not 
consider it necessary to examine the broader issue of whether Mexico’s 
competition laws are, in general, ‘appropriate measures’ in terms of 
Section 1.1.78  
From the view of the Panel in Mexico-Telecoms, therefore, a WTO Member’s 
national competition law could be considered as appropriate measures ‘for the 
purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier 
from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices’, if such national 
competition law is applicable to anticompetitive practices in the 
telecommunications sector. Thus, an antimonopoly law could be an appropriate 
measure ‘for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a 
major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices’ in the 
Chinese telecommunications sector. Therefore, the adoption of a competition 
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law could help China implement the obligation under Section 1.1 of the 
Reference Paper as long as such legislation is applicable to the 
telecommunications sector. 
 
2.3.2.2 How Has the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 Been 
Influenced by Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper? 
The Telecommunications Regulation 2000 is an administrative regulation, while 
the forthcoming Antimonopoly Law will be a national law. Under the Legislation 
Law 2000, ‘National law has higher legal authority than administrative 
regulations, local decrees and administrative or local rules’. Thus, the 
forthcoming Antimonopoly Law will overrule the Telecommunications Regulation 
2000 if it is designed to be applicable to the telecommunications sector or does 
not provide clear exemption for the telecommunications sector. However, many 
WTO Members, such as Mexico, exempt their telecommunications sectors from 
the application of their national competition laws. Currently, China follows these 
practices and has a separate regulation in regard to its telecommunications 
sector. Against this background, thus, it is not easy for China to make its 
forthcoming Antimonopoly Law applicable to its telecommunications sector. It is 
not surprising that some Chinese telecommunications companies lobby strongly 
that the telecommunications sector should be exempted from the Antimonopoly 
Law due to the protection that they enjoy under the existing separate regulation. 
However, China has the obligation to maintain appropriate measures for the 
purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier 
from engaging in or continuing anticompetitive practices under Section 1.1 of 
the Reference Paper. Although China could implement Section 1.1 of the 
Reference Paper through adopting new telecommunications legislation which 
provides some provisions combating anticompetitive behaviour in this sector, the 
current process of adopting a telecommunications law is behind the process of 
adopting the Antimonopoly Law. This leaves the Chinese government with no 
option but to make its Antimonopoly Law applicable to its telecommunications 
sector or silent on such matter, at least before the enactment of new 
telecommunications law. Otherwise, China could face complaints from other 
WTO Members in respect of the implementation of Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper. As happened in Mexico-Telecoms, the WTO could force China to enforce 
appropriate measures in order to prevent anticompetitive practices in the 
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telecommunications sector if China failed to do so itself. In fact, if that 
happened, China’s argument would be weaker than Mexico since its existing 
measures are insufficient to prevent suppliers who, alone or together, are a 
major supplier from engaging in or continuing anticompetitive practices. Thus, it 
is wise for China to consider combating anticompetitive practices in 
telecommunications sector through its forthcoming Antimonopoly Law in order to 
implement its obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. In order to 
make sure that the enactment of China’s Antimonopoly Law can help China to 
implement Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper, the Chinese government needs to 
be aware of the applicability of the forthcoming Antimonopoly Law to 
anticompetitive behaviour in the Chinese telecommunications sector. In Mexico-
Telecom, Mexico’s telecommunications sector is exempted from Mexico’s 
national competition law. If China had followed Mexico’s practice and exempted 
its telecommunications sector from its new Antimonopoly Law, the adoption of 
the Antimonopoly Law in China would not have helped China to implement the 
obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. Therefore, China’s 
forthcoming Antimonopoly Law has to be applicable to the telecommunications 
sector in China in order to help China to implement the obligation under Section 
1.1 of the Reference Paper. 
 
During the process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007, most drafts did 
not clearly exempt the telecommunications sector. For example, Article 2 of the 
June 2006 Draft provides: ‘As for monopolistic conduct prohibited by this Law, 
this Law does not apply where other laws or administrative regulations provide 
provisions’. On the one hand, this provision does not clearly exempt the Chinese 
telecommunications sector from the application of the Antimonopoly Law. On 
the other hand, it leaves such an opportunity open. China could still follow other 
WTO Members’ practices and enact a separate telecommunications law to 
regulate anticompetitive practices in the telecommunications sector after the 
adoption of the Antimonopoly Law. Under the June 2006 Draft, thus, 
anticompetitive practices in the Chinese telecommunications sector could only 
be prohibited by the Antimonopoly Law when these practices were not 
prohibited by any future telecommunications law in China. Before it adopts a 
national telecommunications law which provides the exemption from the 
application of the Antimonopoly Law, therefore, China can argue that its 
competition law is a measure ‘for preventing suppliers who, alone or together, 
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are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices’ 
in the Chinese telecommunications sector, since the June 2006 Draft does not 
clearly provide the exemption for the telecommunications sector.  
 
However, this provision changed in the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Article 2 of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not provide a blank exemption as some drafts do, 
such as Article 2 of the June 2006 Draft. It stipulates:  
This Law is applicable to monopolistic conduct in economic activities within 
the territory of the People’s Republic of China; This Law is applicable to 
monopolistic conduct outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China 
that have eliminative or restrictive effects on competition in the domestic 
market of the People’s Republic of China.  
During the process of drafting the Antimonopoly Law 2007, similar provision only 
appeared in the 2004 Submitted Draft. 79  Article 2 of this draft provides: 
‘Monopolistic behaviours in market transactions in the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China shall be governed by this Law’. Compared to previous drafts, 
thus, this is a great change. It makes it difficult for any further sector legislation 
in the telecommunications sector to exempt the telecommunications sector from 
the application of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. This change makes it possible 
that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 can help China to implement the obligation 
under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. Thus, this change illustrates the 
impact of Section 1.1 on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the WTO’s impact on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 from the second aspect of the WTO’s impacts on the 
development of WTO Members’ domestic legislation. In general, the WTO does 
not establish general obligations for its Members to create internally competitive 
markets, nor require them to take affirmative action or provide remedies against 
private operators engaging in restrictive practices that affect the trade of other 
Members. However, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS and Section 1.1 of the 
Reference Paper are exceptions of this general assumption. They establish 
                                         
79
 An English edition of the 2004 Submitted Draft is available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Questionnaire%20-%20final.pdf. 
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general obligations for Members to affirmatively create internally competitive 
markets and require them to take affirmative action or provide remedies against 
private operators engaging in restrictive practices that affect the trade of other 
Members. 
 
As a Member, China needs to implement the obligations under Articles VIII and IX 
of the GATS and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. Before the adoption of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, the relevant legislation in China was far from enough to 
combat the anticompetitive practices which are prohibited under Articles VIII 
and IX of the GATS and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. The adoption of a 
competition law could help China to implement the obligations under Articles 
VIII and IX of the GATS, and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. The formulation 
of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced by the possibility of helping 
China to implement such obligations. As a result, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 can 
be used to help China to implement the obligations under Articles VIII and IX of 
the GATS, and Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper. In the future, the Chinese 
competition enforcement authorities need to be fully aware of such potential 
benefits from adopting the Antimonopoly Law 2007 and make sure that this law 
is implemented in a way as to materialize such benefits. 
183 
Chapter Five:                                       
The Impact of Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the 
TRIPS on the Formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 
 
This chapter examines the impact of Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k) of the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)1 on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007).2 It 
neither explores comprehensively the interaction between competition law and intellectual 
property rights3 nor argues whether it is justifiable for a country to prohibit intellectual 
property-related anticompetitive practices.4 Instead, it examines whether Articles 8.2, 40, 
and 31(k) of the TRIPS have enhanced the case for China seeking to combat abuses of 
intellectual property rights through the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
                                         
1
 The TRIPS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm. 
2
 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
3
 For such discussions, see, e.g., OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy, Competition 
Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, Paris: OECD, (1989); T. Jorde and D. Teece, eds., 
Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness, New York: Oxford University Press, (1992); R. 
Anderson and N. Gallini, eds., Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy, Calgary: University of Calgary Press for the Industry Canada 
Research Series, (1998); F. Martinez, ‘Competition Policy and TRIPS’, (2001), 
http://www.euronet.be/ceps/Pubs/2001/Trips.pdf; US Federal Trade Commission, ‘To Promote 
Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy’, (2003), 
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; T.-L. Hwang, C. Chen, Z. Huang and J. Chen, eds., 
The Future of Development of Competition Framework, The Hague and London: Kluwer Law 
International, (2004), pp. 107 ff; and S. Anderman, ed., The Interface between Intellectual 
Property Rights and Competition Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2007) 
(examining the experiences of a number of countries in grappling with the problems of 
reconciling the two fields of competition policy and intellectual property rights). 
4
 For such an argument, see, e.g., M. Khor, Intellectual Property, Competition and Development, 
Singapore: Third World Network, (2005), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/par/mk002.doc. 
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1 Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS5 
The TRIPS was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
(1986-1994).6 It sets down minimum standards for many forms of intellectual 
property regulation while allowing each Member to conduct its own internal 
policy and implementation procedures. In particular, it contains requirements 
that domestic law must meet in the area of copyright, patents and trademarks. 
It is the ‘largest and most ambitious attempt to harmonize intellectual property 
rights on a world scale’.7 
 
1.1 Competition and Intellectual Property Rights 
The interaction between intellectual property rights and competition has been 
widely debated.8 The discussion is legend, and it is not intended to add any 
substance to it at this point. However, it is still necessary to provide a brief 
introduction of this interaction in order to explore the impacts of Articles 8.2, 40 
and 31(k) of the TRIPS on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Competition concerns arise in respect of intellectual property rights because 
                                         
5
 For a discussion of intellectual property rights, competition policy and international trade, see, R. 
Anderson, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy and International Trade: Reflections 
on the Work of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition 
Policy’, in T. Cottier and P. Mavroidis, eds., Intellectual Property: Trade, Competition and 
Sustainable Development, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, (2003), 235. For a 
skeptical view of the significance for developing countries of the competition-related clauses in 
the TRIPS, see, H. Ullrich, ‘Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist 
Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 7, 
(2004), 401; and F. Abbott, ‘Are the Competition Rules in the WTO TRIPS Agreement 
Adequate?’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 7, (2004), 687. 
6
 For the drafting history of the TRIPS, see, D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History 
and Analysis, 2nd ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, (2003). For a historical overview of the TRIPS 
agreement, see M. Harris, ‘TRIPS: Historical Overview and Basic Principles’, Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues, vol. 12, (2001), 454. 
7
 P. Demaret, ‘The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the World Trade 
Organisation’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 34, (1995), 123, p. 162. 
8
 There are plenty literatures of applying competition policy vis-à-vis intellectual property rights. For 
such literatures, see note 1. 
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intellectual property rights grant right holders the right to exclude others from 
using the intellectual property without permission. They could arise in all forms 
of intellectual property rights, including patents, trademarks, and copyrights. An 
abuse of a dominant position could occur where intellectual property right 
holders are in a position to exert substantial market power. In Magill TV 
Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE,9 for instance, the BBC, IPT and RTE,10 which held the 
copyright in the collection of their own television programme listings, denied 
Magill’s request to license the listings to prepare a weekly guide. Magill 
complained that this was an abuse of a dominant position. The European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice ruled in favour of Magill. The BBC, 
IPT and RTE, were ordered to license the listings to Magill for a reasonable 
royalty. 
 
Apart from these abusive practices, competition concerns could also arise in 
respect of restrictive conditions imposed when the patented technology or 
product is licensed to others. These conditions may restrict the licensee’s pricing 
of the product, marketing outside a designated area and sub-licensing of the 
patent. Firms could cross-license their patents to each other with such 
conditions, effectively creating cartel-type arrangements without an actual 
cartel agreement. 11  Other competition-restricting clauses in patent licenses 
include conditions requiring the licensee to purchase another product from the 
patent holder (tying), not to deal in rivals’ products or to use their technologies 
or to ‘grant back’ any improvements in the patented technology or product 
exclusively to the original right holder. 
 
1.2 Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS 
The debates on the relationship between intellectual property rights and 
competition can go back to the First International Congress for the Consideration 
of Patent Protection held in Vienna in 1872, which stated: 
                                         
9
 Cases T-69-/89 etc RTE v Commission [1991] ECR II-485, [1991] 4 CMLR 586, upheld by the 
ECJ Cases 241/91 P etc RTE and ITP v Commission [1995] ECR I-734, [1995] 4 CMLR 718. 
10
 BBC is Britain’s national television and radio broadcaster. RTE is Ireland’s national television and 
radio broadcaster. 
11
 See, infra DVD case. 
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We live no longer in the day of industrial action, which is strictly confined 
and is removed from foreign competition, and where slow communication 
prevents or delays the utilization of inventions. We live at a time of 
liberal Customs policy; Steam and Electricity have newly united once 
isolated seats of industry in a way undreamt of; and the mutual exchange 
of goods shows today a magnitude which a generation ago one could not 
have imagined. Under such altered relations the Patent granted for an 
invention in one country becomes in fact a restriction unprofitable and 
obstructive, if the same invention without limitation or increase in price, 
becomes in an adjoining country common property.12  
Such debates were also at the heart of the negotiations during the Uruguay 
Round.13 During the negotiations, developing countries expressed their concerns 
in respect of the potential anticompetitive effects of intellectual property 
rights.14 Thus, they proposed to incorporate provisions addressing these potential 
anticompetitive effects. As a result, the TRIPS includes at least three provisions 
which expressly address intellectual property-related anticompetitive 
practices.15 
 
Article 8 of the TRIPS setting out the principles of applying the TRIPS clearly 
recognises the necessity of applying competition rules to anticompetitive 
practices in the area of intellectual property rights.16  As one of these principles, 
Article 8.2 of the TRIPS provides: 
                                         
12
 Quoted in A. Yusuf, ‘TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions’, in C. Correa and A. 
Yusuf, eds., Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement, (1998), 3, p. 
7. 
13The Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP), 
Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/99, 
(1999), para. 1. For the drafting history of the TRIPS, see, D. Gervais, note 6, (2003). 
14
 See, e.g., Communication from India of 10 July 1989 MTN.GNG./NG11/W/37 sub.2 and VI. 
15
 Most commentators agree that the PRIPS provisions dealing with competition issues refer to 
Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k). See, e.g., H. Ullrich, (2004), note 5, 401, pp. 404-405; F. Abbott, 
(2004), note 5, 687, pp. 689-691. However, Marco Ricolfi argued that Articles 67 and possibly 
66(2) were also competition-related provisions. See, M. Ricolfi, ‘Is There An Antitrust Antidote 
Against IP Overprotection within TRIPS?’, Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review, vol. 
10(2), (2006), 305, pp. 310-313. 
16
 Article 8 of the TRIPS entitles ‘Principles’. 
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Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the 
provision of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices 
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology. 
Thus, it expressly recognises the legitimacy of invoking national competition 
laws by WTO Members in order to combat intellectual property-related 
anticompetitive practices. In other words, it clearly allows a WTO Member to 
take appropriate measures in order to ‘prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably 
restrain trade or adversely affect the transfer of technology’, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the other provisions of the TRIPS. Marco Ricolfi 
claimed:  
There is no question that this provision enables the prevention and control 
not only of bilateral and multilateral dealings—agreements between two 
or more parties—but also of unilateral behaviour, including refusals to 
deal and other forms of exercising IP [intellectual property] that may be 
deemed to constitute abuse.17 
Article 8.2 of the TRIPS does not define the measures which are appropriate in 
order to prevent intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices. 
However, it seems clear that national competition law cannot be considered as 
inappropriate measures for the purpose of preventing intellectual property-
related anticompetitive practices. 
 
The ‘Principle’ provided in Article 8.2 is given greater specificity in Part II of the 
TRIPS, entitled ‘Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of 
Intellectual Property Rights’, in which Section 8 deals with ‘Control of Anti-
Competitive Practices in Contractual Licenses’. Section 8 of Part II of the TRIPS 
consists of only one provision, Article 40, which is addressed to anticompetitive 
licensing practices or conditions. Articles 40.1 and 40.2 cover matters of 
substance, while Articles 40.3 and 40.4 deal with matters of procedure. This 
manner closely parallels paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article IX of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).18 
                                         
17
 M. Ricolfi, (2006), note 15, 305, p. 311. 
18
 The GATS is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm. 
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Article 40.1 recognizes that the terms of a licensing contract could restrict 
competition or impede technology transfer. It provides: ‘Members agree that 
some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights 
which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede 
the transfer and dissemination of technology’. It does not describe the behaviour 
that may be subject to competition law. Instead, it clarifies the rationale under 
which the WTO may approve of its Members’ legal intervention to restore 
competition. Thus, it ‘is strikingly philosophical’.19 
 
Article 40.2, entitled ‘appropriate measures to prevent or control such 
practices’, expressly envisions that WTO Members have the right to specify their 
licensing practices or conditions in their legislation that may in particular cases 
constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights that has adverse effects on 
competition in the relevant market. In addition, it contains a non-exhaustive list 
of practices that may be outlawed or controlled by Members’ legislation. Such 
anticompetitive practices may include exclusive grantback conditions, conditions 
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of 
the relevant laws and regulations of that Member. 20  This list is drawn from 
clauses usually found in domestic legislation, such as in the EU technology 
transfer regulation.21 This list implies that WTO Members appear free to opt for 
per se rules. 
 
Articles 40.1 and 40.2 are concerned with the abusive exercise of intellectual 
property rights and with certain licensing practices and conditions. Unlike Article 
8.2, thus, Articles 40.1 and 40.2 cannot encompass unilateral behaviour, such as 
a refusal to deal or discriminatory behaviour because the control and prevention 
are limited to licensing practices and conditions. In addition, they are viewed 
narrowly in scope. From the legislative history and the examples given in Article 
40.2, they focus primarily on the licensing and transfer of technology rather than 
                                         
19
 M. Ricolfi, (2006), note 15, 305, p. 310. 
20
 The TRIPS, Art. 40.2. 
21
 Such as, Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements (EC 
Commission Regulation on Technology 1996), OJ L 031, 9 February 1996 P. 0002-0013 
(reference to unadjusted EC Treaty numbering). 
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on trademark or copyright licensing.22 
 
Article 31 of the TRIPS, entitled ‘Other Use Without Authorization of Right 
Holder’, lays down the conditions for compulsory licensing. It recognises 
anticompetitive practices as one of the grounds for compulsory licensing. Article 
31 (k) of the TRIPS clearly acknowledges that compulsory licensing is a remedy 
available to combat abuses of patents. Article 31 provides:  
Where the law of a Member allows for other use23 of the subject matter of 
a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by 
the government or third parties authorized by the government, the 
following provisions shall be respected: (k) Members are not obliged to 
apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use 
is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct 
anticompetitive practices may be taken into account in determining the 
amount of remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have 
the authority to refuse termination of authorization if and when the 
conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur. 
This provision illustrates that the TRIPS ‘clearly permits the use of compulsory 
licensing as a legal remedy for practices that are deemed to be anti-competitive 
in the context of the Agreement’.24 It ‘does not define the basis on which a 
practice might be held to be anticompetitive- a situation which possibly calls for 
further guidance, in some form, at an appropriate stage’. 25  Unilateral 
anticompetitive behaviour can be prohibited by the WTO Members’ rules that 
have been adopted in conformity with Article 31(k). However, Article 31 (k) can 
only apply to anticompetitive practices in patents rather than the whole 
intellectual property area. 
 
From the above examination, it can be seen that, first, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) 
                                         
22
 However, Hanns Ullrich argues that Articles 40.1 and 40.2, together with Article 8.2, are ‘broadly 
applicable to restrictive practices relating to all the different intellectual property rights that the 
TRIPS Agreement covers’. See, H. Ullrich, (2004), note 5, 401, p. 405. 
23
 ‘Other use’ refers to use other than that allowed under Article 30. 
24
 R. Anderson, (2003), note 5, 235, p. 241. 
25
 Id. 
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of the TRIPS are not competition rules themselves in their natures. They do not 
introduce their own rules of competition law. They do not define measures which 
could be treated as abuses or set out standards that could be used in evaluating 
particular anticompetitive practices.26 As Debra Valentine claimed, the TRIPS 
was ‘not a competition rule, but simply an acknowledgement of each country’s 
right to use its competition laws to protect against anticompetitive practices 
involving the use of intellectual property’.27 
 
Second, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS are not mandatory because WTO 
Members are by no means under a legal obligation to adopt them.28 Instead, they 
are enabling clauses that expressly recognize the legitimacy of invoking 
competition law to curtail intellectual property-related anticompetitive 
practices by adopting relevant domestic legislation. In other words, they provide 
WTO Members with discretion in the development and the application of their 
national competition laws to combat intellectual property-related 
anticompetitive practices. 29  Thus, they do not oblige WTO Members to take 
actions against abuses of intellectual property rights. This is very different from 
the WTO rules examined in Chapter Four, such as Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper, which require WTO Members to take action against anticompetitive 
                                         
26
 Except Article 40.2 which lists some anticompetitive practices. 
27
 D. Valentine, speech, ‘WTO Core Principles and Trade Competition Polices’, in Barry Hawk, ed., 
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law (2003), New York: Juris Publishing 
Inc., (2004), pp. 712-713. 
28
 It has to be clear that express refusal or unjustified failure to enter into the consultations provided 
for by Articles 40.3 and 40.4 may constitute a breach under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System. But they are not directly relevant to the purpose of this chapter. 
29
 Frederick Abbott claimed: ‘the TRIPS Agreement in its present form provides substantial 
discretion to WTO Members in the formulation and application of competition rules regulating 
intellectual property’. See, F. Abbott, (2004), note 5, 687, p. 687; also see, F. Abbott, ‘Are the 
Competition Rules in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights Adequate?’, in E.-U. Petersmann, ed., Reforming The World Trading System: 
Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2005), 
317, p. 322. However, Aditya Bhattacharjea argued that the current competition-related 
provisions in the TRIPS were not enough to prevent anticompetitive practices in the area of 
intellectual property rights, see, A. Bhattacharjea, ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on 
Competition Policy: A Developing Country Perspective’, Journal of International Economic Law, 
vol. 9, (2006), 293, pp. 301-303, particularly p. 302. 
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practices. 
 
1.3 Could Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) Enhance the Case for 
A WTO Member Seeking to Combat Abuses of 
Intellectual Property Rights?  
As enabling clauses, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) expressly recognize the legitimacy 
of invoking national competition law to curtail intellectual property-related 
anticompetitive practices by employing domestic legislation. It is entirely at the 
discretion of an individual WTO Member to decide whether or not it adopts the 
measures permitted in Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS. Now, the question 
is whether Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) could enhance the case for WTO Members 
seeking to combat intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices.  
 
Marco Ricolfi claimed: ‘if a Member abstains from enacting provisions providing 
for the prohibition and control of IP-related anti-competitive practices, this 
legislative option is, in principle, unobjectionable and cannot lead to a 
complaint’ under the WTO Dispute Settlement System.30 Hanns Ullrich argued 
that the TRIPS promoted ‘a globally harmonized intellectual property regime 
while leaving competition policy to the sovereign determination of Members’. 31 
Robert Anderson claimed that Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS provided 
‘clear but qualified international legal authority for countries that wish to take 
measures to protect themselves against anti-competitive abuses of specific types 
of intellectual property rights’.32 From a legal point of view, their arguments are 
correct due to the nature of Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k) as enabling clauses. In 
practice, however, under what circumstance could a WTO Member act in a way 
permitted in these articles?  
 
The EU argued: 
In general, the TRIPS Agreement would appear to enhance the case for 
countries seeking to protect themselves against anticompetitive abuses of 
                                         
30
 M. Ricolfi, (2006), note 15, 305, p. 316. 
31
 H. Ullrich, (2004), note 5, 401, p. 404. 
32
 R. Anderson, (2003), note 5, 235, p. 241. 
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intellectual property rights, to enact a competition law and establish an 
independent and effective competition authority.33  
Marco Ricolfi also expressed a similar opinion by claiming: ‘the enabling 
character of TRIPs is apt to expand rather than to restrict the lawmaking powers 
retained by Members at the intersection between IP [intellectual property] and 
antitrust’.34 These arguments might be true if we only look at the practices by a 
few rich and powerful WTO Members, such as Canada, the EU, Japan, and the 
US.35 So far, most developed WTO Members have adopted legislation in respect 
of dealing with intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices. In this 
sense, therefore, Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k) of the TRIPS could have and in fact 
have already enhanced ‘the case for countries seeking to protect themselves 
against anticompetitive abuses of intellectual property rights’.  
 
However, other WTO Members, particularly poor WTO Members have not used 
the discretion given by Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS and adopted 
legislation prohibiting intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices. 
The reasons for this fact can vary across those WTO Members. Some could argue 
that this was because it was neither necessary nor urgent for those Members to 
have such legislation due to the lack of abuses of intellectual property rights in 
their domestic markets. It could be the case for some of these WTO Members. 
However, it cannot be the reason for all the WTO Members which have not 
adopted some measures for combating abuses of intellectual property rights. As 
mentioned before, some developing countries expressly raised concerns about 
the adverse effects of intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices 
during the negotiations of the Uruguay Round. And that is why Articles 8.2, 40 
and 31(k) were brought into the TRIPS. If they did not feel that it was necessary 
and urgent to combat intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices in 
their markets, some poor countries would not propose such articles during the 
                                         
33
 WGTCP, WT/WGTCP/W/99, note 10, para. 6. 
34
 M. Ricolfi, (2006), note 15, 305, p. 316. 
35
 For a review of the role of competition law vis-à-vis intellectual property rights in Canada, the EU, 
Japan and the US, see, R. Anderson, ‘The Interface Between Competition Policy and 
Intellectual Property in the Context of the International Trading System’, Journal of International 
Economic Law, vol. 1(4), 655, (1998). For the study on EU experience on the application of 
competition law in relation to the exercise of intellectual property rights, see, WGTCP, 
WT/WGTCP/W/99, note 11, paras. 26-42. 
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Uruguay Round. Thus, there must be other reasons why some WTO Members 
choose not to act in ways permitted under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS. 
 
Frederick Abbott argued: 
The presence of discretion from a legal standpoint does not assure that 
developing Members will not come under pressure from developed 
Members should they choose to exercise it. Developed Members with some 
regularity assert political and economic pressure on developing Members 
not to act in ways permitted under WTO agreements.36 
This argument unveils one of the most significant reasons why some WTO 
Members have not adopted the measures prohibiting abuses of intellectual 
property rights, although they are permitted to do so under the TRIPS.  
 
The TRIPS was proposed by some developed countries, particularly the US. Peter 
Gerhar argued that developing countries agreed to the TRIPS not ‘because they 
could gain from intellectual property rights but because of their overriding 
interest in continued access to the United States market’.37 Abdulgawi Yusuf also 
expressed a similar opinion by claiming that the reason why developing countries 
entered the TRIPS was not due to ‘a conviction that the strengthening of IPR 
protection would continue to the liberalization of international trade, but as a 
bargaining chip for the access of developing countries’ products to the markets 
of industrialized countries’. 38  Carlos Correa claimed that the TRIPS was a 
product of the pressure the developed countries placed upon developing 
countries to negotiate an agreement with ‘the clear objective of universalizing 
the standards of IPRs protection that [the] former had incorporated in their 
legislation’.39 These arguments were proved by a recent study by the World Bank, 
which concluded that the developed WTO Members would be the major 
beneficiaries of the enhanced intellectual property rights under the TRIPS, while 
                                         
36
 F. Abbott, (2004), note 5, 687, p. 693. 
37
 P. Gerhart, ‘Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory- TRIPS as A Substantive Issue’, Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol. 32, (2000), 357, p. 368. 
38
 A. Yusuf, (1998), note 12, 3, p. 8. 
39
 C. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: the TRIPS 
Agreement and Policy Options, London and New York: Zed Books, (2000), pp. 7-8. 
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the developing WTO Members would be the ‘net-loser’.40   
 
Although developing countries concerned about the adverse impact of abuses of 
intellectual property rights on trade, developed countries championed by the US 
tried hard to make sure that the purpose of protecting intellectual property 
rights was not diluted during the negotiations of the Uruguay Round. Thus, 
developed countries agreed to add Articles 8.2, 40, and 31 (k) into the TRIPS as 
enabling clauses rather than mandatory clauses, like the rest of provisions of the 
TRIPS. Hanns Ullrich claimed:  
‘This reservation in favour of Members’ sovereign competition policy 
represents a concession that the industrialized countries made in response 
to an earlier effort by developing countries to enact a Code of Conduct 
for the Transfer of Technology.’ 41  
One of the reasons why these rich countries were in favour of enabling clauses 
rather than mandatory ones was that they could put pressure on the countries 
which wished to act in ways permitted in such enabling clauses. For example, 
Article 40.2 of the TRIPS expressly states that ‘nothing in the Agreement shall 
prevent member countries from specifying in their national legislation licensing 
practices that may constitute an abuse and prevent such anti-competitive 
practices’. In practice, however, WTO Members that act in ways permitted by 
Article 40.2 are often subject to unilateral pressure, when their rules displease 
large trading partners. Such pressures are felt by developed as well as 
developing WTO Members. However, developing WTO Members could feel more 
difficult to resist such pressures due to their weak trading position. 
 
In practice, therefore, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS have not always 
enhanced the case for a WTO Member seeking to combat intellectual property-
related anticompetitive practices. They could only enhance the case for a WTO 
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Member seeking to combat abuses of intellectual property rights if it is strong 
enough to resist pressures from other WTO Members.  
 
1.4 Limitation of the Discretion under Articles 8.2, 40 and 
31 (k) of the TRIPS 
Under Article 8.2 of the TRIPS, WTO Members are authorized to develop their 
own competition policy regarding intellectual property-related restrictive 
practices, only if this is done consistently with the TRIPS. This provision is 
different from Article 8.2 of the Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (hereinafter 
the Brussels Ministerial Text),42 which provided: 
Appropriate measures, provided that they do not derogate from the 
obligations arising under this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the 
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to 
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology. 
Thus, it can be seen that Article 8.2 of the Brussels Ministerial Text uses a ‘do 
not derogate from the obligations’ text, while the final Article 8.2 adopts 
‘consistent with the provisions of’ text as the control mechanism. This change 
illustrates that the restriction on Members’ discretion regarding intellectual 
property-related anticompetitive practices has been relaxed. Despite this 
relaxation, WTO Members’ discretion is not open-ended but restricted. Article 
8.2 of the TRIPS limits WTO Members’ sovereign power to prescribe national 
competition law and policy by requiring that measures adopted to control 
abusive or anticompetitive practices must be ‘consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement’. Hanns Ullrich claimed: 
This requirement of TRIPS-consistency represents more than a mere 
limitation on remedial action, which is always subject to a principle of 
proportionality. Rather, the consistency requirement concerns the 
                                         
42
 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 
MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1, 3rd December 1990. 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Chapter 5, 196 
substantive scope of IPR-related competition rules.43 
He continued: 
[T]his provision must be read as a caveat against an excessive exercise of 
competition policy, which the TRIPS Agreement, by its purpose and 
express wording, otherwise leaves Members free to define. It means that 
they may not use antitrust regulation as a pretext to undermine the 
protection of IPRs as guaranteed by the TRIPS Agreement.44 
This constraint implies that ‘competition policy must remain true to its purpose 
and keep within the bounds of safeguarding competition’ and ‘may not outlaw 
uses and forms of intellectual property that the TRIPS Agreement seeks to 
safeguard’.45 
 
Like Article 8.2 of the TRIPS, Article 40.2 of the TRIPS also requires that 
appropriate measures adopted by Members for the purpose of combating 
intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices must be consistent with 
the other provisions of the TRIPS. In addition, the ‘in particular cases’ language 
in Article 40.2 is also intended to limit the discretion provided by Article 40.2, 
although it is acknowledged to represent less than ideal drafting.46 It implies 
that Members shall define intellectual property-related anticompetitive 
practices on the basis of competitive merits, rather than in an overly abstract 
manner. 
 
In sum, the discretion provided by Articles 8.2, and 40 of the TRIPS is 
constrained by the requirement that relevant provisions in national competition 
laws must be consistent with the TRIPS. These restrictions are mandatory 
components of the TRIPS, and thus, must be taken seriously.47 This implies that 
the flexibility of WTO Members in connection with the shaping of their laws in 
regard to combating intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices is 
far from being unfettered. 
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2 The Status of China’s Legislation on Abuses of 
Intellectual Property Rights before the Adoption 
of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 and Articles 8.2, 
40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS 
As a WTO Member, China is authorized to adopt measures for the purpose of 
combating abuses of intellectual property rights under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) 
of the TRIPS. However, did China use this discretion fully before the adoption of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007? 
 
2.1 The Status of China’s Legislation on Abuses of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
The Chinese system of protecting intellectual property rights did not re-emerge 
until the early 1980s. 48  Internationally, China has acceded to a number of 
international conventions on the protection of intellectual property rights. 49 
Domestically, legislation on the protection of intellectual property rights has also 
been adopted in the areas of trademark, copyright and patent. This has led to 
the creation of a comprehensive legal framework to protect both domestic and 
foreign intellectual property rights. Prior to and immediately after its accession 
to the WTO, China made conscientious efforts to amend its copyright, patent, 
and trademark laws while introducing new implementing regulations and judicial 
interpretations. 50  Although there are still some provisions in the Chinese 
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intellectual property legislation which are not in line with the TRIPS,51 ‘most of 
the laws required under the TRIPS are already on the books’.52 
 
Currently, China’s legal framework for protecting intellectual property rights is 
built on three national laws passed by the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress (NPC): the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the Patent Law 2000),53 the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (hereafter the Trademark Law 2001),54 and the Copyright Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Copyright Law 2001). 55  A great 
number of regulations, rules, measures and policies have been made by the NPC 
Standing Committee, the State Council and various ministries, bureaux and 
commissions. The circulars, opinions and notices of the Supreme People’s Court 
(SPC) also form part of the legal framework of protecting intellectual property 
rights. 
 
Article 48 of the Patent Law 2000 prohibits one type of intellectual property-
related anticompetitive practices. It provides:  
Where any entity which is qualified to exploit the invention or utility 
model has made requests for authorization from the patentee of an 
invention or utility model to exploit its or his patent on reasonable terms 
and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of 
time, the patent administrative organ under the State Council may, upon 
the application of that entity, grant a compulsory license to exploit the 
patent for invention or utility model.  
It is the only provision within the three major pieces of intellectual property 
rights legislation which prohibits any type of abuse of intellectual property rights. 
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On the 30th November 2004, the SPC issued the Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Certain Issues of Application of Law in Cases Involving 
Technology Contract Disputes (hereinafter the Interpretation of Technology 
Contract 2004). 56  The Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004 came into 
force on the 1st January 2005. It is based on the Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (hereinafter the Contract Law 1999),57 the Patent Law 2000, 
and the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China.58  Under the 
Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004, a clause in the technology contract 
is invalid if the following all situations exist: 
1. Restraining the other contracting party from conducting research and 
development on the basis of the contractual technology or restraining 
that party from using improvements of the technology, or creating non-
reciprocal conditions for exchange of improvements, such as requiring the 
other party to share improvements that result solely from the efforts of 
the other party, or transferring improvements to the supplying party on 
non-reciprocal basis, or exclusively or jointly holding the intellectual 
property rights to the improvements without compensation. 2. Restraining 
the other party from acquiring technologies similar to or in competition 
with that of the supplying party. 3. Preventing the other party from 
actualizing the contractual technology in a reasonable manner as 
demanded by the market, including unreasonably restricting quantity, 
variety, price, distribution channels, and export markets of products 
produced or services provided. 4. Requiring the technology transferee to 
accept additional conditions, which are unnecessary for utilizing or 
applying the technology, including purchasing unnecessary technology, raw 
materials, products, equipment, services, or accepting unnecessary 
personnel. 5. Unreasonably restraining the technology transferee's 
channels or sources of procuring raw materials, accessories, products, or 
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equipment. 6. Prohibiting the technology transferee from filing opposition 
on the validity of the intellectual property rights to the contractual 
technology, or imposing additional conditions on those who files such an 
opposition.59 
Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law, the Interpretation of Technology 
Contract 2004 was the most comprehensive legislation regarding certain types of 
abuses of intellectual property rights. It played a significant role in preventing 
anticompetitive practices in technology development and technology transfer, 
and the maintenance of competition in the technology market and optimal 
allocation of technology resources. 
 
2.2 Did China Fully Use the Discretion under Articles 8.2, 
40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS before the Adoption of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007? 
Since the start of China’s intellectual property legislation, the purpose of such 
legislation has always been to protect intellectual property rights rather than 
combat intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices. This trend was 
continued when China applied to join the WTO. The protection of intellectual 
property rights was one of the major concerns of other WTO Members during the 
negotiations of China’s accession to the WTO.60 After China’s accession to the 
WTO, the protection of intellectual property rights is high on the policy agenda 
of the Chinese government. China has strengthened its legal system to protect 
intellectual property rights since its accession to the WTO.  
 
The adverse effects of intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices 
were not fully recognised or addressed in the Chinese legal system until recent 
years. Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, therefore, very few 
provisions in the Chinese legislation prohibited abuses of intellectual property 
rights. Except refusing to grant a patent licence under reasonable conditions,61 
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abuses of intellectual property rights are not prohibited under the Patent Law 
2000, the Trademark Law 2001 and the Copyright Law 2001. As the major piece 
of competition-related legislation at the national level before the adoption of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the Anti Unfair Competition Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (hereinafter the LAUC 1993) made no mention of intellectual 
property-related anticompetitive practices.62 Thus, it is not clear whether the 
LAUC 1993 is applicable to intellectual property-related anticompetitive 
practices. Since it came into force on the 1st December 1993, however, the LAUC 
1993 has not been applied to any abuse of intellectual property rights. Before 
the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, therefore, China’s legislation was 
insufficient to combat abuses of intellectual property rights. This inadequacy 
was exposed in the following case. 
 
On the 28th December 2004, two Chinese DVD manufacturers, Wuxi Multimedia 
Ltd and Orient Power (Wuxi) Technology Ltd, filed a lawsuit against the 3C 
Patent Group (including the Sony Corporation, Philips Electronics, LG Electronics 
and the Pioneer Corporation) in the US (the DVD case). They accused 3C Patent 
Group of price fixing, unlawful tying of essential and non-essential patents 
together, group boycott and conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act.63 China had no legislation dealing with this abuse 
when this dispute emerged. Thus, these two Chinese companies were unable to 
bring a complaint to a Chinese court in 2004. This clearly demonstrated the 
inadequacy of the Chinese legislation regarding certain types of abuses of 
intellectual property rights. 
 
The adoption of the Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004 was certainly 
helpful to deal with restrictive conditions attached to licensing agreements 
regarding intellectual property rights. However, it only partially addressed the 
problem of the lack of legislation on abuses of intellectual property rights in 
China because it is only applicable to six types of anticompetitive practices in 
the area of patent rights. It could not be used to prevent anticompetitive 
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practices in the areas of trademarks and copyrights. Moreover, its legal effect is 
much lower than national laws.64 Most developed countries, such as the US, use 
their national competition laws to combat abuses of intellectual property rights. 
Thus, the Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004 was not an ideal solution 
for China to combat abuses of intellectual property rights. 
 
Despite its shortcomings, the Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004 was the 
only national legislation which prohibits six types of anticompetitive practices in 
regard to technical contracts before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
Its significance was illustrated in the following case. Dongjin Telecom Technology 
Co. Ltd, a Chinese company, sued the American company, Intel Corporation 
(Dongjin v. Intel).65 This was heard before the Beijing First Intermediate Court 
on 28 July 2006. It has been described as China’s first competition law case. It 
involved the issue of a software license. Dongjin Telecom Technology Co. Ltd 
acquired hardware and software from Intel Corporation. The software was 
subject to a licensing agreement, which specified that Dongjin Telecom 
Technology Co. Ltd could only use the software in combination with the 
purchased hardware from Intel Corporation. Dong Jin Telecom Technology Co. 
Ltd argued that the licence created an illegal monopoly in respect of technology 
and, as a result, was void under the Contract Law and Article 10 of the 
Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004. 
 
This case could not be argued under competition law, because the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 did not exist when this case was filed. Nevertheless, it has still been 
referred to as the first Chinese competition case. This case had been widely read 
in legal and academic circles in China as one having profound competition law 
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implications. It has to be mentioned, however, without the Interpretation of 
Technology Contract 2004, this case would not be possible to be filed in a 
Chinese court.  
 
This case illustrated that more and more people in business and legal circles in 
China were aware of the possibility of defending against, or bringing suit against 
anticompetitive practices in the area of intellectual property rights. Moreover, it 
also demonstrated the inadequacy of the Chinese legislation regarding abuses of 
intellectual property rights since it had to rely on a SPC’s interpretation rather 
than a national competition law.  
 
In sum, there were a few provisions in China prohibiting certain types of abuses 
of intellectual property rights before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
As demonstrated in the DVD case and Dongjin v. Intel, however, China’s 
legislation on prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights were insufficient. 
This insufficiency illustrated that, before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007, China did not fully use the discretion under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of 
the TRIPS.  
 
3 Have Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS 
Enhanced the Case for China Seeking to 
Combat Abuses of Intellectual Property Rights 
through the Antimonopoly Law 2007? 
As discussed above, some WTO Members with experience in the implementation 
of intellectual property rights have long used their national competition laws to 
combat intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices. They maintain 
vigorous competition law agencies with broad and effective enforcement powers. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will be applicable to 
anticompetitive practices in the area of intellectual property once it comes into 
force on the 1st August 2008.66 However, it has not been an easy journey for 
China to finally include such a provision in the Antimonopoly Law 2007. China 
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only started to protect intellectual property rights in the 1980s. Its record of 
protecting intellectual properties rights is still subject to intense complaints 
from some WTO Members. For example, the US has placed China on its ‘priority 
watch list’ of countries failing to give adequate protection to intellectual 
property rights.67 The EU has also issued a similar warning on China’s intellectual 
property rights.68 In April 2007, the US filed a case to the WTO against China 
regarding China’s measures affecting the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. 69  Therefore, China’s attempting to regulate 
intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices through its competition 
law during the process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has raised 
concerns from other WTO Members due to China’s poor record of protecting 
intellectual rights.  
 
Against this background, what follows examines whether Articles 8.2, 40 and 
31(k) of the TRIPS have enhanced the case for China seeking to combat abuses of 
intellectual property rights through the Antimonopoly Law 2007 by analysing the 
changes of relevant provisions during the process of formulating China’s first 
comprehensive competition law.  
 
3.1 Stage One (Before China’s Accession to the WTO): No 
Mention of Intellectual Property-Related 
Anticompetitive Practices 
During this stage, the drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law made no mention of 
abuses of intellectual property rights. For instance, the 1999 Draft omitted 
mention of whether the Law would be applicable to intellectual property 
rights. 70  There are two reasons for this omission. First, during that period 
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intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices were not as serious as 
they are now in China. In fact, anticompetitive practices in intellectual property 
rights were rarely heard of in China before China’s accession to the WTO, given 
the fact that competition-related regulation itself was a new topic in China and 
the legal protection of intellectual property rights had only been recognised for 
just more than a decade during that time.71 From the Chinese government view, 
thus, it was not very urgent to regulate intellectual property-related 
anticompetitive practices. The majority of Chinese scholars were also unaware 
of the adverse effects of intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices 
on competition. 
 
Second, China was still in the process of negotiating its WTO membership during 
this period. One of the major concerns from the major players of the WTO, such 
as the US, was the protection of intellectual property rights. Thus, all the 
concerns of the Chinese government were focused on how to reform its regime 
on intellectual property rights in order to improve the protection of intellectual 
property rights. Combating abuses of intellectual property rights could be 
considered to weaken the legal protection of intellectual property rights in 
China and thus upset some major WTO Members, although they applied their 
competition laws to intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices for a 
long period. In order to join the WTO, China had to negotiate bilateral 
agreements before it started multilateral negotiations regarding China’s 
application for WTO membership.72 Thus, it was very important for China to 
secure the key players’ agreements in order to become a WTO Member.  
 
3.2 Stage Two (Between 2001 and 2005): Starting to 
Include a Provision Prohibiting Abuses of Intellectual 
Property Rights in the Drafts of China’s Antimonopoly 
Law 
Since it joined the WTO in 2001, China started to regulate abuses of intellectual 
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property rights. The Interpretation of Technology Contract 2004 was an example. 
This changed attitude led China to include a provision prohibiting abuses of 
intellectual property rights in some drafts of the Antimonopoly Law. The 
February 2002 Draft,73 which was drafted just after China’s accession to the WTO, 
added a special provision entitled ‘Acts of Exercising Intellectual Property 
Rights’. Article 56 of this draft provides: 
The reasonable acts of an operator of exercising rights in accordance with 
the laws protecting intellectual property rights such as the copyright law, 
the trademark law and the patent law shall not be restricted by this law. 
However, if the abuse of intellectual property rights results or may result 
in material restriction or exclusion of competition, this law shall apply.  
It is the first provision which shows China’s desire to regulate abuses of 
intellectual property rights through its competition law. On the one hand, it 
exempts intellectual property rights from the application of the Antimonopoly 
Law. On the other hand, it emphasises that the Antimonopoly Law is applicable if 
abuses of intellectual property rights exist. Similar language to Article 56 of the 
February 2002 Draft was maintained in Article 66 of the 2004 Submitted Draft74 
and Article 56 of the April 2005 Draft.75  
 
As foreign companies expand their investment in China,76 the ability of Chinese 
legislation to protect intellectual property rights is a major topic of discussions 
even after China’s accession to the WTO. Therefore, it was not surprising that 
the draft provision regarding abuses of intellectual property rights ‘received 
                                         
73
 This draft is only circulated in a limited scope. An English edition is on the author’s file. 
74
 An English edition of the 2004 Submitted Draft is available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Questionnaire%20-%20final.pdf. 
75
 An English edition of the April 2005 Draft is available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/China%20Antimonopoly%20Law%20April%208%2020
05%20Draft%20-%20English-v1.pdf. 
76
 China attracts more foreign direct investment than any other developing country. And foreign 
direct investment in China has continually grown. The latest example is that foreign direct 
investment in China was increased more than 10 percent during the first half of 2007. See, 
‘Foreign direct investment in China up 12% in first half’, The Economic Times, 13th July 2007, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/International__Business/Foreign_direct_investment_in_Ch
ina_up_12_in_first_half/articleshow/2199329.cms. 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Chapter 5, 207 
more attention from the foreign business community than any other provision’.77 
Such a provision raised significant concerns for multinationals over the 
protection of their intellectual property rights and, in particular, whether the 
mere act of refusing to license intellectual property rights could trigger an abuse 
of intellectual property rights and lead to compulsory licensing or inefficient 
licensing negotiations under fear of compulsory licensing. These concerns are 
understandable particularly given the fact that China’s record of protecting 
property rights is arguably not good.78  
 
In sum, China started to introduce a provision prohibiting abuses of intellectual 
property rights in the drafts of the Antimonopoly Law during this period. There 
are three reasons for this change. First, during that period abuses of intellectual 
property rights were emerging in China. Cases related to such practices became 
high profile in the media’s view and the public were aware of such practices. 
Moreover, these abuses of intellectual property rights also demonstrated the 
insufficiency of the existing Chinese legislation dealing with such practices. For 
example, the Chinese companies involved in the DVD case had to file a case in 
the US rather than China due to the lack of relevant legislation dealing with 
intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices in China during that time.  
 
Second, both the Chinese government and Chinese scholars started to realise the 
adverse effects of abuses of intellectual property rights on competition. After a 
year of investigation, for example, the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC) published a report ‘The Competition-restricting Behaviour of 
Multinational Companies in China and Counter Measures’ in 2004.79 This report 
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indicated that companies that owned rights to advanced technology or other 
intellectual properties squeezed the market by refusing to sell their services or 
products to Chinese companies. 80  Thus, this report demonstrated that the 
Chinese government was expressly concerned that some multilateral companies 
might abuse their intellectual property rights in order to force out their Chinese 
competitors.  
 
Third, the Chinese government was encouraged by Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of 
the TRIPS, which authorize WTO Members to adopt legislation to combat 
intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices. Before China joined the 
WTO, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS were not applicable to China. The 
enabling character of Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS had impacts on the 
inclusion of a provision prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights.  
 
However, the impact of Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS on the 
formulation of China’s competition law was limited during this period due to two 
reasons. First, as a new WTO Member, China was still ‘learning the rules’ during 
this period, while old members were ‘playing the rules’.81 Yongtu Long, the chief 
negotiator for China’s accession to the WTO, described the Chinese situation as 
‘a blind man riding a blind horse’. 82  Thus, it would take time for China to 
understand the WTO rules and exploit them. Due to the lack of relevant 
expertises, it was difficult for the Chinese government to be fully aware of the 
discretion under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS during this period. 
Second, China’s ability of resisting the pressure from other WTO Members in 
order to act in the way permitted under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS 
was not very strong. In 2001, China was only the sixth biggest trading power with 
                                                                                                                           
Biaoxian Ji Duice], Journal of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce [工商管理杂志
Gongshang Guanli Zazhi], vol. 5, (2004), 42. 
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the WTO.83 This relatively weak position limited the impact of Articles 8.2, 40 
and 31 (k) of the TRIPS on the formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law.   
 
3.3 Stage Three (From 2005 to Present): Including a 
Provisions Prohibiting Abuses of Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
The language used in the February 2002 Draft, the 2004 Submitted Draft and the 
April 2005 Draft was changed in the July 2005 Draft.84 This can be seen from the 
changes of the titles of the relevant provisions. While Article 56 of the February 
2002 Draft is called ‘Acts of Exercising Intellectual Property Rights’, Article 52 of 
the July 2005 Draft is called ‘Applicability to Abuse of Intellectual Property 
Rights’. Article 52 of the July 2005 Draft provides: ‘This Law is applicable to 
undertakings which eliminate or restrict market competition beyond the laws 
and administrative regulations on intellectual property rights’. This change 
makes the purpose of this provision more specific than previous draft provisions 
by stipulating that China’s forthcoming competition law will be applicable to 
anticompetitive practices in the field of intellectual property rights. Some WTO 
Members and foreign companies were concerned that this change would allow 
trumped-up anticompetitive charges to chip away at their profitable patents.85 
 
Article 52 of the July 2005 Draft is still loosely drafted due to the words ‘beyond 
the laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property rights’. This was 
improved in the November 2005 Draft.86 Article 48 of the November 2005 Draft 
provides: ‘This Law is applicable to the conduct by the undertakings eliminating 
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or restricting competition by the abuse of the rights stipulated by the 
Intellectual Property Right Laws or administrative regulations’. It further 
improves the clarification of Article 52 of the July 2005 Draft by changing the 
words ‘beyond the laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property 
rights’ into the language ‘the abuse of the rights stipulated by the Intellectual 
Property Right Laws or administrative regulations’.  
 
Like its equivalent provisions in previous drafts, Article 48 of the November 2005 
Draft was criticised by foreign governments and companies. In fact, some WTO 
Members and foreign companies were even more worried about this provision 
than the provisions in previous drafts because, unlike previous drafts, this 
provision does not provide that this law protects intellectual property rights at 
all. It only focuses on intellectual property-related anticompetitive practices. 
Like the previous drafts, Article 48 of the November 2005 was criticised by some 
foreign experts. H. Stephen Harris, for example, criticised Article 48 as being 
inconsistent with the international norm of competition law.87 He continued:  
The absence of any definition of what conduct may constitute such an 
abuse of IP [Intellectual Property] rights, and the possible imposition of 
compulsory licensing as a remedy, have engendered expressions of great 
concern, especially from foreign high technology companies with 
substantial operations or sales in China.88  
 
Despite the criticism that China faced from abroad in respect of its intention to 
include a provision prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights in its 
competition law, this issue was not raised during China’s first trade policy review 
under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) in 2006. 89  This clearly 
illustrates that after many years of criticising China’s intention of prohibiting 
abuses of intellectual property rights, finally WTO Members accepted that China 
had the legitimate right to regulate abuses of intellectual property rights under 
Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS. At least, they did not think it was wise to 
criticise China’s intention of combating such abuses during China’s first trade 
policy review due to the discretion under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS. 
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To some extent, this has encouraged China to use such discretion fully and 
include a general ban on abuses of intellectual property rights in its first 
competition law. 
 
Article 48 of the December 2005 Draft was changed in the June 2006 Draft.90 
Article 54 of the June 2006 Draft provides: 
Undertakings exercise intellectual property rights according to laws, 
administrative regulations related intellectual property rights, shall not 
be applied to this law; however, undertakings abuse the intellectual 
property rights to eliminate or restrict competition, shall be applied to 
this law.91 
Unlike Article 48 of the December 2005 Draft, Article 54 of the June 2006 Draft 
does not define the term ‘abuse of intellectual property rights’ according to the 
legislation on intellectual property rights. Instead, it provides that this law 
applies to ‘abuse of intellectual property rights that eliminates or restricts 
competition’. This change is necessary because none of the existing legislation 
on intellectual property rights provides a general ban on abuses of intellectual 
property rights. In addition, this article re-introduced the words of protecting 
intellectual property rights, which were used in the February 2002 Draft, the 
2004 Submitted Draft and the April 2005 Draft. This reintroduction aims to 
reassure other WTO Members and foreign companies that intellectual property 
rights will be protected in China’s Antimonopoly Law and only abuses of 
intellectual property rights are prohibited.  
 
Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS helped to strengthen the argument of 
Chinese law-makers who were in favour of regulating abuses of intellectual 
property rights through China’s Antimonopoly Law. During the 22nd session of the 
10th NPC Standing Committee held from the 24th to the 29th June 2006, for 
instance, Shiwei Cheng, vice-Chairman of the 10th NPC Standing Committee, 
argued that the inclusion of prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights in 
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China’s Antimonopoly Law was of significance. 92  He recommended further 
studying this issue.93 During this meeting, no members of the 10th NPC Standing 
Committee expressed any objection in regard to including a provision prohibiting 
abuses of intellectual property rights. Thus, it seemed that all members 
attending the meeting of the 10th NPC Standing Committee in June 2006 agreed 
to prohibit abuses of intellectual property rights through China’s forthcoming 
Antimonopoly Law. Article 54 of the June 2006 Draft is retained in the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. Article 55 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 clearly 
provides that the law will apply to undertakings which abuse intellectual 
property rights to eliminate or restrict competition. 
 
China finally included a provision prohibiting abuses of intellectual property 
rights into the Antimonopoly Law 2007 during this period. There are several 
reasons for this. From the view of the TRIPS, the role played by Articles 8.2, 40 
and 31 (k) of the TRIPS should not be underestimated. Several conditions 
contribute to the role played by Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS. First, 
China is increasingly gaining confidence to exploit WTO rules. By 2005, China had 
been a WTO Member for about four years. During these four years, China used its 
massive human resources to master WTO rules. In May 2002, for instance, the 
Chinese government set up a national training project to introduce WTO rules to 
provincial trade officials as well as management staff in companies.94  
 
Second, with the increasing significance of its economy and trade in the world, 
China is in a stronger position than before to resist the pressure from some WTO 
Members. Since its accession to the WTO, China has dramatically increased its 
trading power. Now it is the third biggest trading member in the WTO after the 
EU and the US, while it was only the sixth-biggest trading power when it joined 
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the WTO in 2001.95 This change means that China is in a better position to resist 
pressures from some WTO Members when it is intended to act in ways permitted 
under Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k) of the TRIPS. With the increase of Chinese 
economic and trading power in the world, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS 
have enhanced the case for China seeking to protect itself against abuses of 
intellectual property rights.  
 
However, it has to be borne in mind that it is far from easy to define the 
borderline between the reasonable exercise of intellectual property rights and 
abuses of such rights. Further administrative rules or guidance in respect of 
implementing Article 55 is needed. The Chinese competition enforcement 
authorities need to be aware of the discretion under Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) 
of the TRIPS when they formulate such rules or guidance. 
 
4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the impact of Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS 
on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. As enabling clauses, Articles 
8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS expressly recognize the legitimacy of invoking 
WTO Members’ national competition laws to combat abuses of intellectual 
property rights. They do not impose obligations on WTO Members in respect of 
combating abuses of intellectual property rights. Whether an individual WTO 
Member chooses to act in ways permitted by these articles depends on various 
conditions. Put another way, these articles do not guarantee that WTO Members 
will adopt legislation dealing with intellectual property-related anticompetitive 
practices in reality. WTO Members might choose not to act in ways permitted in 
Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS due to the pressure from other WTO 
Members. Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS could only enhance the case for 
a WTO Member seeking to combat abuses of intellectual property rights, when it 
is strong enough to resist the pressures from other WTO Members. 
 
China faced huge criticisms regarding its attempt to prohibit abuses of 
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intellectual property rights through its competition law. Against this background, 
Articles 8.2, 40, and 31(k) of the TRIPS have enhanced the case for China seeking 
to prohibit abuses of intellectual property rights through the Antimonopoly Law 
2007, with the increasing significance of China’s economy and trade in the world. 
There is no doubt that these articles are not the reasons why China needs to 
combat abuses of intellectual property rights through the Antimonopoly Law 
2007. However, these enabling clauses have enhanced the case for China seeking 
to prohibit such abuses through the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Without these 
enabling clauses, it would be very difficult for China to include a provision 
prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights in the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
particularly considering the fact that some WTO Members, such as the US, do not 
think China’s record of protecting intellectual property rights is good. The 
changes of the provision prohibiting abuses of intellectual property rights in the 
drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 illustrate how Articles 8.2, 40 and 31 (k) 
of the TRIPS have enhanced the case for China seeking to combat intellectual 
property-related anticompetitive practices through its competition law. 
 
Under the Antimonopoly Law 2007, only Article 55 prohibits abuses of 
intellectual property rights. Therefore, further guidance on this provision is 
needed. In order to formulate such guidance, the Chinese competition 
enforcement authorities need to be aware of the discretion under Articles 8.2, 
40 and 31 (k) of the TRIPS. 
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Chapter Six:                                         
The Impact of the Peer Review in the WTO— 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) 
on the Formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 
Peer review refers to the method ‘by which countries can assess the quality and 
effectiveness of their policies, legislation, policy environments and key 
institutions’. 1  It provides ‘a forum where policies can be explained and 
discussed, where information can be sought and concerns expressed, on a non-
confrontational and non-adversarial basis’. 2 Peer review can be used in a broad 
range of areas. Currently, there are several peer reviews in international 
organisations, such as the peer review of Individual Action Plans in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) System, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Country Reviews of Regulatory Reform 
(specifically the Competition Policy Reviews), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Country Surveillance Mechanism (Article IV Reports)3, the IMF-World Bank 
Financial Sector Assessment Program, and the TPRM. 
 
The TPRM is at the centre of the surveillance of national trade-related policies 
which is a fundamentally important activity running throughout the work of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO).4 It ‘is a unique element in the range of WTO 
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activities’. 5  The reviews take place in the Trade Policy Review Body which 
comprises all WTO Members. The reviews are therefore essentially peer-group 
assessments, despite the fact that much of the fact finding work is done by the 
WTO Secretariat. This means that the TPRM is ‘the only focus for peer review of 
the full range of trade policies’.6 
 
In general, literature on peer review is scarce.7 It is even scarcer in the case of 
the TPRM. 8 In particular, there is no literature on the impact of the TPRM on the 
development of domestic competition law and policy in WTO Members. Against 
this background, this chapter examines the impacts of the TPRM on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law of People’s Republic of China (hereinafter 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007)9. It explores whether, and if so, how the TPRM could 
have contributed to the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, and to what 
extent its formulation has reflected such contributions. 
 
1 General Issues 
As an early result of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), the TPRM was established 
on a provisional basis at the Montreal Ministerial Meeting in December 1988.10 
The first review took place in 1989. Australia, Morocco and the United States (US) 
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were the first countries reviewed under the TPRM.11 Subsequently, the TPRM was 
incorporated into the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation (hereinafter the Marrakesh Agreement) 12 , and placed on a 
permanent footing as one of the WTO’s basic functions. The latest appraisal of 
the TPRM by the Trade Policy Review Body reaffirmed ‘the great importance that 
Members attached to the mission and objectives defined in Annex 3 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement for the TPRM, this being the only multilateral, 
comprehensive evaluation of trade policies’.13 The significance of the TPRM is 
reflected in the seniority of the Trade Policy Review Body — it is the WTO 
General Council by another name. Despite the significance of the TPRM, there 
are fewer research papers and books in the area of the TPRM than other areas 
within the WTO framework, such as the WTO dispute settlement system.14 This 
could be the reason why Donald B. Keesing claimed: the TPRM is ‘a little-
known … activity’ of the WTO.15  
 
1.1 Purpose and Procedure 
1.1.1 Purpose 
The TPRM provides the regular collective appreciation and evaluation of the full 
range of individual WTO Members’ trade polices and practices and their impact 
on the functioning of the multilateral trading system. The purpose of the TPRM 
is to: 
contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and 
commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where 
applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother 
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functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater 
transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of 
Members. Accordingly, the review mechanism will enable the regular 
collective appreciation and evaluation by the Ministerial Conference of 
the full range of individual Members’ trade policies and practices and 
their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading system.16  
Thus, the purpose of the TPRM can be said: 
(a) to increase the transparency and understanding of countries’ trade policies 
and practices, through regular monitoring 
(b) to improve the quality of public and intergovernmental debate on the issues 
(c) to enable a multilateral assessment of the effects of policies on the world 
trading system.17 
Susan Hainsworth claimed that the TPRM, as a peer review, had a ‘secondary 
normative objective: it aims to promote domestic trade policy transparency, in 
recognition of its inherent importance to the furtherance of rule development 
and compliance’.18 
 
1.1.2 Procedure19 
All WTO Members are subject to trade policy review under the TPRM.20 The 
frequency of trade policy review for a WTO Member increases with the overall 
amount of that Member’s trade in the world. The four largest trading WTO 
Members are reviewed every two years.21 Trading states ranking from 5th to 20th 
are reviewed every four years. 22  The remaining WTO Members are reviewed 
every six years.23 The least-developed WTO Members can have even a longer 
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interim period.24 Once a WTO Member is included in the process, its next review 
takes place according to this cycle, except that a leeway of six months may be 
allowed. The procedure of trade policy review can be divided into three stages. 
 
1.1.2.1 Stage One: The Investigation Stage 
In the investigation stage, two investigation reports are produced. The first is 
the Government Report which is supplied by the WTO Member whose trade 
policies are under review. The second is the Secretariat Report which is prepared 
by the Secretariat within the Trade Policy Review Body. In general, the 
Secretariat Report is more substantial than the Government Report. It assembles 
information provided by the WTO Member under review in response to a 
questionnaire from the Secretariat. It also obtains information from interviews 
and consultations which are conducted when the Secretariat staff visit the WTO 
Member. In addition, it also gets information from a number of other sources, 
including publications of the government and organisations like the World Bank 
and the IMF. The Secretariat also has the discretion to consult reports of private 
agencies in the WTO Member. Then, the Secretariat submits its draft report to 
the WTO Member for verification and factual content. The Secretariat then 
revises its text in light of the comments of the WTO Member under review and 
finalises the report on its own authority. In order to preserve the independence 
of its evaluation, however, the summary observations are not subject to the 
same checking process. In general, the Secretariat Report has evolved from 
‘largely descriptive catalogues of countries’ protectionist measures into more 
thorough, incisive and analytical surveys of trade policies and practices’.25 
 
The structure of the Secretariat Report has evolved over time on the basis of 
some experimentation. Currently, the Secretariat Report contains a summary of 
observation and four chapters. Chapter I, Economic Environment, covers the 
major features of the economy, recent economic developments, trade patterns 
in goods and services, evolution of foreign investment, and trade-related aspects 
of the foreign exchange regime. Chapter II, Trade and Investment Regimes, 
covers institutional aspects of trade and investment policy making, including 
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participation in multilateral and regional arrangements, as well as trade disputes 
and consultations. Chapter III, Trade Policies and Practices by Measures, deals 
with measures directly affecting imports, exports and production, while Chapter 
IV, Trade Policy by Sectors, looks at measures by sector. As Sam Laird pointed out, 
this standardised form helps to ensure consistency of treatment, and delegates 
have been found to value being able to find topics in the expected places across 
reports.26  
 
1.1.2.2 Stage Two: The Examination Stage 
In the examination stage, the Trade Policy Review Body discusses the Secretariat 
Report and the Government Report. This process lasts about 10 months or even 
longer if one takes into account the time for preparation. But the review 
meeting is usually held over two days in Geneva. It occupies two morning 
sessions with a day for preparation in between. The WTO Member under review 
makes an introductory statement on the first morning. Then the two discussants 
chosen from the membership to act on their own responsibility rather than as 
representatives of their governments stimulate debate by comments. Typically, 
in advance of the meeting they circulate an outline of the main issues they 
intend to raise. Subsequent to the discussants’ statements, other WTO Members 
may make statements and raise questions. These statements and questions from 
the participating WTO Members reflect concerns and challenges highlighted in 
the reports. This gives the participating WTO Members a rare opportunity to 
question the WTO Member under review about its policies and practices directly 
affecting them. At the end of the first morning, the Chairperson draws an outline 
of the main themes raised at the meeting in order to assist the WTO Member 
under review with its preparation for the next session. The intervening day is 
spent preparing responses to the questions and comments posed on the first day. 
On the second morning, the WTO Member under review answers the questions 
raised on the first morning. These answers should be arranged along the lines of 
the main themes identified by the Chairperson and preferably be in writing. At 
the end of the meeting the Chair presents concluding remarks which aim at 
giving an assessment of the issues raised in the review. The Chair’s concluding 
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remarks formally end the review process. 
 
1.1.2.3 Stage Three: The Dissemination Stage 
In the dissemination stage, the following documents are published and are made 
available on the WTO website: the Secretariat Report, the Government Report, 
the minutes of the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body, a first press release 
based on the Secretariat Report including a summary of the Secretariat Report 
and parts of the Government Report, and a second press release containing the 
conclusions of the Chairman of the Trade Policy Review Body. There are no 
formal recommendations on actions to be taken by the WTO Member under 
review. 
 
1.2 Soft Persuasion Character of the TPRM and China’s 
Approach to International Matters 
1.2.1 Soft Persuasion Character of the TPRM 
1.2.1.1 Soft Persuasion Character 
Peer review does not have legal binding power. Instead, it functions through peer 
pressure which is a means of soft persuasion. As a peer review, the TPRM is no 
exception. Article A(i) of Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement explicitly provides 
that the TPRM ‘is not intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific 
obligations under the [WTO] Agreements or for dispute settlement purposes, or 
to impose new policy commitments on Members’. Thus, the TPRM is separated 
from the WTO dispute settlement system.27 As Victoria C. Price summarized, the 
TPRM ‘reflects a diplomatic and peer-pressure approach to the enforcement 
                                         
27
 More about the WTO dispute settlement system, see, P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy 
of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, (2005), pp. 172-306; E.-U. Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, 
London, The Hague and Boston: Kluwer Law International, (1997); E.-U. Petersmann, ‘The 
Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organisation and the Evolution of the GATT 
Dispute Settlement System Since 1948’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 31, (1997), 1157, 
pp. 1163-1165; M. Moore, ‘WTO’s Unique System of Settling Disputes Nears 200 Cases in 
2000’, Press/180, Geneva: WTO, (2000). 
Zhaofeng Zhou, 2008  Chapter 6, 222 
problem’, while the WTO dispute settlement system is ‘a rule-based approach to 
the problem of the “judge and bailiff”’.28 This has been recognised in the Report 
to the Singapore Ministerial meeting, which noted that the TPRM’s specific de-
linkage from dispute settlement procedures was an essential feature which must 
be safeguarded.29 The second appraisal of the Trade Policy Review by the Trade 
Policy Review Body in 2005 also reconfirmed:  
The TPRM had been conceived as a policy exercise and it was therefore 
not intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific WTO 
obligations or for dispute settlement procedures, or to impose new policy 
commitments on Members.30 
Similar words have also appeared in every annual report of the Trade Policy 
Review Body. 
 
Thus, it is clear that the TPRM functions through peer pressure rather than 
sanctions. Secretariat Reports and questions raised by other WTO Members do 
not have similar legal status that the rulings by the Panel and the Appellate Body 
have. Thus, a WTO Member is not obliged to carry out reforms of the policies 
which were exposed during the trade policy review. Similarly, it has no legal 
obligation to adopt advisory opinions in the Secretariat Report.  
 
Because it is up to individual WTO Members to decide whether or not they 
accept the advisory opinions from the Secretariat Reports and address other 
WTO Members’ concerns during their trade policy reviews, the effectiveness of 
the TPRM, as a peer review, relies on the influence of the persuasion exercised 
by the peers.31 As Donald B. Keesing argued, the TPRM uses ‘sweet reason, not 
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the threat of retaliation or the empowerment of some quasi-judicial authority, 
to induce countries to liberalize’ their trade-related policies. 32  Thus, the 
sweeter the reasons are, the more the WTO Member under review is willing to 
accept the recommendations from the Secretariat Report and address the 
concerns from other WTO Members. The TPRM can give rise to peer pressure 
through such Secretariat Reports, discussions during trade policy reviews, public 
scrutiny, the impact of the foregoing on domestic public opinion, policy makers, 
and other stakeholders. 
 
1.2.1.2 Merits of the TPRM’s Soft Persuasion Character 
There is no doubt that the TPRM, like other peer review, has a soft persuasion 
character because it functions through peer pressure. However, scholars differ in 
their views of the merits of the TPRM’s soft persuasion character. Some scholars 
have criticised the TPRM’s peer-pressure approach. For example, John Jackson 
argued that such a peer-pressure approach was a backward step for the rule-
oriented development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). He 
argued: 
these reviews are not likely to have a significant impact on the 
implementation or effectiveness of the legal obligations contained in the 
variety of GATT treaties and protocols, including those that will come into 
effect at the end of the Uruguay Round. Indeed there are some risks that 
this review mechanism will divert attention from the legal norms in such a 
way as actually to decrease the pressure on Contracting Practices to 
observe those norms. To some degree, the [TPRM] is a concession to the 
view that GATT is primarily a ‘negotiating’ or ‘consulting’ organization, 
rather than one which tries to define and implement reasonably precise 
norms to help the standardization of world trading activities. 33 
Despite this criticism, he did recognise: ‘These reviews could indeed be an 
important addition to the GATT, providing information to many GATT members 
about the trade policies of particular Contracting Parties, and offering an 
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 J. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System, New York: Council on Foreign Relations for the 
Royal Institute of International, (1990), p. 80 
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opportunity for criticism of those policies’.34 
 
Other scholars applauded the TPRM’s soft persuasion character. For example, 
Sam Laird pointed out: ‘one of the strengths of the TPRM is its role as a forum 
where policies can be explained and discussed, where information can be sought 
and concerns can be expressed on a non-confrontational and non-legalistic 
basis.’35 Fabricio Pagani argued that the soft persuasion character of peer review 
could be ‘an important driving force to stimulate the state to change, achieve 
goals and meet standards’.36  
 
The soft persuasion nature of the TPRM proves better suited to encouraging and 
enhancing policy co-operation and convergence than a traditional enforcement 
mechanism. Particularly, unlike the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body, the 
TPRM has the flexibility to take into account a WTO Member’s policy objectives, 
and to look at its performance in a historical and political context. Therefore, 
the TPRM assesses and encourages trends toward trade-related liberalization 
even among relatively poorly performing WTO Members, while noting negative 
trends in the WTO Members that may presently have a higher performance 
record. Susan Hainsworth pointed out: 
Consisting of a pragmatic peer review with a focus on discussion and 
negotiation, it [the TPRM] has the added effect of casting light on 
domestic policies and practices, and providing an opportunity for their 
appraisal in relation to the contextual international norms. While 
ostensibly leaving state sovereignty untouched, the principle of 
submitting to peer review and criticism of policies does indeed smack of 
acknowledgement of an advanced degree of economic interdependence, 
and the consequent importance of channelling state policy-making toward 
the development of common, accepted approaches in the trade policy 
arena. Through exposure of unacceptable domestic policies, the TPRM 
sets parameters within which it encourages adherence to accepted 
international norms.37 
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In response to John Jackson’s criticism of the TPRM, Victoria C. Price argued: 
The question really boils down to an assessment of whether the peer 
pressure and increased transparency generated by the TPRM will have 
more than a marginal effect on the trade system, and whether the TPRM 
is complementary to, rather than in competition with, the dispute-
settlement regime. Time will tell.38 
After about 20 years of enforcement, what John Jackson was worried about the 
TPRM did not materialize. The TPRM has not diverted attention from the legal 
norms in such a way as actually to decrease the pressure on WTO Members to 
observe those norms, as predicted by Jackson. In fact, it has been praised by 
WTO Members through the Trade Policy Review Body. 39  The Report to the 
Singapore Ministerial Conference, which was held in Singapore in December 1996, 
noted: ‘The TPRM occupies a unique place within the WTO in promoting non-
confrontational discussion of key trade policy issues’.40 
 
1.2.2 China’s Approach to International Issues 
For about two thousand years, Chinese society was not ruled through laws as the 
ideal but an ‘order of traditional manners and customs’ based on Confucianism. 
Confucianism advocates the state of non-disputes, non-litigation and seeking 
harmony. The ideal society was to be created around the model of ethically 
exemplary individuals, and not through perfect laws. Even nowadays, the 
prototype of an ideal Chinese personality is highlighted, as in the case of a 
particularly faithful bus conductor in Beijing.41 In contrast to the high numbers 
of lawyers in the US and the strong tendency of Americans to resort to the law 
and courts to resolve conflicts, Chinese prefer arbitration and compromise to 
direct confrontation.  
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This traditional philosophy also affects China’s approach to international issues. 
Traditionally, China advocates bilateral consultation and negotiation. It has 
taken a sceptical, sometimes even negative, attitude towards dispute settlement 
mechanisms of international judicial and semi-judicial bodies. To date, for 
instance, China has not submitted any dispute to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), despite the fact that China, as one of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council of the United Nations, has the power to appoint one 
Chinese national as one of the fifteen judges of the ICJ.42  
 
This attitude has not changed since China joined the WTO. Article 16.5 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement clearly provides that no reservations may be made in 
respect of any provision of the agreement. As a WTO Member, thus, China has 
subjected itself to an international judicial body, the WTO dispute settlement 
system, for the first time.43 China has been involved in very few cases as either 
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complainant44 or as respondent45 since its accession to the WTO, though it has 
been involved in many cases as a third party.46 This is contrast to most other 
frequent users of the WTO dispute settlement system. Under the WTO dispute 
settlement system, for example, the US and the EU complained 242 times which 
accounted for 28.3% of all bilateral disputes between 1995 and 2004.47 During 
the same period, they were involved as respondents in 481 cases which 
accounted for 56.2% of all bilateral disputes.48 Even when it is involved in a 
dispute, China tries to solve the dispute at the consultation period and avoid 
bringing the dispute to a WTO Panel. On the 18th March 2004, for instance, the 
US requested consultations in regard to China’s policy on refund of value added 
tax to domestic industry producing integrated circuits.49  Through a series of 
consultations, China and the US finally came to an agreement. On the 14th July 
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2004, they signed the Memorandum of Understanding between China and the US 
Regarding China’s Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, which was notified to 
the WTO soon afterwards. 50  Thus, the four-month-long dispute was settled 
during the phase of consultation. This illustrates that, after its accession to the 
WTO, China still follows its traditional approach to international matters and 
prefers to solve disputes through arbitration and compromise than direct 
confrontation. The soft persuasion character of the TPRM is suited to China’s 
traditional approach to international disputes. China is apt to feel more 
confident to use the TPRM than the WTO dispute settlement system due to the 
TPRM’s non-confrontational and non-legalistic characteristics.  
 
2 The Impact of the TPRM on the Formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Originally, the issues in respect of national competition law and policy were not 
officially part of the content of trade policy review when the TPRM was first 
established under the GATT in 1988. Initially, they were not part of trade policy 
review when the WTO was established in 1995. Increasingly, however, the WTO 
Secretariat and reviewed WTO Members were choosing to report their national 
competition laws and policies because they thought that their national 
competition laws and policies were relevant to trade in goods and services and 
regulatory reform. Moreover, other WTO Members were also very keen to ask 
questions related to national competition law and policy. In 2001, the Trade 
Policy Review Body formally recognised that a WTO Member’s national 
competition law and policy was one of the common themes of the Secretariat 
Reports of trade policy review of WTO Members.51 Since then, a WTO Member’s 
national competition law and policy has always been examined in Chapter III 
‘Trade Policies and Practices by Measures’ of the Secretariat Report.  
 
When it joined the WTO in 2001, China was the seventh largest trading state in 
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the world.52 Thus, it would be reviewed every four years by the WTO Trade 
Policy Review Body.53 Since 2004, however, it has become the third largest trader 
after the European Union (EU) and the US.54 Consequently, the WTO decided to 
review China’s trade policy every two years rather than every four years. 55 
China’s first WTO trade policy review was carried out in late 2005. The 
Government Report and the Secretariat Report were published on the WTO 
website in early 2006. There are 12 paragraphs regarding China’s competition 
law and policy in the Secretariat Report of China’s first trade policy review. 
What follows examines the impacts of the TPRM on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 by exploring several functions performed by the TPRM. 
 
Before doing so, it has to be accepted that the TPRM has limitations in respect of 
reviewing WTO Members’ domestic competition law and policy due to the fact 
that the TPRM is not designed for the purpose of reviewing national competition 
law and policy only. The content in regard to national competition law and policy 
is limited in the Secretariat Report because it is not the only issue that the 
Secretariat Report deals with. The TPRM covers a wide range of trade-related 
issues in addition to national competition law and policy and does not allow the 
necessary time and degree of detail which an effective competition-specific 
peer review warrants. Thus, the TPRM is only able to deal with the general 
issues related to WTO Members’ competition law and policy under the current 
WTO framework. In other words, the TPRM is unable to deeply and 
comprehensively examine the WTO Members’ national competition laws under 
the existing system. Compared to competition-specific peer reviews, such as the 
one undertaken in the Competition Law and Policy Committee of the OECD,56 
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therefore, the contribution of the TPRM to the development of a WTO Member’s 
domestic competition law and policy is limited. This is the reason why WTO 
Members spent seven years discussing the possibility of setting up a separate 
peer review system which will be specially designed for reviewing WTO Members’ 
national competition law and policy. 57  Due to this limitation, the possible 
contribution from the TPRM to the development of China’s Antimonopoly Law is 
limited. It is not possible for the TPRM to provide a comprehensive review of 
China’s competition law and policy due to the nature of the TPRM. Nevertheless, 
the TPRM provides the only official review, at the international level, of Chinese 
competition law and policy. Thus, it is very significant to examine the impacts of 
the TPRM on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
                                                                                                                           
prepared by experts from five different OECD directorates. One chapter assesses the 
macroeconomic context for regulatory reform, the strengths and challenges of regulatory 
reform, and the challenges confronting future regulatory performance. Three thematic chapters 
examine the quality of regulatory institutions and government processes, competition policy and 
enforcement, and the enhancement of market openness through regulatory reform. Each review 
also contains chapters on particular sectors such as electricity and telecommunications. The 
chapter on competition policy and enforcement covers: (i) the competition policy's historical 
foundations; (ii) substantive issues including content of the competition law; (iii) institutional 
issues such as enforcement structures and practices; (iv) limits of competition policy including 
exemptions and special regulatory regimes; (v) competition advocacy for regulatory reform; and 
(vi) conclusions and policy options. 
57
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WGTCP, Peer Review: Merits and Approaches in a Trade and Competition Context - 
Communication from the OECD, WT/WGTCP/244, (2003).  
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2.1 Providing Policy Advice 
In a study, the OECD claimed: ‘Peer review may offer advice and proposals on 
the relevant policy dilemmas of the country under review’.58  By doing so, ‘peer 
review may disseminate the prevailing consensus and best practice to 
government and policymakers worldwide’.59 As a peer review, the TPRM is no 
exception. In its first appraisal in 1999, the Trade Policy Review Body noted: ‘the 
TPRM can provide a valuable input into national policy making, serving as an 
independent, objective assessment of trade and economic policies’. 60  It 
continued: ‘The TPRM…is of significant value in providing authoritative, well 
founded analyses of developments in trade policies and practices.’61 In its 2006 
annual report of trade policy review, the Trade Policy Review Body noted:  
By providing an overall picture of the institutional interaction in trade policy 
formulation and implementation and the effect of policies on different sectors, 
the reports have also served as an input to trade policy formulation in some 
cases. 62 
Sam Laird also argued: Trade Policy Review ‘as an independent and objective 
analysis of trade policies… has … contributed to the development of national 
policies’. 63  Thus, it seems clear that the TPRM could contribute to the 
development of WTO Members’ domestic policies by providing policy advice. 
Since national competition law and policy is one of the common themes of the 
TPRM, the TPRM could contribute to the development of WTO Members’ 
competition law and policy through providing policy advice. 
 
There are many associations, such as the American Bar Association, and 
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organisations, such as the OECD have provided considerable advice during the 
process of the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007.64 For China, however, 
none of them can rival the advisory role played by the TPRM due to its 
significance. China was advised during China’s first trade policy review that it 
needed to adopt a comprehensive competition law. The TPRM stated that China 
lacked ‘a modern, comprehensive competition law incorporating broad 
provisions to deal with cartels, anticompetitive mergers, and abuses of a 
dominant position’. 65  In addition, it also recommended that China’s 
Antimonopoly Law (1) ensured ‘non-discriminatory treatment of private 
enterprises versus state-owned enterprises throughout China’; (2) addressed ‘the 
challenges posed by administrative and state monopolies and other anti-
competitive arrangements’; and (3) ensured ‘continuing non-discriminatory 
treatment of foreign corporations operating in China’.66 
 
These recommendations have been accepted by China. This can be seen from 
the adoption and the content of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Before its first 
trade policy review, China had spent nearly 20 years on formulating its 
Antimonopoly Law. However, no draft was deliberated by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC). After China’s first trade 
policy review, the State Council approved in principle the June 2006 Draft on the 
8th June 2006 for the first time.67 At its 22nd session, which was held from the 
24th to the 29th June 2006, the 10th NPC Standing Committee deliberated the 
June 2006 Draft for the first time.68 One year later, it deliberated the June 2007 
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Draft.69 Two month later, it adopted the Antimonopoly Law 2007.70 These events 
clearly illustrated that the process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
was dramatically hastened after China’s first trade policy review. To some extent, 
therefore, they demonstrate the influence of the TPRM on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing policy advice. 
 
In addition, the content of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 also demonstrates the 
influence of the TPRM on its formulation through providing policy advice. In 
particular, Article 7 could be seen as a response to the opinion on ensuring non-
discriminatory treatment of private enterprises versus State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) throughout China. It did not appear in the drafts before China’s first trade 
policy review. It was first proposed in the June 2007 Draft about one year after 
China’s first trade policy review. And it was finally included in the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007. Chapter V of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 could be seen as a response 
to the opinion on addressing the challenge posed by administrative monopolies.71 
Some previous drafts, such as the 2004 Submitted Draft72 and the July 2005 
Draft73, include one chapter which prohibits administrative monopolies. Under 
the November 2005 Draft74, however, such a chapter was deleted and only one 
provision prohibits administrative monopolies. In response to the opinion on this 
issue in the Secretariat Report of China’s first trade policy review, the 
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Antimonopoly Law 2007 finally includes a whole chapter and six provisions in 
total prohibiting administrative monopolies.75  
 
2.2 Lending Intellectual and Moral Support 
To some extent, the function of lending intellectual and moral support is an 
extension of the function of providing policy advice. By providing policy advice 
to the WTO Member under review, the TPRM can also lend intellectual and moral 
support to those who argue for similar policies. In its 2005 annual report, the 
Trade Policy Review Body noted that the Secretariat Reports ‘provide a factual 
and independent review of the trade policies and practices of individual 
Members under review’. 76 In doing so, the TPRM lends intellectual and moral 
support to those within the WTO Member who favour liberalization.77 This has 
been recognised by the WTO. In its Report to the Singapore Ministerial Meeting, 
for instance, the Trade Policy Review Body noted: 
Members have appreciated that such reviews help them take stock of 
their policies on the basis of independent objective assessment, have 
strengthened the hand of domestic agencies promoting liberalisation and 
helped strengthen inter-agency discussion and co-operation in their own 
countries.78 
Similar words can also be found in the 1998 annual report of the Trade Policy 
Review Body. 79  Therefore, the TPRM ‘can sometimes assist governments in 
pursuing desirable trade policy reforms’ by lending intellectual and moral 
support.80 
 
In the case of adopting China’s Antimonopoly Law, the Secretariat Report of 
China’s first trade policy review stated: 
Adoption of China’s pending new Antimonopoly Law will fill a significant 
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existing gap in the legislative framework for the establishment of a 
market economy. Competition in the economy is at present enforced 
through a number of related laws, and appears not to be very effective.81 
There is no doubt that these words provided a timely needed intellectual and 
moral support to those who argued that China needed a competition law.82 Such 
a support would not be available if China were not a WTO Member. As mentioned 
above, the process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was dramatically 
hastened after China’s first trade policy review. This illustrates the impact of the 
TPRM on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 through lending 
intellectual and moral support because important legislation usually can be 
adopted through the legislative process very quickly in China, once the 
leadership reaches consensus on such legislation, and there is no doubt that the 
intellectual and moral support provided through the TPRM helped the Chinese 
leadership to reach such consensus. 
 
2.3 Improving Transparency 
The significance of transparency in a peer review is clearly summarised by the 
OECD. It argued: 
One of the main assets of peer review is as a transparency mechanism. 
Transparency is key to the adoption of good economic policies. The 
concept of transparency can be traced back to the literature of public 
choice, which sets out the basic line of argument that elected officials 
and civil servants may become influenced by vested interests (‘rent 
seekers’) to take decisions that help such groups and run counter to the 
promotion of general public welfare. Transparency is said to lead to 
better decision-making by alerting the public at home to the potential 
costs and benefits of policies as well as signalling potentially harmful 
changes to trading partners. 83 
In another document, it expressed a similar opinion by arguing that peer review 
could ‘improve policy-making through heightened transparency’. 84   The 
significance of transparency to the TPRM is emphasised in the Marrakesh 
Agreement. Article A of Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement clearly provides the 
objectives of the TPRM as being to contribute to improved adherence by all 
Members to the WTO Agreements and hence to the smoother functioning of the 
multilateral trading system, ‘by achieving greater transparency in, and 
understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members’.  
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In practice, improving transparency has proved to be one of the most 
appreciated functions of the TPRM. An appraisal of the TPRM by the Trade Policy 
Review Body placed special emphasis on this role by concluding that the TPRM 
‘had a valuable public good aspect, particularly in its contribution to 
transparency’.85 In its annual reports of the TPRM, the Trade Policy Review Body 
also recognised the role played by the TPRM in improving transparency regarding 
WTO Members’ trade-related policies. In its 2006 annual report of trade policy 
review, for instance, the Trade Policy Review Body noted:  
As envisaged in Annex 3, the TPRM continues to be a valuable forum for 
achieving transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and 
practices of Members, thus contributing to the smoother functioning of 
the multilateral trading system.86 
 
During the trade policy review, the WTO Member under review has the chance to 
present and clarify national rules, practices and procedures, and explain their 
rationale. All of these are documented and available on the WTO website. In 
addition, the Secretariat Reports are also published on the WTO website. The 
combination of these two levels of enhanced transparency—toward WTO 
Members and toward public opinion—contributes to the effectiveness of the 
TPRM. Therefore, the TPRM could help improve transparency and thus raise 
public awareness of WTO Members’ trade-related policies. The World Bank and 
the IMF claimed: ‘the TPRM has contributed to increased transparency of trade 
regimes and through the publication of the reviews to better awareness of the 
issues among wider audiences.’87  
 
Traditionally, Chinese legislation was considered as a national secret. This was 
changed when the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter 
the Legislation Law 2000) came into effect in July 2000.88 It provides that, when 
drafting legislation, apart from laws enacted or amended by the NPC, opinions 
from organizations and the public must be solicited, through, inter alia, 
seminars, appraisal meetings, and hearings. Since China joined the WTO, 
transparency in the process of legislation appears ‘to have been improved’.89 In 
the case of the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, the drafting process 
was even more transparent than previous Chinese legislation.90 A few drafts were 
available not only in Chinese but also in English. 91  It was a welcome 
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improvement. However, officials were still reluctant to openly express their 
opinions regarding the Antimonopoly Law during the drafting process. Thus, the 
TPRM provided a rare opportunity for outsiders to view the process of drafting 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007. The Secretariat Report, the Government Report and 
questions asked by other WTO Members are openly available to the public and 
can be found on the WTO website.  
 
Due to the improved transparency brought by the TPRM, the process of 
formulating the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is very different from previous 
legislation when China was not a member of the WTO. For example, the 
formulation of the Anti Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter the LAUC 1993)92 was not an open process. The public had little 
involvement in the process of formulating the LAUC 1993 due to the lack of 
relevant information. Moreover, China was not obliged to open the process of 
drafting the LAUC 1993. Since it joined the WTO, the process of formulating the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 was under the spotlight particularly through the TPRM.  
 
Achieving transparency is particularly valuable in the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. One of the main difficulties China faced in the process 
of drafting the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was the lobby by some industries against 
the adoption of an antimonopoly law. The disparity in industries and lobbying 
power between those who benefited from anticompetitive environments and 
those who would benefit from competitive environments delayed the adoption of 
an antimonopoly law.93 As the Eminent Persons Group argued, an ‘essential first 
step in developing support for better trade polices is public awareness’. 94 
Therefore, the TPRM has helped China to mitigate the influence of these vested 
interests due to the public awareness raised through improved transparency. This 
can be seen from the changes of some provisions of China’s Antimonopoly Law 
during the drafting process. For example, Article 2 of the June 2006 Draft 
provides: ‘As for monopolistic conduct prohibited by this Law, this Law does not 
apply where other laws or administrative regulations provide provisions’. In fact, 
this provision routinely appeared in most of the previous drafts as well. Under 
this provision, the industries and sectors which have more lobbying power than 
others can pursue exemption from the application of antimonopoly law and thus 
their interests would be protected. Therefore, this provision is helpful to 
maintain the interests of the powerful industries and sectors which benefit from 
the lack of competition legislation in China. However, Article 2 of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not provide that the Law is not applicable where 
other laws or administrative regulations provide provisions. Thus, no industries 
can be granted exemptions under Article 2 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. This 
change illustrates the impact of the TPRM on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through improving transparency.  
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2.4 Providing A Chanel of Learning Experiences 
Canada argued that peer review could offer ‘an ongoing, long-term education 
and information-sharing experience… across legal cultures, developmental levels 
and different institutional or historical settings’. 95  The OECD claimed: ‘one 
major benefit of the TPRM process has been the development of an extensive 
source of material on trade policies.’ 96 Sam Laird also argued: ‘the reviews 
[under the TPRM]… provide all countries with an independent source of learning 
experiences with trade policy at all levels of development’.97  He then argued:  
One aspect of the reviews [under the TPRM] has been a learning process 
about trade reforms and the linkages between trade and other policies. 
Thus, the lessons of trade reforms are being passed on to other countries 
within the WTO system.’98   
A report by the OECD also claimed that peer review aimed to ‘improve policy-
making through … sharing of information and experience’.99  
 
In particular, the inclusion of national competition law and policy descriptions in 
the TPRM has been identified as a valuable educative process. A US delegate in 
the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy 
(WGTCP) stated that during the TPRM process the Secretariat had invested a fair 
amount of interest and resources in asking the US what was being done in the 
antitrust area. Thus, he argued that the TPRM had been a useful learning 
experience for the US because it highlighted differences in approaches and 
perspectives with other jurisdictions.100  
 
It is necessary for China to learn from other WTO Members in respect of the 
development of competition law and policy due to its lack of experience in this 
area. This necessity was recognised and put into practices during the process of 
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drafting the Antimonopoly Law. In order to learn about their experience on 
competition legislation, for instance, China sent numerous officials to other 
countries and translated many pieces of competition legislation in other 
countries during the process of drafting its Antimonopoly Law. During the 
meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body which was held on the 19th and the 21st 
April 2006, the Brazilian delegate asked: ‘In which aspects of anti-trust 
regulations is China taking into account the experience of other countries in 
terms of setting up its own competition policy?’101 In response to this question, 
the Chinese government stated: 
In the drafting, MOFCOM [Ministry of Commerce], the Legislative Affairs 
Office of the State Council and other departments held many seminars 
with anti-monopoly law enforcement officials, experts on anti-monopoly 
laws from the US, the EU and Japan, and domestic and foreign enterprises. 
On those occasions, relevant issues relating to China’s anti-monopoly legal 
regime were discussed, and opinions from foreign experts were taken to 
the largest possible extent.102 
 
The TPRM provides another channel for China to learn the experiences of other 
competition regimes. China could learn experiences from its own trade policy 
review under the TPRM. It could also learn experiences through participating in 
other WTO Members’ trade policy reviews. In regard to competition law, it could 
benefit enormously from other WTO Members’ trade policy reviews. First, some 
WTO Members, such as the US and the EU, have a long history and rich 
experience in regard to competition legislation and enforcement. Hence, China 
could learn from them through participating in their trade policy reviews under 
the TPRM. Second, some transitional and developing WTO Members which face 
similar economic difficulties to China could also provide valuable experiences to 
China on competition legislation, although their competition regimes are also 
relatively new.  
 
Through providing a channel of learning experiences, the TPRM has helped China 
to formulate some provisions in the Antimonopoly Law 2007. For example, 
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Article 15 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 provides exemptions to anticompetitive 
agreements prohibited by Articles 13 and 14. The criteria adopted in Article 15 
are in line with practice under German and EU competition regimes. However 
such criteria were changed several times during the process of drafting China’s 
Antimonopoly Law. This illustrates the contribution of the TPRM to the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing learning 
experiences. Moreover, in the future, the implementation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 could also benefit from the TPRM through its function of providing a 
channel of learning experiences. 
 
2.5 Providing A Forum for Policy Dialogue 
Peer review provides a forum for policy dialogue. During the process of peer 
review, the country under review and peer countries systematically exchange 
information, attitudes and views on policy decisions and their application. As one 
study claims: ‘This dialogue can be the basis for further co-operation, through, 
for example, the adoption of new policy guidelines, recommendations or even 
the negotiation of legal undertakings’.103  
 
As a peer review, the TPRM provides a forum for policy dialogue. Through the 
TPRM, WTO Members can raise their concerns, while the WTO Member under 
review can explain its policies. According to Sam Laird, ‘one of the strengths of 
the TPRM is its role as a forum where polices can be explained and discussed, 
where information can be sought and concerns can be expressed on a non-
confrontational and non-legalistic basis’.104   In other words, the TPRM, as a 
forum for policy dialogue, provides two functions. First, the TPRM provides 
chances for WTO Members to raise their concerns on the policies of the WTO 
Member under review. During peer review, ‘[t]he reactions of the group engaging 
in peer review may provide a measure of the effectiveness or acceptability of a 
particular idea, opinion, or point of view.’105 This implies that concerns raised by 
other WTO Members during the WTO trade policy review could have impacts on 
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the development of new policies of the WTO Member under review. At least 
these concerns raise the awareness of the WTO Member on relevant issues. 
 
Second, the TPRM provides chances for the WTO Member under review to explain 
its policies that raise concerns from other WTO Members, address the concerns 
from other WTO Members, and defend its policies where necessary. In its report 
to the Singapore Ministerial Meeting, the Trade Policy Review Body noted: ‘[i]n 
many cases… review meetings can provide a useful forum for governments to 
explain the development of policies’.106 During the trade policy review, the WTO 
Member under review needs to address the concerns raised by other WTO 
Members and sometimes reassure them on these issues. However, this does not 
imply that it has to agree with other WTO Members in regard to its policies. In 
the case where it disagrees with other WTO Members in respect of certain of its 
policies, it can defend them through the TPRM. As Donald B. Keesing claimed, ‘in 
cases where a country remains convinced of the correctness of its policies, the 
TPRM provides a forum where it can respond to critics and advance its own more 
favourable interpretation of its trade regime.’107  
 
Through policy dialogue, the TPRM can ‘help Members to anticipate and defuse 
potential trade-related conflicts’, although it is not intended to serve as a basis 
for the enforcement of specific obligations under the WTO Agreements or for 
dispute settlement procedures.108 In other words, any potential complaints can 
be discussed and could be addressed through the policy dialogue provided by the 
TPRM. Sungjoon Cho pointed out: 
Trade disputes are not brewed overnight. Rather, trade frictions usually 
precede the outbreak of full-fledged disputes. Once a dispute is 
announced, registered, and adjudicated, it is very easy for it to escalate 
beyond the control of the parties. Therefore, if frictions can be diffused 
before they reach the level of disputes, much time, energy and expense 
will be saved. 109 
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Economically, therefore, the policy dialogue function provided through the TPRM 
could reduce the costs of litigation. It also provides the chance to avoid direct 
political conflict and thus save face for the WTO Members involved. In addition, 
it provides the chance for WTO Members to avoid domestic political pressure 
caused by losing a WTO case. Thus, these economic and political benefits from 
the policy dialogue under the TPRM are attractive for China. This policy dialogue 
function by the TPRM is also consistent with China’s traditional approach to 
international matters. 
 
China organised and participated in numerous seminars and conferences in 
regard to its Antimonopoly Law during the drafting process. Compared to these 
seminars and conferences, the policy dialogue forum provided by the TPRM is 
unique due to the following reasons. First, many WTO Members participated in 
the discussions in regard to China’s competition law during China’s first trade 
policy review. Such large scale participation in China’s domestic legislation is 
unprecedented in China’s legislation history. Second, it is first time that China 
discussed its domestic legislation with other nations on a mandatory basis. In 
other words, it was China’s duty to discuss its competition law during China’s 
trade policy review. Third, the TPRM provided a rare opportunity for other WTO 
Members to get explanations regarding China’s competition law from high-level 
officials in the Chinese government. Without the TPRM, it would not be easy to 
get such explanations. 
 
During China’s trade policy review, several WTO Members raised their concerns 
regarding China’s Antimonopoly Law.  For example, Chinese Taipei110, Japan111, 
and Turkey112 asked about the drafting progress of China’s Antimonopoly Law. In 
response, the Chinese government stated that the Antimonopoly Law had been 
put on the legislation agenda of the 10th NPC Standing Committee for 2006 and 
would be reviewed in August 2006.113 In fact, the 10th NPC Standing Committee 
deliberated the draft Antimonopoly Law in June 2006, two months earlier than 
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the time it told the Trade Policy Review Body. This illustrated that China took the 
concerns seriously. 
 
The US asked how the most recent draft of China’s Antimonopoly Law ensured 
non-discriminatory treatment for foreign companies.114 In response, the Chinese 
representative stated: 
The Antimonopoly Law will also observe the national treatment principle, 
imposing no discriminatory treatment to foreign enterprises. The rights of 
all market entities to participate in fair competition in China will be 
effectively protected by this competition legislation system. 115  
 
The term ‘public interest’ routinely appeared in the drafts of China’s 
Antimonopoly Law during the drafting process.116 For example, Article 1 of the 
November 2005 Draft provides: ‘This Law is enacted for the purposes of… 
safeguarding … public interest’. The inclusion of public interests as a test in the 
drafts of China’s Antimonopoly Law brought concerns from other WTO Members 
during China’s trade policy review. For example, the EU asked the meaning of 
the public interest in the context of the Antimonopoly Law and how China would 
apply the public interest test.117 In response, the Chinese government stated: ‘As 
for public interest mentioned in the draft of Antimonopoly Law, specific 
stipulations could be found in the future implementation regulation, rules and 
guidelines’. 118 From this response, it can be seen that China intended to keep 
the term ‘public interest’ in its Antimonopoly Law rather than delete such term. 
However, China did reassure the EU by stating that further administrative rules 
and guidance on applying public interest test would be provided in the future. 
The Antimonopoly Law 2007 clearly includes ‘public interest’ as one of its 
objectives. 119  In the future, thus, some guidance or administrative rules on 
implementing and interpreting the public interest are needed in order to address 
the concerns from other WTO Members. 
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The US,120 the EU,121 Canada,122 and the Chinese Taipei123 asked whether and how 
China’s Antimonopoly Law would be applied to SOEs. In reply, the Chinese 
government stated:  
China’s competition legislation system, including the coming Antimonopoly 
Law, will be equally applicable to all market entities including SOEs, 
enterprises of collective ownership, private enterprises and foreign 
invested enterprises. It will neither grant exemption to SOEs, nor provide 
for different treatment between SOEs and private enterprises in its 
application…The rights of all market entities to participate in fair 
competition in China will be effectively protected by this competition 
legislation system.124 
One year after China’s first trade policy review, the 10th NPC Standing 
Committee deliberated the June 2007 Draft in June 2007. Compared to the June 
2006 Draft, one of the changes of this draft is that it includes a new provision 
that clearly prohibits big SOEs from abusing their dominant positions and 
harming consumers’ interests.125  Such a provision did not appear in previous 
drafts. This provision remained in the Antimonopoly Law 2007.126 From this, we 
can see that the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced 
by the TPRM through providing a forum of policy dialogue. 
 
The US asked whether the monopolistic conduct of any sectors or industries, 
such as the energy sector, was exempted from the application of the most recent 
draft of the Antimonopoly Law.127 In response, the Chinese government stated: 
The current draft of the Antimonopoly Law does not explicitly provide the 
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industries or areas that are exempt from its application. Therefore the 
law will be applicable to all industries and areas.128  
However, this provision does provide a loophole through which some industries 
and sectors can be granted exemptions from the application of the Antimonopoly 
Law because it is not applicable where other laws or administrative rules provide 
provisions. Such language routinely appeared in most of the drafts during the 
process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law. However, Article 2 of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 does not include such words. Therefore, no industries 
can be granted exemptions under Article 2 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
Considering the fact that most of drafts provides: ‘this Law is not applicable 
where other laws or administrative rules provide provisions’, this change is very 
dramatic. It illustrates the impact of the TPRM on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing a forum for policy dialogue. 
 
In sum, the TPRM has played a significant role on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing a forum for policy dialogue. China did 
not address all the concerns on its Antimonopoly Law raised by other WTO 
Members during its first trade policy review. However, it did address some of 
them. Without the forum for policy dialogue provided by the TPRM, it would not 
be easy for other WTO Members to raise their concerns and get explanations and 
reassurances regarding some draft provisions of China’s Antimonopoly Law. This 
dialogue forum provided by the TPRM also benefits China. Through the TPRM, 
China has addressed such concerns which otherwise could lead to serious 
complaints, such as the concern regarding the national treatment principle.129 
Addressing such concerns lead to the changes in certain provisions of China’s 
Antimonopoly Law. These changes are examples of the impacts of the TPRM on 
the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing a forum of 
policy dialogue. 
 
3 Conclusion  
Despite the fact that it is not specially designed as a competition-specific peer 
review mechanism, the TPRM, as the only peer review on trade-related policies 
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at the international level, could still contribute to the development of domestic 
competition law and policy in the WTO Members. Under the TPRM, the review 
regarding China’s Antimonopoly Law went beyond the boundary of the existing 
WTO rules on competition issues because the scope of the TPRM is not narrowed 
to trade policies only. Compared to the impact examined in Chapters three, four 
and five, therefore, the impacts of the TPRM on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 cover more contents of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 and 
thus are more comprehensive.  
 
This chapter has shown that the TPRM has contributed to the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through providing policy advice, by lending intellectual 
and moral support, improving transparency, providing a channel of learning 
experiences from other WTO Members and providing a forum for policy dialogue 
where concerns can be expressed and policies can be explained. China will be 
reviewed under the TPRM every two years. The Secretariat Report of China’s first 
trade policy review has clearly mentioned: ‘[w]hile adoption of the new law 
[China’s Antimonopoly Law] will mark a significant further step in the evolution 
of China’s legislative framework, much will depend on its implementation’130 In 
particular, it claimed: ‘Sound implementation of the new law in a transparent 
and non-discriminatory manner will be vital to its effectiveness’.131 In the future, 
therefore, it is no doubt that the implementation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
will be scrutinized under the TPRM. Thus, the Chinese competition enforcement 
authorities need to be aware of the influence of the TPRM on the 
implementation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 through the functions mentioned 
above. 
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Conclusion 
Graham Mayeda claimed: ‘[t]he accession of China to the WTO has opened a 
two-way street along which influence will flow both from the WTO to China, but 
also from China towards the WTO and its members’.1 He provided a study on how 
China could influence the international trading system.2 By contrast, this thesis 
provides an example to how the World Trade Organisation (WTO) influences 
China by examining the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Antimonopoly Law 2007). 
 
1 A Significant Topic 
Over the last 60 years, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
its successor, the WTO, have led to an effective reduction of governmental 
barriers to trade through trade liberalization policies. 3  Tariff and non-tariff 
barriers as well as regulatory obstacles have been either reduced or eliminated. 
Today there is consensus that some anticompetitive practices could have adverse 
impacts on international trade. 4  In the absence of an effective competition 
regime, the benefits of trade liberalization would be nullified or at least 
reduced. Therefore, the WTO is very keen on the development of competition 
law and policy in its Members. Particularly, this is illustrated by the formal 
inclusion of national competition law and policy into the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM) in 2001.5 During China’s first WTO trade policy review, for 
instance, the development of China’s competition law and policy in general and 
China’s Antimonopoly Law in particular was examined. 
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China started its Economic Reform and Open Door Policy in 1978. The main 
purpose of the Economic Reform is to transform the Chinese economic system 
from a centrally planned economy to a market economy where resources are 
located through market forces and competition. The Chinese Economic Reform is 
associated with the deregulation of prices and privatization of the State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). It has lead to some diminution in the direct role of the State 
in economic activity. Nowadays, market forces play a major role in the Chinese 
economy. 6  The purpose of the Open Door Policy is to liberalize trade and 
investment. The advent of trade liberalization has witnessed far-reaching trade 
policy reforms leading to a considerable reduction in governmental trade 
barriers. 7  This process of trade liberalization has speeded up since China’s 
accession to the WTO.8  
 
With the introduction of the Economic Reform and Open Door Policy, 
anticompetitive practices by both domestic and foreign firms emerged in China. 
In order to combat these practices, China started to enact some competition-
related legislation since 1980. Since then, it has enacted several pieces of 
legislation dealing with anticompetitive practices, such as the Price Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the Price Law 1997)9 and the Anti Unfair 
Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the LAUC 
1993). 10  However, the competition-related legislation in China before the 
adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 was scattered in several laws and 
regulations. It lacked system and comprehensiveness. It did not provide some 
essential components of what would be considered a complete set of 
competition policy tools, such as the definition of an abuse of a dominant 
                                         
6
 The government still plays a significant role in a few industries, such as the oil industry. 
7
 For example, the average applied MFN tariff was reduced from 35% in 1994 to 15.6% in 2001, 
just before China acceded to the WTO. See, Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review-
People’s Republic of China- Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/161, 28th February 2006, p. x, 
p. 4, and p. 29. 
8
 For example, the average applied MFN tariff was reduced from 15.6% in 2001, just before China 
acceded to the WTO, to 9.7% in 2005. See, Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/161, note 7, 
p. x. 
9
 An English version is available at http://www.chinagate.com.cn/english/430.htm. 
10
 An English version is available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=3306. 
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position. Therefore, it could not meet the needs of the new environment as 
China’s economy shifted from a centrally planned system to a market economy. 
Thus, the demand increased for the enactment of a systematic and 
comprehensive competition law in China.  
 
After nearly 20 years of formulation, China adopted the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
on the 30th August 2007. 11  The Antimonopoly Law 2007 aims to maintain 
competition and restrain anticompetitive practices. It bans: (1) monopolistic 
agreements such as price fixing cartels among companies in a competitive 
relationship and collusion among bidders; (2) abuse of a dominant market 
position, such as price discrimination and refusing or forcing transactions; (3) 
large-scale mergers and acquisitions among firms that could lead to a de facto 
restriction of competition in relevant markets; (4) administrative monopolies. 
 
During the process of drafting China’s Antimonopoly Law, various factors could 
have had impacts on its formulation. According to the source, they can be 
divided into domestic and international factors. Examples of domestic factors 
are economic conditions and domestic market structure. During the process of 
drafting China’s Antimonopoly Law, China was aware of these domestic factors. 
In 2002, for instance, Peng Li, then Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
9th National People’s Congress (NPC) (1998-2003) and former Prime Minister 
(1988-1998) claimed: ‘China must formulate an antimonopoly law which… 
accommodates China’s economic development needs’.12  
 
The international factors that could have had impacts on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 include the influences from individual countries and 
international organizations. One of the examples of the influences from 
individual countries is that China sent many representatives to other countries in 
order to learn their experiences regarding competition legislation during the 
                                         
11
 The official Chinese edition is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-
08/30/content_6635143.htm. An unofficial English translation is provided as an appendix in this 
thesis. 
12
 See, ‘Enacting the Antimonopoly Law and Establishing and Perfecting Market Economy System’ 
[制定反垄断法建立完善市场经济体制, Zhiding Fanlongdua Fa Jianli Wanshan Shichang Jingji 
Tizhi], People’s Daily[人民日报, Renmin Ribao], 30th June 2002, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/2144/2867/20020630/764360.html. 
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process of formulating the Antimonopoly Law. In addition to the influences from 
individual countries, international organizations could also have played a role in 
the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law. This study examines the influences 
from one such organization, the WTO.  
 
A WTO Member’s domestic competition law could have an impact on 
international trade. In the case of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, such impacts 
could be even bigger due to China’s sheer economic size and trading power. 
Therefore, the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has generated 
unprecedented interest from both the WTO and its Members. However, there is a 
lack of thorough and comprehensive studies on the WTO’s impact on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Against this background, this study 
examines the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
It focuses on three questions: (1) whether the WTO could have had an influence 
on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; (2) if so, how the WTO could 
have had an influence on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; and (3) 
to what extent the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has reflected the 
WTO’s influences.  
 
2 Key Findings in This Study 
There is a consensus both within and outside of China that the WTO could have 
had impact on the formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law. During the 
discussions in the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy (WGTCP), for instance, the Chinese delegate acknowledged: 
‘to meet the needs of its national economic construction and in implementing its 
commitment made during its WTO accession process, China has been 
accelerating its work in drafting its Antimonopoly Law’. 13  In 2002, Peng Li 
claimed: ‘China must formulate an antimonopoly law which is consistent with 
the international conventions and customs, especially the WTO Agreements’.14 
Other WTO Members also argued that the WTO rules were relevant in the 
                                         
13
 WGTCP, Communication from China - Elements contained in Paragraph 25 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, WT/WGTCP/W/227, (2003), para. 3. 
14
 See, ‘Enacting the Antimonopoly Law and Establishing and Perfecting Market Economy System’, 
note 12. 
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formulation of China’s Antimonopoly Law. For example, Tim Stratford, the US 
Trade Representative (USTR) official responsible for China, said: ‘The United 
States will assess whether any legislation [the Antimonopoly Law] violates 
China’s commitments to the World Trade Organization’.15 
 
However, these comments only reflect one aspect of the WTO’s impact on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. This study has shown that the WTO 
could have had impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 in four 
aspects: 
(i) consistency: the Antimonopoly Law 2007 needs to be consistent 
with the WTO rules; 
(ii) obligation: the enactment of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 could 
help China implement its WTO commitments; 
(iii) enabling: the WTO rules could have enhanced the case for China 
seeking to combat anticompetitive practices through the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007; 
(iv) peer pressure: the TPRM could have contributed to the 
development of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
In particular, Chapter Three examines the WTO’s impact from the first aspect. It 
argues that the WTO national treatment principle matters to the WTO Members’ 
national competition laws. As a WTO Member, thus, China needs to make sure 
that its Antimonopoly Law is consistent with the WTO national treatment 
principle. In theory, therefore, the relevance of the WTO national treatment 
principle could have had impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007. In reality, however, it took China a few years to accept the relevance of 
the WTO national treatment principle in the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007. This struggle has been reflected in the process of formulating the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. Through analysing the changes of the relevant 
provisions in different drafts, Chapter Three shows that the WTO national 
treatment principle has had impact on the formulation of the objectives and 
                                         
15
 See, ‘China to consider introducing anti-monopoly law’, 28th December 2005, 
http://today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=reutersEdge&storyID=uri:2005-12-
28T152702Z_01_ARM855600_RTRUKOC_0_US-CHINA-
MONOPOLY.xml&pageNumber=1&summit; ‘Nation may introduce antimonopoly law’, 30th 
December 2005, http://www.newsgd.com/business/laws/200512300064.htm. 
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exemptions of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
Chapter Four examines the WTO’s impact from the second aspect. First, it 
argues that Articles VIII and IX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) not only prohibit anticompetitive practices that have impact on 
international trade in services but also oblige WTO Members to combat such 
anticompetitive practices. Before the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, 
China’s competition-related legislation did not cover all the anticompetitive 
practices prohibited under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. The adoption of a 
competition law could help China to implement its obligations under Articles VIII 
and IX of the GATS by providing a general ban on all anticompetitive practices. 
This possibility of helping China to implement the obligations under Articles VIII 
and IX of the GATS has strengthened the expectation that the Antimonopoly Law 
would provide a general ban on all anticompetitive practices during the process 
of formulating this Law. Second, it argues that Section 1.1 of the Reference 
Paper on Regulatory Principles of the Negotiating Group on Basic 
Telecommunications (hereinafter the Reference Paper) requires Members to 
maintain ‘appropriate measures’ for ‘the purpose of preventing suppliers who, 
alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing 
anticompetitive practices’ in the telecommunications sector. The existing 
telecommunications legislation in China is far from effective to prevent 
anticompetitive practices. A comprehensive competition law could help China to 
implement the obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper because it 
could be an ‘appropriate measure’ for preventing anticompetitive practices in 
the telecommunications sector. This possibility of helping China to implement 
the obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper has led to the changes 
of certain provisions in the drafts and the Antimonopoly Law 2007 in order to 
make such legislation applicable to the telecommunications sector. 
 
Chapter Five examines the WTO’s impact from the third aspect. It argues that 
Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) authorize WTO Members to regulate abuses of intellectual 
property rights. However, these enabling clauses could only enhance the case for 
a WTO Member seeking to combat abuses of intellectual property rights through 
domestic measures when it can resist pressures from other WTO Members. 
China’s desire to prohibit abuses of intellectual property rights through its 
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Antimonopoly Law was criticised by other WTO Members during the process of 
formulating this Law. With the increasing significance of China’s economy and 
trading power, however, China has become stronger and more able to resist 
pressures from other WTO Members in regard to regulating abuses of intellectual 
property rights. Under these circumstances, Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the 
TRIPS have enhanced the case for China seeking to regulate abuses of 
intellectual property rights through its Antimonopoly Law. This is illustrated in 
Article 55 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, which stipulates that the law will 
apply to undertakings which abuse intellectual property rights to eliminate or 
restrict competition. 
 
Chapter Six examines the WTO’s impact from the fourth aspect. It argues that 
the TPRM could have contributed to the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 
2007 by (a) providing valuable and independent policy advice; (b) lending moral 
and intellectual supports to those who are in favour of adopting an antimonopoly 
law; (c) increasing transparency; (d) providing a channel of learning experiences 
from other Members; and (e) providing a forum where other Members can 
express their concerns and the Member under review can explain and defend 
their policies. Through analysing the changes of the relevant draft provisions, 
Chapter Six shows that the TPRM has contributed to the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
In sum, this study has found: 
(1) The WTO could have had impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007;  
(2) The WTO could have had influences on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 through four aspects: (i) consistency: the content 
of China’s forthcoming Antimonopoly Law needs to be consistent with the 
WTO national treatment principle; (ii) obligation: the adoption of the 
Antimonopoly Law could help China to implement obligations under 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS and Section 1 of the Reference Paper; (iii) 
enabling: Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS could have enhanced the 
case for China seeking to prohibit intellectual property-related 
anticompetitive practices through the Antimonopoly Law 2007; and (iv) 
peer pressure: the TPRM could have contributed to the formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
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(3) Through analysing the changes of some provisions in the drafts and the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, this study has demonstrated that the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has been influenced by the 
WTO in these four aspects. 
 
Needless to say, however, it should be borne in mind that there are limitations of 
the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. First, 
there is no overarching set of principles or interpretation of the WTO rules as 
they apply to competition issues. This makes it very difficult to implement 
competition-related WTO rules. It also makes competition-related WTO rules less 
known outside of the world of academics. Second, the WTO does not require a 
WTO Member to adopt a national competition law. China is no exception. Article 
65 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the People’s Republic 
of China expressly mentioned that China was formulating an antimonopoly law.16 
However, this provision is not included in the Protocol on the Accession of the 
People’s Republic of China. 17  Therefore, China has no obligation to enact a 
comprehensive competition law. Nevertheless, the limitations of the WTO on its 
Members’ domestic competition laws should not be interpreted as saying that 
the WTO has no impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. As has 
been shown in this study, the WTO has influenced the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 from four aspects. 
 
3 Recommendations 
The Antimonopoly Law 2007 will come into force on the 1st August 2008.18 The 
WTO not only has influenced the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, but 
also could have impact on the enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. In 
fact, the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will really begin to matter to the WTO and its 
Members when it is implemented. Moreover, the further development of the 
                                         
16
 For the text, see WTO document, WT/ACC/CHN/49, (2001). 
17
 The Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Part I, Art. 1(2). For the text of 
the Protocol on China’s Accession, see, WTO, Protocol on the Agreement of the People’s 
Republic of China to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2003). 
18
 The Antimonopoly Law 2007, Art. 57. 
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Antimonopoly Law 2007 is inevitable because the development of competition 
law in China is a process. Thus, the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is 
only the start of the WTO’s impacts on China’s competition regime. In the future, 
therefore, the Chinese competition enforcement authorities need not only to be 
aware of the WTO’s impact but also to understand precisely such impacts. Due to 
the lack of comprehensive studies on the WTO’s impact on competition law in 
general and the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 in particular, however, 
it is far from easy for the Chinese competition enforcement authorities to 
understand precisely the WTO’s legal impact on China’s competition regime. 
Based on this study, therefore, a few recommendations are provided to the 
Chinese competition enforcement authorities. 
 
3.1 First Recommendation 
The Chinese competition enforcement authorities must make sure that the 
enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 is consistent with the WTO national 
treatment principle. At least, there should be no de jure discrimination against 
foreign companies through either the Antimonopoly Law 2007 or further 
guidance of this Law. Any such discrimination could trigger complaints from 
other WTO Members and thus China could face unfavourable rulings from a Panel 
and the Appellate Body. In particular, the Chinese competition enforcement 
authorities need to be aware of the potential violation of the WTO national 
treatment principle through interpreting and implementing the terms ‘public 
interest’ and ‘development of the socialist market economy’ under Article 1 of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007. In practice, de facto discrimination is generally 
related to the enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Although the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 will not come into force until the 1st August 2008, it is 
still necessary for the Chinese competition enforcement authorities to be aware 
of the risk of violating the WTO national treatment principle. In particular, the 
Chinese competition enforcement authorities need to be aware of the potential 
de jure discrimination against foreign companies when it interprets and 
implements the exemption provisions under the Antimonopoly Law 2007, such as 
Article 15. 
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3.2 Second Recommendation 
Articles VIII and IX of the GATS require WTO Members to take action or provide 
remedies against certain anticompetitive practices in trade of services. Before 
the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, however, China’s competition-
related legislation was insufficient to implement such WTO obligations. The 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 could help China to implement such WTO obligations 
because it provides a general ban on anticompetitive practices. In order to 
materialise this benefit, however, the Chinese competition enforcement 
authorities need to make sure that further guidance on implementing the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 is formulated in a way as to accommodate the needs of 
implementing the obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the GATS. 
 
Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper clearly requires China to adopt appropriate 
measures for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a 
major supplier from engaging in or continuing anticompetitive practices in the 
telecommunications sector. In order to implement this obligation, China has at 
least three options: (1) amending the Telecommunications Regulation 2000; (2) 
adopting a new telecommunications law; (3) adopting the Antimonopoly Law 
2007. As examined in Chapter four, the first two choices are not likely to 
materialise in the near future, while the Antimonopoly Law will come into force 
on the 1st August 2008. Realistically, therefore, it is wise for China to implement 
its obligation under Section 1.1 of the Reference Paper through the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. The Antimonopoly Law 2007 could be applicable to the 
telecommunications sector because it does not grant any exemptions to the 
telecommunications sector. Therefore, the Chinese competition enforcement 
authorities need to be aware of the applicability of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
to the telecommunications sector and enforce this Law in a way as to 
accommodate the needs of implementing the obligation under Section 1.1 of the 
Reference Paper. 
 
3.3 Third Recommendation 
Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS expressly recognize the legitimacy of 
invoking WTO Members’ domestic legislation to combat abuses of intellectual 
property rights. They have enhanced the case for China seeking to regulate 
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abuses of intellectual property rights through the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
However, Article 55 of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 only provides a general 
provision by stating that it is applicable to abuses of intellectual property rights. 
Thus, further guidelines or administrative rules are needed in order to provide a 
detailed procedure and a set of criteria on implementing Article 55. During the 
process of formulating such guidelines or administrative rules, the Chinese 
competition enforcement authorities need to be aware of the discretion 
provided by Article 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS.  
 
3.4 Fourth Recommendation 
The TPRM has contributed to the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
through providing policy advice, by lending intellectual and moral support, 
improving transparency, providing a channel of learning experiences and 
providing a forum for policy dialogue. It will continue such influences on the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. For instance, China will be reviewed under the TPRM in 
2008 for the second time. There is no doubt that one of the concerns regarding 
China’s competition law and policy will be the enforcement of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 during China’s second trade policy review. In the future, therefore, the 
Chinese competition enforcement authorities need to be aware of and 
understand the comprehensive impacts of the TPRM on the Antimonopoly Law 
2007. In particular, the Chinese competition enforcement authorities need to be 
aware that the implementation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 will scrutinized by 
the WTO and other WTO Members through the TPRM. 
 
4 Further Studies 
4.1 Other Potential Impact of the WTO on the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007  
4.1.1 Potential Impact of Other WTO Rules on the Formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
Although the purpose of this study is to examine the WTO’s impact on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, it has to be accepted that for 
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reasons of space and time this thesis has only focused on the impacts of the WTO 
national treatment principle, Articles VIII and IX of the GATS, Section 1 of the 
Reference Paper, and Articles 8.2, 40 and 31(k) of the TRIPS and the TPRM. 
There are dozens of competition-specific provisions under the current WTO 
system. And these competition-specific provisions might have had a bearing on 
the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. For instance, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) requires standards be no more restrictive on 
trade than is necessary. 19  Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the TBT could be used to 
challenge the use of proprietary standards to restrict competition, such as in 
cases where standards (such as computer software standards) limit competition 
in networked services. In addition, the principles of transparency and fairness 
could also have influenced the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. All 
these illustrate that there is a need for further studies on whether these 
competition-related WTO rules could have influenced the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, and if so, to what extent the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 has reflected such influences. 
 
4.1.2 Potential Impact of the WTO on the Formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007 from Non-Legal Perspectives 
This study explores the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007 from a legal perspective. It is possible to look at this issue from other 
perspectives, such as an economic perspective. As mentioned in the Introduction 
of this thesis, there are some studies on the economic impact of the WTO on 
China. However, there is no comprehensive economic analysis on the WTO’s 
impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. Therefore, it is worthy 
of further studies. 
 
4.1.3  Potential Impact of the WTO on the Implementation and 
Further Development of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 
This study focuses on the WTO’s impact on the formulation of the Antimonopoly 
Law 2007. With the adoption of the Antimonopoly Law 2007, attention now turns 
to the implementation and further development of this Law. Therefore, further 
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 The TBT is available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm. 
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studies are needed regarding the WTO’s impacts on the implementation and 
further development of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
 
4.2 Potential Impact of the WTO on Other Members’ 
Competition Laws 
After the WTO General Council’s post Cancun Decision (hereinafter the July 
Package) which excluded competition policy from the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations,20 any potential agreement on competition within the WTO will not 
materialize in the very near future. Thus, attention now turns to how to use the 
existing competition-related rules within the WTO rather than how to establish a 
new competition system within the WTO. This change makes studies on the 
impact of the existing WTO rules on national competition regimes more 
significant than before. For the WTO Member which has not adopted a 
competition law but is in the process of formulating a national competition law, 
such studies could raise the awareness of the relevance of the WTO in the 
formulation of a domestic competition law. For the WTO Member which has 
already adopted a competition law, such studies could help the competition 
authorities to be aware that the enforcement of the existing competition law 
must be consistent with the WTO rules. In addition, such studies could raise the 
awareness of the potential impact of the WTO on the further development of the 
existing competition law. Therefore, studies on the WTO’s impact on WTO 
Members’ domestic competition laws could be very helpful for WTO Members. 
However, there is a lack of such studies.21 Although this thesis throws some light 
on this general issue by examining the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007, further studies are needed in order to understand the 
WTO’s impact on WTO Members’ competition laws. Such studies could be more 
comprehensive than the studies on the impacts of the WTO on the formulation of 
the Antimonopoly Law 2007 because they include more than one WTO Member.  
                                         
20
 Paragraph 1 (g) of the July Package, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm. 
21
 After July 2004 when the consensus was reached to exclude competition policy from the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations, there has been lack of studies on the competition issues under the 
WTO, not mention to the impacts of the existing WTO rules on WTO Members’ national 
competition laws. 
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5 Contributions of This Study 
This thesis has contributed to the policy making and the academic literature in 
at least three different areas. First, it has illustrated: (1) the WTO could have 
influenced the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007; (2) the WTO could 
have influenced the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 in four aspects; 
(3) the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007 has reflected such influences. 
Before this study, no research had been done regarding the WTO’s impacts on 
the formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007. To some extent, the lack of 
studies on this topic illustrates how original this study is. It has thrown light into 
a dark area where there was no intelligent light. From this sense, the 
contribution of this study is that it fills the gap left by other scholars and helps 
policy makers to understand in a precise way the WTO’s impacts on the 
formulation of the Antimonopoly Law 2007.  
 
Second, this study has exposed a new research area, the WTO’s impact on the 
development of WTO Members’ competition regimes in general and competition 
laws in particular, through analysing the WTO’s impacts on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. T. L. Knutsen argued: ‘one does not ask of a theory 
whether it is true or false, rather one asks whether it is enlightening’.22 If he is 
right, this thesis is certainly enlightening. It opens a new research area, the 
impacts of the WTO on WTO Members’ national competition laws. This study is 
the only research that has been carried out regarding this issue so far. One of the 
reasons why there is a lack of studies in this area could be the interdisciplinary 
character of this topic. It combines both international trade law, particularly 
WTO law and national competition law and policy. In general, WTO law is 
considered as part of public international law, while national competition law 
belongs to national law. There are not many scholars with expertise in both 
subjects. Thus, it is far from easy to bring these two subjects together. Despite 
this difficulty, this thesis has demonstrated that studies in this area can be 
carried out by examining the WTO’s impact on the formulation of the 
Antimonopoly Law 2007. 
                                         
22
 T. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, 2nd ed., Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, (1997), p. 1. 
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Third, this study has developed and applied a structure of four aspects of the 
WTO’s impacts on domestic legislation: (1) consistency: the content of domestic 
legislation needs to be consistent with the WTO rules; (2) obligation: The 
adoption of domestic legislation could help Members implement WTO rules; (3) 
enabling: the WTO rules could enhance the case for Members seeking to act in 
the way permitted by the WTO; (4) peer pressure: the WTO peer review system, 
the TPRM, could contribute to the development of WTO Members’ domestic 
legislation. This structure could be used for further studies on the WTO’s impact 
on WTO Members’ domestic legislation. In particular, it could be used for 
carrying out further studies on the impact of the WTO on other WTO Members’ 
competition legislation.  
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Appendix 
The Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Adopted at the 29th session of the Standing Committee of the 10th National 
People’s Congress on the 30th August 2007) 
Translated by Jia Yuan 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: General Provisions 
Chapter 2: Monopoly Agreement 
Chapter 3: Abuse of a Dominant Market Position 
Chapter 4: Concentration of Undertakings 
Chapter 5: Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict 
Competition 
Chapter 6: Investigation of the Suspected Monopoly Conducts 
Chapter 7: Legal Liabilities 
Chapter 8: Supplementary Articles 
 
Chapter 1: General Provisions 
Article 1: This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining 
monopolistic conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing 
economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers and the public 
interest, promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy. 
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Article 2: This Law shall be applicable to monopolistic conducts in economic 
activities within the People’s Republic of China. 
This Law shall apply to the conducts outside the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China if they eliminate or have restrictive effect on competition on 
the domestic market of the PRC. 
Article 3: “Monopolistic conduct” is defined in this law as the following 
activities: 
(i) monopolistic agreements among undertakings; 
(ii) abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings; 
(iii) concentration of undertakings that eliminates or restricts competition 
or might be eliminating or restricting competition; 
Article 4: The State formulates and carries out competition rules which in 
accordance with the socialist market economy, perfects macro-control, and 
advances a unified, open, competitive and orderly market system. 
Article 5: Undertakings shall through fair competition, voluntary alliance, 
concentrate according to law, expand the scope of operation, and enhance 
competition ability. 
Article 6: Undertakings of a dominant position shall be prohibited to abuse a 
dominant position, eliminate, and restrict competition. 
Article 7: For the undertaking in the state-owned economy controlled industries 
to which are related to national economic lifeline and state security, and in the 
industries to which the state grants special or exclusive rights, the state protect 
their lawful operation. The state also lawfully regulates and controls their 
operation and the price of their commodities and services, safeguards interests 
of consumers, promotes technical progresses. 
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Undertakings mentioned above shall lawfully operate, be honest and faithful, be 
strict self-discipline, accept social supervision, shall not damage interests of 
consumers using their dominant or exclusive positions. 
Article 8: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and regulations grant rights to administer public issues shall be prohibited to 
abuse administrative power, to eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 9: The State Council establishes the Antimonopoly Commission, which in 
charge of organizing, coordinating, guiding antimonopoly works, performs the 
following responsibilities: 
(i) study and draft related competition policies; 
(ii) organize research, assess general competition situations in the market, 
issue assess report; 
(iii) enact and issue antimonopoly guidelines; 
(iv) coordinate antimonopoly execution works; 
(v) other responsibilities stipulated by the State Council. 
The State Council stipulates composition and working rules of the Antimonopoly 
Commission. 
Article 10: Antimonopoly execution authorities are in charge of antimonopoly 
execution pursuant to this law. 
Antimonopoly execution authorities shall authorise the corresponded authorities 
of provincial government or government in an autonomous region or directly 
municipality to in charge of antimonopoly execution pursuant to this law, when 
needed. 
Article 11: Association of undertakings should intensify industrial self-discipline, 
guide undertakings to lawfully compete, safeguard the competition order in the 
market. 
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Article 12: An “undertaking” in this law refers to a legal person, other 
organization or natural person that engages in businesses of commodities 
(hereinafter “commodities” include services). 
A “relevant market” in this law refers to the territorial area within which the 
undertakings compete against each other during a time period for relevant 
products. 
Chapter 2: Monopoly Agreement 
Article 13: Any following agreements among the undertakings competed with 
each other shall be prohibited: 
(i) fix, or change prices of products; 
(ii) limit the output or sales of the products; 
(iii) allocate the sales markets or the raw material purchasing markets; 
(iv) limit the purchase new technology or new facilities, or the 
development of, new products or new technology; 
(v) jointly boycott transactions; 
(vi) other agreements identified by antimonopoly execution authorities. 
Agreements referred to this law are agreement, decision or concerted action 
which eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 14: Any following agreements among undertaking and counterparty are 
prohibited: 
(i) fix the price for resale; 
(ii) restrict the lowest price for resale; 
(iii) another monopoly agreement identified by antimonopoly execution 
authorities. 
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Article 15: Agreements among undertakings with one of the following objectives 
shall be exempted from application of article 13, 14 if 
(i) agreements to improve technology, to research and develop new 
products; 
(ii) agreements for the purpose of product quality upgrading, cost 
reduction and efficiency improvement, of unify standards, norms or 
specialise; 
(iii) agreements by small and medium-sized enterprises to improve 
operational efficiency and to enhance their competitiveness; 
(iv) agreements to cope with economic depression, to moderate serious 
decrease in sales volumes or distinct production surplus; 
(v) agreements to achieve public interests, such as save energy, protect 
environment, relieve the victims of a disaster and so on; 
(vi) agreements to maintain legitimate interest in the cooperation with 
foreign economic entities and foreign trade; 
(vii) other situation stipulated by laws and the State Council. 
Undertakings pursuant to (i) to (v), and therefore exempted from Article 13, 14, 
must additionally prove, that the agreements can enable consumers to share 
impartially the interests derived from the agreements, and will not entirely 
eliminate the competition in relevant market. 
Article 16: Association of industry shall be prohibited to organize undertakings 
to conduct monopoly activities being prohibited by this law. 
Chapter 3: Abuse of a Dominant Market Position 
Article 17: Undertakings of a dominant market position shall not abuse their 
dominant market positions to conduct following conducts: 
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(i) sell commodities at unfairly high prices or buy commodities at unfairly 
low prices; 
(ii) sell commoditiews at prices below cost without legitimate reasons; 
(iii) refuse to trade with counterparty without legitimate reasons; 
(iv) require its counterparty to trade exclusively with it or trade 
exclusively with the appointed undertakings without legitimate 
reasons; 
(v) tie products or require as unreasonable conditions for trading without 
legitimate reasons; 
(vi) apply dissimilar prices or other transaction terms to equivalent 
counterparties; 
(vii) other conducts identified as abuse of a dominant position by 
antimonopoly execution authorities 
For the purposes of this law, “dominant market position” refers to the 
undertaking(s) having the ability to control the price, quantity or other trading 
conditions of products in relevant market, or to hinder or affect other 
undertakings to enter the relevant market. 
Article 18: The following factors will be taken into consideration in finding 
dominant market position: 
(i) market share in relevant market, and the competition situation of the 
relevant market; 
(ii) ability to control the sales markets or the raw material purchasing 
markets; 
(iii) financial status and technical conditions of the undertaking; 
(iv) the degree of dependence of other undertakings; 
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(v) entry to relevant market by other undertakings; 
(vi) other factors related to find a dominant market position. 
Article 19: Undertakings that have any of the following situations can be 
assumed to be have a dominant market position: 
(i) the relevant market share of one undertaking accounts for1/2 or 
above; 
(ii) the joint relevant market share of two undertakings accounts for 2/3 
or above; 
(iii) the joint relevant market share of three undertakings accounts for 3/4 
or above. 
Undertakings with a market share of less than 1/10 will not be deemed as 
occupying a dominant market position even if they fall within the scope of 
second or third item. 
When the Undertakings assumed to have a dominant market position can prove 
that they do not have a dominant market, shall not be assumed to have a 
dominant market position.  
Chapter 4: Concentration of Undertakings 
Article 20: A concentration refers to the following situations: 
(i) the merger of undertakings; 
(ii) the acquisition by undertakings, whether by purchase of securities or 
assets, of control of other undertakings; 
(iii) the acquisition by contact or any other means, of control of other 
undertakings or of possibility of exercising decisive influence on other 
undertakings. 
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Article 21: A concentration falls under the notification criteria issued by the 
State Council, a report must be notify in advance with the antimonopoly 
execution authorities. Without notification the concentration shall not be 
implemented. 
Article 22: A concentration refers to following situations, shall not notify to the 
antimonopoly execution authorities: 
(i) one undertaking which is a party to the concentration has the power to 
exercise more than half  the voting rights of every other undertaking, 
whether of the equity or the asset; 
(ii) one undertaking which is not a party to the concentration has the 
power to exercise more than half  the voting rights of every 
undertaking concerned, whether of the equity or the asset; 
Article 23: Undertakings which notify a concentration in advance with the 
antimonopoly execution authorities, shall submit following documents or 
materials: 
(i) summary of notification; 
(ii) the effect on competition on the relevant market of the 
concentration; 
(iii) agreement of concentration; 
(iv) the financial reports and accounting reports of the proceeding 
accounting year of the undertakings concerned; 
(v) other documents or materials stipulated by antimonopoly execution 
authorities. 
The summary of notification shall record, name, residence, scope of business, 
expected date for concentrating and other items stipulated by antimonopoly 
execution authorities of the undertakings concerned. 
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Article 24: In case that the documents submitted by the notifying undertakings 
are not complete, shall submit the rest of the documents and materials with a 
set period stipulated by antimonopoly execution authorities. It will be taken as 
not notified, when the added documents and materials are not timely 
submitted. 
Article 25: The antimonopoly execution authorities shall preliminarily review 
the notified concentration and take the decisions whether to precede review and 
notify the undertakings in written form within 30 days, calculated from the date 
of receipt of the complete filing documents and materials referred to article 23 
submitted by the undertakings. 
Before a decision taken by the antimonopoly execution authorities, the 
concentration shall be not implemented. 
If the antimonopoly execution authorities has taken decision not to precede 
review or has not decided in case of expiring of the period, the concentration 
shall be implemented. 
Article 26: If the antimonopoly execution authorities has decided to precede the 
review, shall review and decide whether to prohibit the concentration and notify 
the undertakings in written form within 90 days, calculated form the date of the 
decision being taken. 
If the concentration is prohibited, the reasons shall be explained. Within the 
review period the concentration shall be not implemented. 
Under the following circumstances, the time limit stipulated in the first 
paragraph may be extended to add 60 days after notifying the undertakings in 
written form: 
(i) the undertakings concerned agree to extend the time limit; 
(ii) the documents or materials submitted are inaccurate and need 
verification; 
(iii) other significant events occurred after notification. 
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If the antimonopoly execution authorities have not decided in case of expiring of 
the period, the concentration shall be implemented. 
Article 27: In the review of a concentration the following factors shall be 
considered: 
(i) market share in the relevant market of the undertakings concerned 
and their ability to control the market; 
(ii) concentrate degree of the relevant market ; 
(iii) effect on the market entry and technology improvement; 
(iv) effect on consumers and other undertakings; 
(v) effect on national economical improvement; 
(vi) other factors shall affect the competition, be considered by the 
antimonopoly execution authorities. 
Article 28: If a concentration has or may have effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition, the antimonopoly execution authorities shall take decision of 
prohibition. However, if the undertakings can prove that the concentration bring 
more positive effect than negative effect on competition, or the concentration 
pursuant to public interests, the antimonopoly execution authorities shall 
decide, not to prohibit the concentration. 
Article 29: The antimonopoly execution authorities shall make a decision of 
approval with restrictions and conditions where a concentration will reduce the 
negative effect on competition. 
Article 30: The antimonopoly execution authorities shall announce the decisions 
of prohibition or conditional concentration to public. 
Article 31: In case the acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign investors or 
other manners to concentrate referred to national security, besides being 
reviewed according to this law, shall be carried out national safety review 
according to related regulations. 
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Chapter 5: Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict 
Competition 
Article 32: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and regulations grant rights to administer public issues shall not abuse 
administrative power to limit or limit in a different form the organizations or 
persons to operate, purchase or use the products of any undertakings designated 
by them. 
Article 33: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and regulations grant rights to administer public issues shall not abuse 
administrative power to carry out following conducts, to hinder the free flow of 
the commodities between regions: 
(i) create discriminated items, carry out discriminated standards, or 
stipulate discriminated prices to nonlocal  commodities.  
(ii) stipulate different technical requisition, test standards to nonlocal an 
local commodities, or conduct repeat testing, repeat certification and 
so on, in order to limit nonlocal commodities to enter local market; 
(iii) specially require administrative permit to counter nonlocal 
commodities, in order to limit nonlocal commodities to enter local 
market; 
(iv) create burdens or other methods to limit nonlocal commodities enter 
or local commodities exit; 
(v) other conducts which hinder commodities free flow between regions. 
Article 34: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and regulations grant rights to administer public issues shall not abuse 
administrative power to exclude or restrict nonlocal undertakings to participate 
local bids activities through the manners that they create discriminated quality 
requisitions, judge standards or not announce information according to law. 
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Article 35: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and regulations grant rights to administer public issues shall not abuse 
administrative power to exclude or restrict nonlocal undertakings to set up 
branches through that they give unfair treatment to nonlocal undertakings. 
Article 36: Administrative power by government and organisations to which laws 
and regulations grant rights to administer public issues shall not abuse 
administrative power to force the undertakings to carry out monopoly conducts 
according to this law. 
Article 37: Administrative power shall not abuse administrative power to 
stipulate regulations including contents to eliminate or restrict competition. 
Chapter 6: Investigation of the Suspected Monopoly Conducts 
Article 38: The antimonopoly execution authorities investigate monopoly 
conducts according to law. 
Refers to antimonopoly conduct, any organization or person has the right to 
report to the antimonopoly execution authorities. The antimonopoly execution 
authorities shall keep the secret for the reporter. 
If the report is submitted in written form and supplies related facts and proofs, 
the antimonopoly execution authorities shall conduct necessary investigation. 
Article 39: When conducting investigations, the antimonopoly execution 
authorities can take the following measures: 
(i) enter the premise or other related places of the undertakings being 
investigated; 
(ii) request the undertaking concerned, interested parties and other 
relevant organizations or persons being investigated to explain related 
circumstances; 
(iii) exam, copy related documents and materials of the undertakings, 
interested parties and other relevant organizations or persons being 
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investigated, such as certificates, agreements, accounting books, 
letters and telegraphs of business, electronic data and so on; 
(iv) seal up or detain related proofs; 
(v) inquire about the bank account information of the undertakings 
concerned. 
Taking the measures stipulated above, shall be reported in written form to the 
chef person in charge of the antimonopoly execution authorities, and be 
approved. 
Article 40: Investigating the suspected monopoly conducts by the antimonopoly 
execution authorities, the executors shall be not less than two persons, and shall 
show the papers of execution. 
The executor conduct inquiring and investigating, shall fabricate written notes 
which are signature by the inquired or investigated person. 
Article 41: The antimonopoly execution authorities and their staffs shall be 
obliged to keep the secret which known in the execution. 
Article 42: Undertakings concerned, interested parties or other related 
organizations or persons being investigated shall cooperate with the 
antimonopoly execution authorities by performing responsibility, shall not refuse 
or hinder the antimonopoly execution authorities to investigate. 
Article 43: Undertakings concerned, interested parties being investigated have 
the right to state opinions. The antimonopoly execution authorities shall verify 
the facts, reasons and proofs being given by undertakings concerned, interested 
parties being investigated. 
Article 44: After investigating and verifying the suspected monopoly conducts, if 
the antimonopoly execution authorities believe that monopoly conduct was 
done, shall take decisions according to law and publish it. 
Article 45: In case of a suspected monopoly conduct being investigated by the 
antimonopoly execution authorities, if the undertakings being investigated 
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promise that they will conduct concrete measures to eliminate the negative 
effect of the monopoly conducts within a time limit being acknowledged by the 
antimonopoly execution authorities, the antimonopoly execution authorities 
shall decide to suspend the investigation. The decision to suspend the 
investigation shall note what concrete was promised by the undertakings being 
investigated. 
If the antimonopoly execution authorities decide to suspend investigation, shall 
supervision the circumstances in which undertakings perform their promises. If 
the undertakings have performed the promises, the antimonopoly execution 
authorities shall decide to stop the investigation. 
Under the following circumstances, the antimonopoly execution authorities shall 
regain the investigation: 
(i) undertakings have not performed the promises; 
(ii) the fact being applied to suspend the investigation has significant 
changed; 
(iii) the decision to suspend the investigation is based on uncompleted or 
untruthful information being supplied by the undertakings. 
Chapter 7: Legal Liabilities 
Article 46: In case there exists monopoly agreement and is implemented by the 
undertakings in violation of this law, the antimonopoly execution authorities 
shall order the undertakings to cease such act, the illegal gains shall be 
confiscated, and a fine between 1% and 10% of the turnover in the preceding 
year shall be imposed; If the monopoly agreement is not implemented, a fine 
below 500,000 Yuan shall be imposed. 
If the undertakings actively report the circumstance of the monopoly agreement 
to the antimonopoly execution authorities and supply important proofs, the 
antimonopoly execution authorities shall reduce or remit the fines according to 
own judgement. 
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If the association of undertakings organise undertakings of the branch to reach 
monopoly agreement in violation of this law, the antimonopoly execution 
authorities shall impose a fine below 500,000 Yuan; and if the circumstances are 
serious, the social organization register administrative department shall dissolve 
the register. 
Article 47: In case there exists an act abusing dominant market position by the 
undertakings in violation of this law, the antimonopoly execution authorities 
shall order the undertakings to cease such act, the illegal gains shall be 
confiscated, and a fine between 1% and 10% of the turnover in the preceding 
year shall be imposed. 
Article 48: In case the undertakings concentrate in violation of this law, the 
antimonopoly execution authorities shall order the undertakings to cease 
concentration, dispose securities or assets in limited time, transfer the 
operation and conduct other necessary measures to regain the status before the 
concentration, a fine below 500,000 shall be imposed. 
Article 49: Referred to the fines of article 46, 47, 48 of this law, the 
antimonopoly execution authorities shall consider the nature, degree and time 
of duration of the violation, to decide concrete amount of fine. 
Article 50: If undertakings carry out monopoly conduct, and cause losses to 
others, shall bear civil liability according to law. 
Article 51: If administrative power by government and organisations to which 
laws and regulations grant rights to administer public issues abuse administrative 
power, to eliminate or restrict competition, shall be ordered by superior 
authorities to correct themselves; people in direct charge and people directly 
involved shall be imposed administrative punishment. The antimonopoly 
execution authorities shall supply suggestion to related superior authorities to 
handle according to law. 
If administrative power by government and organisations to which laws and 
regulations grant rights to administer public issues abuse administrative power, 
to eliminate or restrict competition will be handled by another regulation, shall 
be applied to another regulation. 
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Article 52: In reviewing and investigating by the antimonopoly execution 
authorities, if they refuse to supply related materials, information, or supply 
incorrect materials, information, or remove, hide or destroy proofs, or other 
conducts to refuse or hinder investigation, the antimonopoly execution 
authorities shall order the undertakings to cease such act, A fine not to exceed 
20,000 Yuan to individuals and 200,000 Yuan to organization may be assessed. If 
the circumstances are serious, a fine not to between 20,000 Yuan and 100,000 
Yuan to individuals and between 200,000 Yuan and 1000,000 Yuan to 
organization may be assessed; if the said act constitutes a criminal offence, 
prosecution will be launched according to law. 
Article 53: If the undertaking does not accept the decision made by the 
antimonopoly execution authorities according to article 28, 29 of this law, 
he/she shall in the first place apply for administrative review; and if the 
undertaking still disagree with the decision of the administrative review, he/she 
may file a administrative lawsuit according to law. 
If the undertaking does not accept the decision made by the antimonopoly 
execution authorities besides the decisions stipulated by first paragraph, he/she 
shall apply for administrative review according to law or file administrative 
lawsuit. 
Article 54: Any employee of the antimonopoly execution authorities who abuse 
his official power, neglect his duties, engage in malpractices or irregularities, or 
disclose any trade secret, constitute a criminal offence, prosecution will be 
launched according to law. Where the act is not so serious as to be prosecuted 
for criminal liability, he shall be imposed the administrative penalty according to 
law. 
Chapter 8: Supplementary Articles 
Article 55: Undertakings exercise intellectual property rights according to laws, 
administrative regulations related intellectual property rights, shall not be 
applied to this law; however, undertakings abuse the intellectual property rights 
to eliminate or restrict competition, shall be applied to this law. 
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Article 56: Agricultural producers and rural economic organizations alliance or 
concerted act in the producing, processing, selling, transporting or reserving 
agricultural products shall be not applied to this law. 
Article 57: This law is effective as of August 1, 2008. 
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